PERIODICAL ROOM
GENERAL LIBRARY
UNIV. OF MICH.

AUG 2 3 1943

The ANTIOCH REVIEW

Volume Three · · Summer 1943 · · Number Two

. . . Featuring . . .

ACTION ON N.R.P.B. PLANNING
—J. Raymond Walsh

TWILIGHT OF THE PRICE SYSTEM
—C. E. Ayres

THE NOVEL IN LATIN AMERICA
—Bertram D. Wolfe

A FOREIGN POLICY FOR WHAT?
—Irwin Ross

STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC WAR
—Joseph Rosenfarb

—Other articles by Talbot Hamlin, Richard N. Current, Charles I. Glicksberg, Melvin Rader, David Dempsey, Lawrence and Sylvia Martin.

PUBLISHED FOUR TIMES A YEAR AT YELLOW SPRINGS, OHIO
SUBSCRIPTION THREE DOLLARS A YEAR — SINGLE COPIES SEVENTY-FIVE CENTS

YOU'LL WANT TO READ

freedom

A quarterly commentary on all aspects of liberty

PRYNS HOPKINS, *editor*

Consistently fine articles by top-notch writers on all phases of freedom—genetic, aesthetic, psychological, industrial, political and intellectual.

SUBSCRIBE NOW

Single Copies 25 Cents
By Subscription
Twelve Issues: $2.00

1375 S. Oak Knoll Avenue
Dept. AR
Pasadena 5 California

CONTEMPORARY

JEWISH RECORD

"A Magazine of Real Dignity and Worth"—*Waldo Frank*

- Significant articles by such writers as Salo W. Baron, Waldo Frank, Louis Golding, Thomas Mann.
- "The Cedars of Lebanon", a series of timely interpretations of Judaism.
- Chronicles, events in concise form —country by country.
- Magazine Digest.
- Book Reviews.

In Current and Coming Issues

Whither American Jewry? ..... *Zachariah Shuster*
A Common Sense View of Anti-Semitism ..... *Ralph E. Samuel*
The Healing of Humanity ..... *Jacques Maritain*
The Cedars of Lebanon Series: Judaism: Race or Religion? ... *Ernest Renan*

One Year (6 issues) $2
Send your order with remittance to

CONTEMPORARY JEWISH RECORD
386 Fourth Avenue New York 16, N. Y.

Contents

Editorial		147
Action for Postwar Planning	*J. Raymond Walsh*	153
The Twilight of the Price System	*C. E. Ayres*	162
A Public Opinion for Planning	*Talbot Hamlin*	182
The Novel in Latin America	*Bertram D. Wolfe*	191
What Price American Foreign Policy?	*Irwin Ross*	209
John C. Calhoun, Philosopher of Reaction	*Richard Nelson Current*	223
Mysticism in Contemporary Poetry	*Charles I. Glicksberg*	235
The Conflict of Fascist and Democratic Ideals	*Melvin Rader*	246
The World's Most Unbuilt Canal	*Lawrence & Sylvia Martin*	262
War for Democracy—or Restoration?	*David Dempsey*	271
Strategy in the Pacific War	*Joseph Rosenfarb*	283
We Note	*The Editors*	298
Contributors		303

The ANTIOCH REVIEW

Volume III Published in June, 1943 Number 2

Copyright 1943, by The Antioch Review, Incorporated, Yellow Springs, Ohio. Contributions to The Antioch Review may not be reprinted in whole or in part without the permission of the Editors.

The ANTIOCH REVIEW

"Why should there not be a patient confidence in the ultimate justice of the people? Is there any better or equal hope in the world?"

—ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

Editorial Board

PAUL BIXLER

W. B. ALEXANDER
VALDEMAR CARLSON
FREEMAN CHAMPNEY
LEWIS COREY
GEORGE R. GEIGER
LINCOLN R. GIBBS
J. DONALD KINGSLEY
HERMAN SCHNURER

MAX ASTRACHAN, *Business Manager*

Indexed in the *International Index to Periodicals*

Published at Yellow Springs, Ohio, in March, June, September, and December by THE ANTIOCH REVIEW, Incorporated, a non-profit organization incorporated under the laws of the State of Ohio. THE ANTIOCH REVIEW is not an official publication of Antioch College and the views expressed in its columns are not necessarily those of the College. Subscription rates: $3.00 the year; Canadian, $3.50; Foreign, $4.00. Single copies, seventy-five cents.

Contributions should be sent to The Editors of THE ANTIOCH REVIEW, Post Office Box 268, Yellow Springs, Ohio. Unsolicited manuscripts which are found unavailable for publication will not be returned unless accompanied by a stamped, self-addressed envelope. The Editors assume no responsibility for the views expressed by contributors of articles.

Publication Office, 212 Xenia Avenue, Yellow Springs, Ohio.

Entered as second-class matter March 22, 1941 at the post office at Yellow Springs, Ohio, under the Act of March 3, 1879.

The ANTIOCH REVIEW

Volume Three ·.· Summer 1943 ·.· Number 2

EDITORIAL

PROGRAM FOR PROGRESS

WHEN, IN MARCH, President Roosevelt suddenly dumped the two most formidable parts of the National Resources Planning Board Report in the collective laps of Congress, he gave the country its chief political issue for 1943 and for several years to come. Shall we share our domestic potentialities, or shall we divide up unequally what used to be? Shall we make good on the social revolution which our present economy tells us is overdue, or shall we attempt to shore up what is left of the nineteenth century? Shall we go into the peace with our heads high and with confidence in our destiny, or shall we go in fearful both of ourselves and of the world? Shall we extend democracy, or shall we put our heads into the jaws of fascism? A large part of the answer to these questions will be found in our response to the documents which the President so abruptly tossed into the Congressional lions' den.

This is true although the country at large has not yet had the opportunity to understand either the issue or the Report. Newspapers generally printed a catch-as-catch-can account of the Report's transmission to Congress, but in the days and weeks that followed, most of them attacked it without mitigation on their editorial pages; and in their news columns they printed little but condemnation by reactionary Republicans, by stray Congressmen fearful of change, and by such upholders of *laissez faire* as Joseph P. Kennedy, former ambassador to the Court of St. James. Only in the liberal press—in such publications as *PM, The Nation, The New Republic, The Survey Graphic*—has the Report received its just due. As J. Raymond Walsh and Talbot Hamlin suggest elsewhere in this issue, it has been left for labor and other progressive groups of citizens all over the country to give it the popular attention it deserves. It would not be surprising if in the end it took a rousing campaign speech by the President to give it the right publicity.

If a majority of the public are simply unenlightened, a majority of Congress (at least its most vocal members) seem to be simply apoplectic. Well before the publication of the Report, the House had marked the N.R.P.B. for slaughter as part of the hated "bureaucracy." In the Senate the Board came away with a subsistence appropriation of $200,000—a sum which the Senators could not deny since it is to be used to assist their own local and state planning groups. It was in this session, during six hours of acrimonious denunciation, that the Report was called everything from "hooey" (Senator Taft's delicate word) to "large appropriations, no taxes, and the American flag" (Senator Tydings' choice phrase). Such is the state of senatorial animus that when Senator Wagner, later on, introduced a bill to extend social insurance along the lines laid down by the Report, he emphasized its relation to the present Social Security Act and contrasted it with the Beveridge Plan—but avoided any reference to the N.R.P.B. In spite of his political pains, he will be lucky in this session to get any part of his bill back alive.

What is this Report which scarifies so many Congressmen and which few in or out of Washington seem to have read? First of all, it is nothing pulled out of a hat. Some of its recommendations were made in a report of more than a year ago; its most detailed part—"Security, Work, and Relief Policies"—is the result of three years labor; and some of its conclusions go back further than that.

In broad outline it rests its case upon two equally important and complementary bases: an expanding economy, which has so far received less than its share of available publicity; and a broad coverage of social security for all, which because of some similarity to the Beveridge Plan has been more generally understood. The plans for an expanding economy envisage a national income of 100 to 125 billions a year. "The government need not and should not alone undertake the attainment of such high national production, but can underwrite it and co-operate in its attainment," says the Report. And it recognizes the supreme importance of consumption: "Government can and should underwrite effective demand for goods and services."

Methods to accomplish this purpose are several. Where useful or necessary, the government is to give aid in research and in finance to free private enterprise ("free from compulsory labor, irresponsible private power, arbitrary public authority, and unregulated monopolies"). Meas-

ures must be taken "to encourage the healthy and aggressive development of private enterprise," "to prevent the abuse of economic power," "to eliminate avoidable uncertainties and needless burdens in the laws affecting enterprise and in their administration," "to uphold the right of labor to collective bargaining," "to maintain the fair share of the farmer in the benefits of an expanding economy." A sharp reduction in consumption taxes is suggested, "with major emphasis on the individual income tax and less reliance on the corporate income tax." An adequate program of public improvement projects is to be prepared and carried out where necessary. In certain industries of crucial importance in war time the government should share control with private enterprise in mixed corporations.

In short, the government is to offer that stimulation and encouragement to private enterprise which has in recent times been lacking in many sections of our national economy; and whenever business by itself or business and government in collaboration fail to maintain the national income at a fair level, the government is to uphold it by projects of useful work, financed by borrowing. This latter process, government spending, has caused many if not most of the Congressional heart throbs, but it is the tested method necessary to close the gap between private savings and investment which—according to Alvin H. Hansen, economic advisor to the N.R.P.B.—has caused the knock in our national economic machine.

The idea of a dynamic economy is incomplete unless it is closely related to the complementary base of full employment and the broadest kind of social security. According to the Report, it should be the policy of the government to underwrite full employment for all employables, and the government should guarantee and, when necessary, underwrite equal access to security, education, health and nutrition, and wholesome housing conditions. Here is a large program, but none of it in the least revolutionary unless we consider under social security the recommendations in education. Not only is expansion called for in all aspects of formal education, in adult education, in student aid, in public libraries, but the economic factor must no longer be an obstacle to learning: "no youth should be barred by economic circumstances from carrying his education as far as he profitably can."

Digging down through the invective with which the Report has been belabored, we find a number of recurring objections. It is said that the

Report is political or that it will be used as a political instrument. It is said that the Report isn't specific in amounts of money needed to finance its various elements, that we can't afford it, that it will do away with incentive and initiative. Under nearly all the objections seeking serious answers lies a common economic assumption, readily apparent.

The Report is political?

If it means that the Report has been drawn up by politicians, the answer is no. But if it means that the Report will be used by politicians, the answer is yes, and the more quickly the better. The ideas behind an expanding economy and a broad social security are unfamiliar to the American public. Anything of the national importance which these ideas portend for the future needs the fullest of understanding—an understanding which can only be arrived at through political education. In the Report the tradition of democracy sharply splits off from the tradition of *laissez faire*. For many Americans this is still a considerable wrenching of the mind, which had better be taken head on and in full view. Beyond this, even if it were possible to inaugurate these plans without argument and without conflict, it would be unwise. It is our sound custom to hammer out ideas on the anvil of public debate and political battle. In this way we give them practical shape, and in a democracy convince the majority and so make them stick.

The N.R.P.B. has fashioned a progressive weapon of no mean political power and importance. It should be used, first of all, against those Representatives and Senators who are sabotaging any effort to put recommendations of the Report into law. Some of these men are simply ignorant. Others wish to prevent that social revolution at home which is not only necessary to fight the war efficiently but to give us a society in which we can freely and safely live in peace time. While we are fighting overseas, they are moving up their heavy guns to force upon us a negotiated peace at home. By their own admission, they want subsidies for new private industry with insurance against loss, but when people need useful employment, they inquire blandly; "Where is the money to be found?" They are men who must be voted out of Congress if America is to meet the postwar world confidently and positively.

The Report will destroy incentive and initiative?

One is moved to ask immediately whose incentive and whose initiative. As for the average worker, the initiative he will show if he is con-

tinually threatened with the possibility of going on relief and with the necessity of proving his right to that relief is not likely to be either of a very high order or of any social value. Under social security he cannot fail to do better. As the more progressive unions have already shown, security is a frequent stimulus to pride in work itself—which should allay fears that employable men, if they should ever have the opportunity (which nothing in the Board's Report contemplates), would prefer idleness to a job.

But the more important part of the question lies in another quarter. One thinks immediately of Bismarck and the German social service state and asks who is promoting this plan and for what purposes? If reactionary organizations were behind it seeking a stranglehold over American society or American economy, then we should rightly be fearful of its promotion. But they are and will be its strongest opponents. The N.R.P.B. Report has been drawn up by technicians; and whereas they are naturally and personally interested in the details of the plan, they can hardly be said to have drawn it up in the interests of any special group—the orientation of the Report proving exactly the contrary. This is no plan to enslave the American worker or anyone else. Essentially its ideas open a new frontier in which both initiative and adventure may be reinstalled to their high place in American life.

The Report isn't specific in money? We can't afford it?

It is true that none of the recommendations, except those in education, call for the expenditure of specific sums of money. This is partly because it is impossible now to forecast postwar needs in specific measure and partly because the National Resources Planning Board is an over-all planning agency whose plans are drawn on broad lines in the interests of other agencies as well as of Congress. On the latter point the Report is in marked contrast to the Beveridge Plan. As an expert Sir William Beveridge was asked to do a very specific job on social insurance and he came up with a specific legislative program. But the N.R.P.B., with relationship to all other American planning groups and with responsibilities to other government organizations, has brought forth the *principles* which must underlie a sound legislative program.

More significantly, Beveridge touches upon the economic base which must support English social security only very gingerly in an appendix, whereas the N.R.P.B. places the issue of a vigorous economy at the very

beginning of the Report and gives it an importance equal and complementary to that of social security. Too much cannot be made of the fact that the orientation and tone of the N.R.P.B. Report are positive rather than defensive.

The repeated cry of reactionary Senators is: "Where is the money coming from?" This is not said in good faith, for these gentlemen are adamant most of all against the Report's economic program. Yet even assuming good faith, the question is a bad one. If social security is thought of as a scheme whereby one part of the population supports another part, it is immediately off on the wrong track from which it can be derailed only with the greatest of difficulty. This is its mistake—that it assumes the attitude of the trustee of a foundation with a fixed income. Its orientation is a preoccupation with money.

Here the gauge is laid down, for the N.R.P.B. does not consider money an essential resource nor does it view finance as a limiting factor. In its lexicon of national resources, the Board envisages three categories: men, materials, and techniques; these, in toto, are what we must consider in building our society. Money falls here, if anywhere, under techniques—a minor technique by which we measure progress and do not seek to control it. We have the men, the materials, the technology; we can and should use them fully without our inbred fear of finance.

In discussing the Report in *Newsweek* shortly after its transmission to Congress, Ernest K. Lindley remarked that in the end the American people may well discover its "essential conservatism." The term in that sense is used infrequently among us. But there are undoubtedly members of the National Resources Planning Board who would understand it easily enough and it is possible that in ten years we shall look back upon the Board's far-reaching plan in such a light. In that time it should be possible for us to act upon many of its major recommendations and to do so without a civil war. If that is not possible, there will be many more people then than there are today who will think a civil war worth the cost.

ACTION FOR POSTWAR PLANNING

By J. RAYMOND WALSH

THERE IS NO DENYING THAT THE National Resources Planning Board Report was launched during a period of history when the trend in public opinion is away from planning, away from social betterment schemes, and away from the leadership of the New Deal. Concretely, this trend is indicated by the attitude of Congress toward appropriations for the National Resources Planning Board, Federal Security Administration, and federal aid. Few American Congresses have been more conservative than the present one. The political pendulum is swinging toward a condition which is sometimes described as a state of "normalcy." It is devoutly to be hoped that in the process we are preserved from a period of subnormalcy.

This state of affairs has been produced by such factors as the constant hammering of the anti-Roosevelt press, the oratory of a Rickenbacker, the misunderstanding of the aims of such agencies of the government as the Office of Price Administration, and the general weariness which comes to all of us when adjustments are too violent and rapid.

Conscious of this prevailing attitude, President Roosevelt has not pushed the N. R. P. B. Report. He is undoubtedly waiting for public opinion to catch up with the ideas in this enlightened document. It is unfortunate that this is the case; too bad that a complete program of legislation cannot be enacted at once, to give meaning to the N. R. P. B.'s enunciated policies.

However, this condition provides an opportunity. Instead of lamenting the backwardness of public opinion, we must go to work to enlighten it. We can begin at once by answering those who say that consideration of postwar problems and planning should be postponed until victory is won. We can point out that the men in the fighting services and the workers in the mines, mills, and on the farms need the strength which comes from the knowledge of a concrete program for solving the problems

of economic inequality, unemployment, and war. We should make it increasingly clear that the present struggle in which we are engaged is more than a war: it is a revolution against injustices existing between states and within states. Victory in the international phase of the struggle will depend on our ability to convince the peoples of the world that the great democracies are fighting for more than the preservation of the *status quo*. It is almost a truism that a people's willingness to fight depends on its faith in the future!

Perhaps the most revolutionary idea in the entire National Resources Planning Board Report is the concept of full peace-time employment. By acting now on the plans outlined by the N. R. P. B., we need not look forward to a collapse of our economy when 11,000,000 soldiers are demobilized and 17,000,000 workers no longer needed to produce the instruments of war.

In order to reach such a happy state of affairs it is necessary to convince the American people that it is just as possible to keep our national income at a $120,000,000,000 level in peace time as it is in war time. Government can use its resources to build houses and power dams, to build up our timber supply and prevent floods by planting trees, and to provide many other civilian needs just as successfully as it built guns and planes and submarines. Whether it does or not depends on our social outlook and that of the men we elected to Congress in 1942 and will elect in 1944.

Recent polls of public opinion indicate that great numbers of American people expect unemployment at the end of this war. There is an undercurrent of fatalism in their thinking, to the effect that war and depressions are acts of God, not acts of men, and consequently must be endured. Because of this attitude, great numbers of people in the poverty-stricken industrial and sharecropper rural America are turning to a fundamentalist, escapist kind of religion which gives them hope of a comfortable afterlife to compensate for their misery here and now; or are listening to fascist-minded Gerald K. Smith, who adds political demagoguery to his religious fraud.

There is one way to antidote this dangerous trend which ultimately leads to Ku Klux Klanism and fascism. Education, through a demonstration of better things to be acquired here on earth—homes lighted by electricity, bright curtains and attractive furnishings, healthy children, pleasant parks and playgrounds—is the only answer to the exploiters who

turn the minds of American workers and farmers away from the idea that houses and health are the right of all and can be secured by all.

Studies by Milton Shufro, Public Relations Director of the Chicago Housing Projects, brought out the fact that the social outlook of the residents changed after they had lived in decent quarters, and that their interest in the good things of life, including music and art, increased. Residents who were compelled to move out of the projects because increased earnings made then ineligible immediately made plans for their own co-operative housing units. Mr. Floyd Adams, a principal of the Jacob Riis School, says that the children from the projects are much more co-operative and teachable than those from neighboring communities. The same testimony has come from educators who have visited the T. V. A. schools at Norris, Tennessee. Changed living conditions change attitudes, and demonstrations of improved living conditions bring increased demands for future improvements.

II

President Roosevelt's enunciation of the Four Freedoms gave the morale of the world a lift. However, an abstract ideal like freedom from want calls for specific interpretation by the government. American victims of economic dislocations must be assured that the rest of us will share the responsibility for their future security.

Although full employment is the goal, we need also to plan for a program of social security which will assure total freedom from want and fear. Jobs for all, with incomes adequate to provide more than the bare necessities of life are our objectives plus full security for those unable to earn their living, because of age or illness.

Arguments for full employment can be made as appealing to the economic realist as to the idealist. An unemployed man is not only non-productive but is incapable of purchasing the production of others. He is, therefore, a two-fold liability, which must be understood by the farmer and small businessman. Full employment and social security concern them as much as the industrial worker.

Today, the American worker is employed and the farmer is prosperous. In a war-torn world, a wide dislocation of food supply influences the situation. However, hunger did not begin with World War II. Even in America, the submarginal third never had all the food it needed. Many

of the middle third did without proper amounts of milk and meat. In 1940, 125,000 out of 425,000 Chicago public school children were suffering from malnutrition. The same situation existed in other large cities. Such a situation is contrary to the national interest and is uneconomic. Farmers will be most seriously affected if it is permitted to occur again.

Perhaps the best strategy for those interested in the National Resources Planning Board reports would be an interpretation of the economic effect of low-income or no-income city workers on the farmers' prosperity. Perhaps, this could best be done by contrasting the amount of milk, meat, and vegetables the $15-per-week worker buys, with that of the $75-per-week worker. This contrast should then be brought to the attention of every farmer and small-town paper in America.

Indeed, every farmer might be reminded daily of what happened during and after World War I. Wheat jumped from 58c to $3.20 from 1916 to 1919, binders from $85 to $225. After the war, by 1923, wheat dropped from $3.20 to 80c and binders stayed at $210-$215. Farmers could no longer buy binders even though they needed them. Consequently, factories closed down, workers lost their jobs, and the years of the locust were upon us. Vice-President Wallace taught the farmers to do what industry had done, create a scarcity and raise prices to the point where they could buy binders again, thereby stimulating the production of binders and incidentally making it possible for the workers to earn enough to buy milk for their children. Henry Wallace's program was probably the only one which would work in that particular period in the evolution of human thinking in regard to things economic. But if we love America and want to protect its institutions, we must avoid a repetition of this solution. Hunger in the midst of surplus, artificial scarcities when people are ill-clad, is not only bad economics but bad ethics. The Henry Wallace of the ever-normal granary and the quart of milk for every child is much the greater figure.

Certain farmers, members of pietistic religious groups, refused to participate in the A. A. A. One such said that he never would join because "God meant for the earth to blossom like a garden." It was nature's plan for life to be fruitful and multiply, and he was not going to violate God's will by refusing to grow food when there were hungry people in the world! His heart was in the right place. It is up to us to build on his sentiment what innumerable economists and historians have argued, the union

of labor and the farmer. By understanding that full employment means prosperity for the farmers too, labor and the farmer will work out their differences.

III

Today big business is getting bigger and small business is disappearing. Thirty thousand small businesses have been closed in Chicago alone during the war. Many of these small entrepreneurs are bitter. They blame government or That Man in the White House for their fate. It was just such a group of disgruntled middle-class businessmen who turned to Hitler as their savior, and who, incidentally, were liquidated completely in recent months. A marked phenomenon in the last election was the swing of these voters away from the New Deal. Conversations with them brought out their belief that Washington was deliberately destroying them because economic theorists in government took the position that little business was inefficient. Some said the New Deal was run by a bunch of "Reds" and it was "time to put a real honest-to-goodness American in the White House." Labor, this group declared, was getting entirely too powerful. In fact, everyone but themselves was getting a break, and they considered themselves the stepchildren of the New Deal. This feeling was so strong in Chicago that Mayor Kelly made several trips to Washington purportedly in the interest of small business.

Those interested in tomorrow dare not ignore the state of mind of these little-businessmen. They meet people, they talk. Those who want to popularize full employment in peace time plus social security need to talk, too. The barbershop and the filling station and the drugstore should not be neglected as founts of public opinion. When we talk to the corner grocery man, we can remind him of his stake in continuing employment and social security. He, like the farmer, can only expect to prosper when his neighbors are working and have money to spend. He can be reminded of those days, not long past, when he had to carry his neighbors on charge accounts because the chain stores turned them away.

In pleading for the economic enlightment of the farmer and small businessman I believe the greatest single object of organized labor should be graduation from a purely pressure-group approach to problems of hours and wages, prices and working conditions, to one of national leadership in the welfare of this country. The day of the self-interest pressure group

is past. Instead, this is a time when no group can be secure in an insecure society; a time when the pragmatist works for the security of his fellow men in order to insure his own.

Let me illustrate my point from a difference of opinion which developed in a large and powerful teachers' organization affiliated with labor. The older and more traditionalist group took the position that it was up to the organization leadership to secure salary restoration and other economic benefits and not to ask too many question about how the money was to be secured. Yours, they said to their leaders, is the job of putting on the pressure for restoration. It's up to the Board to find the money. On the other hand, persons who differed pointed out that local real-estate values had declined tremendously, that thousands of families were moving to the suburbs, and that if teachers wanted security they had to become politically alert, change the city's leadership, work for slum clearance projects, see to it that the city became an attractive place for people to live in and build homes in. The struggle in that teachers' organization, over their proper function, has not been decided, nor is the problem it poses solved in America, or for that matter, in the world.

IV

The question is how to assure jobs for all, security for all. The answer will be determined by our ability to translate our abstract beliefs and special knowledge into concrete action. One of the tests of this ability is to elect a Congress which will translate N. R. P. B. enunciations of policy into law.

Members of the N. R. P. B. and all the other planners, professional and amateur, may draw up the blueprints, but it is up to Congress finally to execute them. The decisions in regard to the future of America and the world are political decisions! The technical staffs of Britain and America plan moves to defeat the Axis, but it is up to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to O. K. them. They in turn are responsible to the people. Believers in democracy would not want it otherwise. We do not want a society where a Robespierre or a Hitler at will reforms the nation, even if he has to kill everyone in it. We want a political body where our voices are heard and our influence is felt.

We must graduate from the resolution and blueprint stage into the action stage. We must understand that the political decisions of today

determine the world of tomorrow. November 3, 1942, indicated what kind of a postwar world large sections of the country wanted. Many friends of progressive legislation and international organization were defeated for Congress in various sections, their reactionary opponents elected to office. If we don't go to work now, all our dreams for the postwar world will be shattered. Nineteen forty-four is not so far away!

Specifically, we should begin now to popularize the ideas in the N. R. P. B. Report. Literature should be simply written and illustrated. Clear, concise informative material should be published in small-town papers, farm papers, and religious periodicals. (We must be at least as intelligent in securing our ends as are the public utilities who poison the minds of small-town America by the copy they include with their advertisements.) Perhaps we should take advantage of the popular comic strip technique for the dissemination of our ideas.

However, even if intellectual or aesthetic inhibitions prevent going that far, there is no reason why organization for the spread of information should not be set up in every state. The first responsibility of such state organizations would be to seek out, catalogue, and contact sympathizers in every city, town, and crossroads. They in turn could contact and approach others. Thus a mass organization would be ready for political action when feasible.

There is no substitute for the political machine in getting things done, and the sooner planners learn how it operates the better their chance for carrying out a program. The strength of a political party rests in its party workers, precinct captains, and persons who contact neighbors, ring doorbells, and pass out literature.

In other words, if we would like to prevent the swing toward "normalcy," the trend toward reaction, we must begin now to line up those who agree with us. We should have begun years ago and never stopped. Nothing is more disheartening than the futility of most reformers and idealists in politics. Usually, they wait until five or six weeks before election time to build their organization. Then, when the election is over, the organization disintegrates because its members are too individualistic and undisciplined to hold together. Perhaps we need more mimeograph crankers and fewer utopians!

Most labor leaders, publishers, civic leaders agree that a concrete state-by-state program should be put into operation to organize those who

want to march in the same direction. All agree that we will hang if we don't, although so far all have gone ahead with the immediate, hoping the inevitable would not come.

Face to face with such a situation, the best thing to do is to organize a training school in the art of politics, the science of who gets what, when and why. At such a school everyone interested in the future of America should first memorize the number of his ward and precinct (how many teachers of government know the answer to that one?); go to party headquarters in the ward in which he lives and get acquainted with the "bosses"; help put up the folding chairs, hang up the hats and coats; talk to everyone who comes and goes; become a precinct captain. The best way to become a captain is to canvass the voters in the precinct; if they are for you and your program, you will be made the precinct captain. Attend every party caucus, help select the candidates for office. These are important tasks, these decisions are more important than those of election day. Finally, see that you are elected as a delegate to conventions, and learn how democracy really functions!

"He who pays the piper calls the tune" is an old and true observation. In American politics, most of the money in the ward and precinct comes from organized vice at the bottom or organized privilege at the top. Those in between have not yet learned truly to support the programs they believe in and the men who would, if elected, put them into action. Actually, it has been impossible for the honest individual with a modest income to stay in politics. He simply cannot afford it!

The answer to the dilemma is an educational program which will bring from the pockets of millions of Americans $1, $5, $10 contributions for programs of enlightened political action. This will supply the political participation to combat the feeling of helplessness which has grown up in the minds of many Americans, causing them to shrug their shoulders and stay away from the polls. This state of mind is much like that of workers before unions were formed to give meaning to their desires for self-expression and self-determination.

This need not be so. The political forms are in existence and it is up to us to give them leadership and direction. The strategy for labor and the liberals who wish a better tomorrow is no new strategy. It is as old as man. It assumes just one thing—the ability of leaders to become intelligent in

regard to the political process and to take the people of America with them.

Today is the day to begin. Tom Paine and Sam Adams started the American Revolution with their pens. Solomon Levinson sold the Pact of Paris with his pen and his unfailing energy. If we love America, we can do no less.

THE TWILIGHT OF THE PRICE SYSTEM

By C. E. AYRES

THE IMPRESSION is quite general today that Western society is breaking down, or at least threatening to break down, and everyone agrees that it is not working as a sound mechanism should. Furthermore, everybody agrees that whatever may be the cause of our present trouble, it is not due to a failure of technology. Some people do blame science and technology for all our troubles, but they fear what they regard as overdevelopment. What they challenge is not the fact of technological development but its meaning. They deplore the "materialism" of the age, as the devotees of ancient sanctities have always done, looking back to some earlier day when (as their kind always think) men lived "simply" and Communed with Truth. In short their value judgments derive from the institutional traditions of the past and they abhor technological progress because it has led the modern world to break with those traditions. Unfortunately, but inevitably, it has not been a clean break. The neomedievalists think we have too much science, and even too much "material" comfort, for our spiritual good. We think the trouble lies altogether on the other side. But with regard to the present and prospective vigor of science and technology all agree.

The tenacity of institutional traditions is likewise a generally admitted fact. But it is one thing to reach the logical conclusion that institutional atavisms are the seat of all our trouble and quite another to determine methodologically what to do about it. The immediate and complete abrogation of the institutional structure is both impossible and inconceivable. We may deplore the organization of society along the lines of coercive power with its penumbra of legend and mysticism; but the immediate alternative would be a void. Since it is beyond our powers to conjure a new social order from a void, we have no alternative but to carry on. This means that, in spite of anything we may be able to do within the predictable future, coercion, injustice, inequality, ignorance, and superstition will

certainly persist. Progress will consist in pushing back their boundaries here and there; and the question is, where? Where and how can the present confusions be most effectively relieved?

The chief problem would appear to be one of equilibrium. In some sense or other all social philosophers have realized the strategic importance of maintaining some sort of balance between the various activities and interests of the community. A great deal of present-day discussion centers in the disequilibrium which has resulted from the rapid technological development of recent decades and even centuries. The common supposition is that institutional development has lagged behind the machine process and that our institutions need to be brought up to date and the equilibrium of institutions and technology thus re-established. This view of the matter misconceives the nature of technology and institutions; but the conception of equilibrium is nevertheless sound. Perfection is beyond the power of social theory. The alterations which any single generation can make in the existing social structure must be very slight.

Their perception of this truth was the greatest achievement of the founders of the science of political economy. As such it will continue to command respect after all the misconceptions of classical tradition have been clearly recognized and discounted. Because price seemed to provide an intellectual vehicle for understanding the forces at work in modern economic life as well as an effective mechanism for the control of those forces, the vehicle has very largely displaced the "pay load" in the apprehension of economists and the whole problem has been conceived as that of price equilibrium. But the larger realities have never altogether disappeared from view. For the mercantilist no less than for Adam Smith, for Professor Pigou no less than for Thorstein Veblen, the basic economic problem is that of increasing the "national dividend." All considerations relating to the distribution of the product of industry are of secondary importance; for when the volume of production per head of population is increasing sooner or later every member of the community, even slaves and untouchables, will certainly benefit; whereas in a community in which the volume of production per head of population is decreasing the assignment of a larger share of community income to any given individual, group, or class will not save these beneficiaries from sharing the eventual ruin of the whole community. Production and distribution are related. If there were no relationship between these two sets of concerns, economic

activities would not constitute an economy but only a patternless heterogeneity of acts and interests. What by contrast does constitute an economy is a continuous relationship between these two sets of concerns so that the volume of the national dividend is indeed conditioned by the fashion in which it is distributed, while at the same time distribution is conditioned by the social pattern of production.

It is the task of the economy to effect two sets of adjustments, one between the rich and the poor, and another between "alternative uses" of the instruments and materials of production; and these two adjustments must be reconciled to each other so as to maximize the national dividend. This is what price equilibrium has been traditionally supposed to achieve. The particular form which this pattern took in the classical theory of the economy was of course dictated by the existing structure of society. The founders of economic science lived in a world in which a very extreme degree of inequality already prevailed. It was also a world in which the national dividend was plainly on the increase. Economists have not been more callous to the cruelties of the prevailing system than most of their contemporaries, but their attention has been quite properly focused on the growth of the national dividend. In early modern times they were also deeply impressed by the change which the form or mechanism of inequality had undergone simultaneously with this sudden growth of the national dividend, the change by which money power had been substituted for feudal rank as the basis of the social system. It was the simultaneity of these changes which gave rise to the belief in a causal relationship between them. This conviction was nourished by the institutional apparatus and ideology of capitalism and so eventuated in the theory that the growth of the national dividend is contingent upon a social structure in which inequality results in saving, saving in the growth of capital, and the growth of capital in the increase of the national dividend; and it was this central idea that economic inequality is a condition by which all members of the community are eventually blessed which inaugurated and still sustains the policy of *laissez faire,* the fundamental strategy of which is that the existing structure of society must at all costs be let alone.

The chief strength of this policy and of the system of ideas by which it is sustained lies in the dynamic relationship between distribution and production which it presumes to establish and sustain. Price equilibrium is only the outward and visible sign of a real balance of forces in the economy.

Doubt on this point is fatal to the whole theory, and that is why the doubts which have been multiplying in recent years even among the faithful are so disconcerting. They have taken many forms, but all have the same consequence. One is that of a reservation with regard to income distribution. It has become increasingly common for economists to insist, with an air of superior sophistication, that price equilibrium effects optimum efficiency in the use of the factors of production only for a given schedule of income distribution. This leaves the way open for the advocacy of a deliberate policy of reducing the extremities of inequality, but in doing so it reduces the whole theory to nonsense. Nowadays some economists even talk of a community's having to choose between a greater degree of distributive justice at the cost of a lowered national dividend and a greater national dividend at the cost of a greater degree of distributive injustice. Quite apart from the fact that it seems to imply that slavery is the most efficient, and equality the least efficient, productive arrangement, this formula represents the complete abandonment of the classical theory. This is even more obviously true of "pure" equilibrium theory and the theory of monopolistic competition. To old-fashioned orthodoxy, competitive price equilibrium, meant *both* the maximization of satisfactions and the optimum use of the factors of production, not the dubious achievement of one at the expense of the other, and certainly not a mere meaningless balance of prices by which neither maximum satisfaction nor optimum efficiency is guaranteed. The net result of the logical sophistication of contemporary price theory is the complete elimination from its neat array of simultaneous equations of all the larger realities for which price was originally conceived to stand.

Meanwhile direct scrutiny of those realities has raised a more insistent question. The classical supposition that the growth of the national dividend is enhanced by inequality raises an inescapable issue of fact. The question is what social forces are in fact chiefly responsible for the productive achievements of industrial society. The weakness of the classical theory at this (by its own reckoning) crucial point would be apparent if the issue had not always been obscured by the complex apparatus of price theory. For nothing is more obvious than its total lack of any realistic study of the actual processes of production, or analysis of the actual history of industrial society. It has long been notorious that the supposed "factors of production" with which classical economists have been so much concerned from

the eighteenth century to the present day are in fact distributive categories the very identity of which emerges from the analysis not of physical production but of the division of money income among its typical recipients. The whole effort of this analysis has been to show *how* industrial production is "made possible" by the accumulation of capital funds. At no time has economic orthodoxy ever approached the concrete reality of the industrial world with the intent to ascertain without previous commitment *whether* such is the case. From the very beginning the representation of the real balance of forces in the modern economy in terms of price equilibrium has owed its amazing plausibility to antecedent conviction with regard to the central issue of fact—the conviction, shared by the whole bourgeois community, that the exercise of financial power *must* be accompanied by the exercise of creative powers, a state of mind which owes nothing to fact and prevails among us as such beliefs do among all communities as a reflection simply of the acquiescence of the community in the prevailing social structure.

But the exact opposite is no less conceivable. That is, it is conceivable that the productive powers of industrial society have grown not because of the institutions of capitalism but in spite of them; that the chief, and catastrophically serious, obstacle to the full utilization and continued growth of those powers is precisely the distributive system which perennially balks industrial production by failing to provide the consumer purchasing power which is essential to the absorption of the product of industry; and that the welfare of the whole community—the rich no less than the poor—is contingent upon the successful prosecution of a policy of income redistribution by which this deficiency of consumer purchasing power will be corrected. This policy also, and the system of ideas by which it is sustained, have their origin in the fundamental relationship between distribution and production by which an economy is constituted. No less than the classical theory of capital accumulation and policy of *laissez faire,* the theory of purchasing power deficiency and the policy of income redistribution center upon the growth of the national dividend to which all distributive arrangements are ancillary.

The question upon which the strategic issue of policy thus turns is whether the national dividend is enhanced or inhibited by inequality. It is with regard to this primary issue of fact that the analysis of the industrial process in terms of the technological and institutional factors which con-

dition it presents the strongest contrast to the classical way of thinking. In attributing the extraordinary growth of the national dividend in recent centuries to the equally extraordinary development of tools and machines and scientific know-how, this way of thinking establishes the continuity of recent developments with an age-old process, a point at which the failure of economic orthodoxy is most striking. Such a way of thinking violates popular belief, but it coincides exactly with the findings of the other sciences. Indeed, the role of science in the transformation of modern life is now quite generally regarded as an established fact, even by people whose economic convictions flatly contradict it. For however plausible the theory may be which attributes the growth of industrial tools to the investment of capital funds, nobody[1] supposes that the intellectual achievements of modern science are attributable to financial benevolence alone. This contradiction has become so obvious in recent years that many economists have felt themselves compelled to take cognizance of it to the extent of declaring that although the development of science and technology must be acknowledged to condition the whole industrial process, it does so in a "noneconomic" way and must therefore be excluded from economic analysis; but such an exclusion in effect brushes aside the basic issue of fact by which the validity of economic analysis must be eventually determined.

That the institutions of modern Western society as well as its technology have prodigiously affected industrial production no one doubts, least of all those who think in terms of technology and institutions. The question is, How? It is one thing to recognize the importance of the release of Western society from feudalism, quite another to attribute the growth of the national dividend to the exercise of financial power. After all, capitalism is only one feature of the modern social structure. It may well be that the progress of technology and the consequent growth of the national dividend owe more to political democracy, the separation of church and state, and the melting away of class distinctions than to financial overlordship. Insofar as it can be distinguished from the other features of the institutional scheme the latter may be an unqualified nuisance.

Such a nuisance is no less catastrophic for being indirect and unintended. In a society in which power can be achieved by the accumulation

[1]An exception must be made in favor of Professor J. A. Schumpeter. See, for example, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (1942), Chapter XI.

and investment of capital funds it goes without saying that ambitious men will devote themselves to this activity. To suppose that in doing so they are acting with conscious solicitude for the welfare of posterity is so preposterous that no one has ever ventured to assert it, the idea being rather that in seeking their own gain "they are led as if by an invisible hand to promote an end which is no part of their intention." But it is equally fantastic to suppose, as classical theory has always done, that preference of future for present consumption is the guiding motive, a preference which is therefore thought to be expressed in and guided by the interest rate. This idea expresses the antecedent assumption that the accumulation and investment of capital funds is the true essence of industrial growth, which is thus supposed to be automatically adjusted to the "needs" of the community by the rise and fall of the interest rate. But the point is one that has always given trouble, since it is obvious that people of modest circumstances who are saving for a rainy day will hardly be moved to desist by a fall of the interest rate, while to people who are engaged in carving empires for themselves out of the commonweal a per cent or two of interest is of no concern whatever.

Granted the existence of the financial power system, the participants, both large and small, in the struggle for economic power will accumulate all they can. If the funds from which such accumulations are made poured from the heavens in a never ending stream this exercise might have no effect on the national dividend. But such is not the case. It is the essence of the case as stated by classical economists themselves that saving is alternative to consumption and chiefly to the consumption of the masses; and since consumption is the sole eventual outlet for the product of industry this means that the inevitable effect of the struggle to accumulate financial power is the constriction of industrial output—the precise opposite to what has been conventionally supposed.

Here the basic issue of fact is posed again. Is there any evidence of any such constriction? Up to a few years ago the evidence on this point was still obscure, but the past thirteen years have provided as clear a demonstration as the most exacting experimentalist could wish. According to judgments expressed at the time, the functioning of the capitalist economy during the 1920's was as near perfection as it has ever attained. This was, indeed, the "New Era" of prosperity. But this era was followed by the greatest depression of modern times in the course of which the following

facts emerged with unmistakable clarity. Most conspicuous, perhaps, was unemployment, that is, the severance of many millions of families from their sole source of income and the consequent curtailment (virtual cessation) of their consumption. This was accompanied by widespread and very considerable restriction of production, that is, shrinkage of the national dividend, either by outright suspension of production or by the destruction or sequestration of huge segments of the national dividend after it had been produced. Nothing could have been clearer than the fact that the national dividend was suffering not from the inability of the community's industrial plant to maintain output but rather from the inability of the community to absorb that output. To complete the demonstration, it was no less conspicuous that a vast surplus of idle funds existed, funds which had been accumulated and were continuing to accumulate for which no investment outlets could be found.

Here was in fact the very condition the impossibility of which has always been a major premise of economic orthodoxy, and the demonstration still continued. Beginning in 1933 a new national administration inaugurated a series of efforts to put consumer purchasing power into circulation, with the result that conditions improved steadily if slowly, leaving the winter of 1932-33 as the trough of the depression. In 1936 these efforts reached their peak and the soldiers' bonus was pyramided on top of them, with the recovery of 1936-37 as the unmistakable consequence. Since the bonus was a single incident, and since the first sign of recovery brought a great outcry for "balancing the budget," as many economists had long ago predicted that it would, this brief respite was followed by a slackening of recovery which was still continuing when the effects of the present war began to be felt.

The fact that it is war and not economic "experimentation" which has finally ended the great depression of the 1930's is frequently cited as though to discredit all efforts to stimulate consumption by the expansion of mass consumer purchasing power. But such a reading of the facts overlooks the most conspicuous features of the present situation. War is in effect a public works program that absorbs immense quantities of materials and puts millions of men directly on the public payroll thereby increasing consumption not only to the limit of the slack occasioned by depressions but far beyond it, with the result that consumer demand far exceeds the current output of industry. No responsible student would argue that the

present situation is an economically wholesome one. In the long run consumption by destruction is bound to be suicidal, and a catastrophic price inflation is bound to be the effect of the simultaneous expansion of purchasing power and curtailment of *civilian* production unless extreme measures—price control, rationing, and the recapture of purchasing power—are taken to prevent it. But however excessive the answer, it is scarcely possible to doubt, in view of this demonstration, that a depression can be completely obliterated, full employment achieved, and industry exerted to its uttermost limits, by governmental stimulation of consumption.

As many writers have pointed out, none of these facts is new. Every feature of this demonstration has been enacted before, indeed many times before. It is therefore necessary to inquire why such facts have not been perceived before. The first answer to such an inquiry must be that they have been perceived before, both perceived and to a considerable degree understood. The so-called "underconsumption fallacy" has been in circulation at least since the seventeenth century.[2] To scotch it was the object of "Say's law," the dogma that under capitalism there can be no such thing as general overproduction (or underconsumption), a law in which its first great codifier sought to epitomize classical doctrine. This issue was the focal point of a long and lively controversy between Malthus and Ricardo, and it runs through virtually the whole literature of socialism.[3] To be sure, the identification of "the underconsumption fallacy" with what Mr. J. M. Keynes has called "the underworld" of economics can scarcely be said to have added to its fame. Discussion of "the flaw in the price system"[4] went underground with Sismondi and there it remained until the upheaval of the 1930's. Long before this time, as Mr. Keynes admitted handsomely in 1936, a few isolated but able individuals of complete respectability were deeply troubled by their discovery of this fundamental defect in the capitalist system, notably Silvio Gessel, A. F. Mummery, and J. A. Hobson. But their publications were greeted by what can only be

[2]See Hazel V. Roberts, *Boisguilbert, Economist of the Reign of Louis XIV* (1935), Chapter X, especially pp. 206-207.

[3]The most complete and satisfactory analysis of this controversy is contained in the unpublished doctoral dissertation of Professor George H. Hildebrand, Jr., *The Theory of Markets and the Problem of Economic Crises, from Quesnay to Marx* (1942), available only in the library of Cornell University.

[4]P. W. Martin, *The Flaw in the Price System* (1924).

called a conspiracy of silence.[5] They were joined in later years, especially during the New Era of the 1920's by other mavericks, such as Martin in England and Foster and Catchings in the United States; and during the 1930's there was of course an eruption of "underconsumptionism." Even then the discussion of the deficiency of purchasing power was clouded by social credit schemes of varying degrees of monetary wildness; but for the first time since Malthus the idea was seriously discussed, in large part under the leadership of Mr. Keynes (now Lord Keynes).

But "the underconsumption fallacy" still remains the orphan child of economics, partly for lack of the parenthood which only a general theory of economic progress could afford, and partly because of the asperity of its foster parents. If capitalism suffers from a fatal defect, it would be greatly to the advantage of the people who have the biggest stake in the present order of things to recognize and remedy that defect. A few have indeed tried to do so. Thus Gesell, Mummery, and Catchings were successful businessmen. But capitalists generally have not, largely no doubt because they considered the very thought socialistic—as indeed it was, at least by adoption. Meanwhile the socialists, who were quite undismayed by the perception of a fatal deficiency in the capitalistic system, were on that account all the more eager to pull the whole thing down. The strategy of reducing the extremes of inequality in the present distribution of income with the view to restoring the balance of the present social order is equally unpalatable to people who regard it as only a prelude to the destruction of that order and to people who regard it as a subterfuge for retaining the capitalistic system.

It is to this situation that the unwillingness of the community to face the fact of a strategic deficiency of consumer purchasing power has been chiefly due. The hostility of socialists to "mere amelioration" has contributed to the neglect of underconsumption; but the effective opposition has been that of the respectable nine-tenths of the community, and it has been motivated by fear. Some of these fears are justified, and some are not. Conservative economists do not refute "the underconsumption fallacy"; they brush it aside with a single footnote reference; and they do so because they rightly fear that admission even of the possibility of such a thing

[5] Vividly described by Mr. Hobson in his "Confessions of an Economic Heretic," quoted by Mr. Keynes, *General Theory of the Price System*, p. 365ff.

would endanger the whole structure of their argument. In like manner conservative citizens—and they are by no means limited to the very rich—fear to admit that expansion of consumer purchasing power by reduction of accumulation is an economic possibility lest that be a prelude to general confiscation. The rich have good reason to be afraid; and there is also good reason for the widespread aversion to indiscriminate confiscation, but it is not the reason which capitalist orthodoxy has given.

As far back as the record runs, long before the time of the Hebrew prophets, the rich have been the objects of impassioned denunciation. Their position has of course been extremely vulnerable to such attack. Some of the rich have always made hogs of themselves. Some have found no better use for wealth than to flaunt it in the faces of the poor, and "pecuniary canons of taste," as Veblen called them, have enforced quite unnecessarily invidious distinctions throughout the community. But it is nevertheless true that some people of wealth and many in comfortable circumstances have lived exemplary lives, avoiding ostentation insofar as it was possible for them to do so within the limits of modes of behavior of which they were the victims along with all the rest of the community, and using their wealth to foster beauty and learning. It is not necessary to argue that they have been ideal patrons of science and the arts, or to suppose that it is patronage which makes creative achievement possible. The point is that, given a social structure which produces extremes of wealth and poverty, a great many people of good fortune have behaved as well as might have been expected under the circumstances. To denounce all the beneficiaries of an admittedly vicious system is to condemn the innocent along with the guilty—if the corruption of the rich by their riches can be regarded as guilt any more than the corruption of the poor by their poverty.

The injustice of such a condemnation has always been strongly felt by a large part of the community, and it has been accentuated by the extravagance of the claims which represent the whole national dividend as belonging "by right" to the poor. It is one thing to recognize that extremes of wealth and poverty are deplorable and quite another to denounce everybody above the level of the "proletariat" as by that fact alone a scoundrel who is engaged in robbing and otherwise exploiting the unfortunate. For if it is untrue that the rich enjoy their wealth by divine appointment, it is equally untrue that any other section of the community has any *a priori*

warrant to the whole of the national dividend or for that matter any special part of it.

The proposition that a distinction can be drawn between the "productive" and the supposedly "unproductive" members of the community by which the claim of the former can be established and that of the latter nullified is without any merit whatsoever. In recent years that claim has been advanced on the basis of the supposed distinction between income from labor and income from property. This claim is of course a perversion of the classical doctrine of productivity by which the creation of "value" was imputed to the supposed "factors of production." That argument had as its object the validation of the claims of capital, as spokesmen for the "proletariat" have easily established. But in applying the same reasoning to establish the claim of labor to what is supposed to be its exclusive product the advocates of revolution have committed the very error to which they so cogently object when it is committed in the interest of "capital." The supposed distinction between the productive and the unproductive parts of the community is based not on the actualities of the industrial process but on the exigencies of the existing distributive system. Productive labor is identified by receipt of wages; unproductive "idleness" is identified by receipt of income from property or at least in some other manner.

Such a distinction can be made in no other way. Revolutionists have rough and ready tests by which they purport to distinguish friend from foe, for example by examination of their hands. But a surgeon or a composer may have hands as devoid of calluses as those of any millionaire, while a rich yachtsman's hands may be as rough as those of any fisherman. Is the surgeon therefore a drone, and the yachtsman a useful citizen? Housewives receive no wages and are therefore classified by the Bureau of the Census as not "gainfully employed." Are they therefore members of the idle rich? It may be supposed that allowance can be made for the social connections of these members of the community. But if a rich polo player is idle however assiduous a player he may be, are his hostlers members of the leisure class? What is the difference between shoeing a farmer's horses and shoeing polo ponies? And if a blacksmith passes from one clientele to the other, what is his status? If the "hangers-on" are infected with the idleness of their principal, what about the miners and smelterers who produce the iron that is used to shoe polo ponies?

The truth of the matter is that the national dividend is the product of the community. It is conditioned both positively and negatively by every member of it, and in ways so complex and recondite as to make the attribution of credit and discredit, responsibility and blame, the most difficult of judgments—one which is indeed traditionally reserved to God. To make the distribution of income contingent upon such a judgment is to render the whole problem utterly insoluble. Everybody is to some extent aware of this difficulty, however strongly he may feel that his own contribution is undervalued, as the aphorism which reserves judgment to God plainly indicates; and this is one of the principal reasons why, in spite of all the misery and squalor of inequality, the community continues to look coldly upon proposals for a sweeping redistribution of income.

But none of these issues is germane to the strategy of the industrial economy. If it is true that under capitalism industrial society suffers from a chronic deficiency of mass consumer purchasing power and a corresponding surfeit of funds accumulated for investment, then it seems clear that the object of economic strategy must be a redistribution of income calculated to relieve industrial society from the burden of excess funds and to swell the mass of consumer purchasing power to the point at which it absorbs the whole product of industry under full employment of men and machines. To this strategy it makes no difference what the social sanctions are by virtue of which excessive incomes have come into existence. The danger of overaccumulation is just as great in the case of an income derived from landed estates inherited from the time of William the Conqueror as in that of a like income derived from speculation or from bootlegging. Each gluts the investment market no less than any other, and each represents the same degree of diminution of mass purchasing power.

Nor is there any question of checking the extravagances of the rich. Insofar as the rich spend their incomes they are providing an outlet for industrial production, as economists have known at least since the time of Bernard Mandeville. Some such outlets may seem less praiseworthy than others; but this is true of the poor no less than the rich, and is not at issue in any case. If the industrial system can be made to work, society can easily afford even the wildest extravagances of the rich. As economists have often pointed out with reference to proposals for a division of the good things of life such that everyone may have his "fair share," the rich are by definition not very numerous and a division of their perquisites among the many mil-

lions of the poor would still leave each individual share disappointingly meager. The only hope for substantial betterment of the lot of the whole community is by the increase of the national dividend on a scale such as that of the increase which in spite of everything has actually been realized during the past five centuries or even on a far greater scale. It is not the spending of the rich which prevents the realization of such an increase but the accumulation that results from their inability to spend their entire incomes and from their pursuit of power by accumulation and investment.

There remains the objection that the volume of funds which could be diverted from accumulation would be inadequate to create a volume of consumer purchasing power commensurate to the present supposed deficiency. This objection has no basis whatever, for it contravenees two principles on which all economists agree. One is the principle of "the multiplier." If the entire future increase of consumer purchasing power had of necessity to be taken from present accumulation, the objection would of course be valid. But obviously such is not the case. All economists agree that such adjustments are cumulative. They are so because expansion of consumption brings about expansion of production which in turn means an expansion of employment and so a further expansion of mass purchasing power. So sensitive are the construction, or capital goods, industries to such movements that many students, including Mr. Keynes, look to them as the key to the whole problem. If the interest rate and the prices of capital goods could be brought low enough, so they argue, real investment would increase and the resulting multiplication of the flow of purchasing power would be sufficient to balance the economy. With regard to the multiplication which such expansion effects they are of course right. The sole defect of their argument is its neglect of the present flow of purchasing power as the vital limiting factor. How cheap must capital be in order to induce a producer to expand who sees no immediate prospect of selling more goods? The economy may create its own market (or may be made to do so), but no single producer does. What is necessary in order to put Mr. Keynes' multiplier to work is first of all to set in motion an expansion of consumer purchasing power; but once the expanding is under way, the multiplier of course does all the rest.

The supposition that such "pump.-priming" involves a sacrifice of capital funds that are essential to real investment is a contradiction of the holiest of the sacred cows of orthodox theory, "Say's law of markets." Econ-

omists would have been forced to realize this long ago but for the fact that there is no criterion by which real investment can be distinguished from spurious investment. That is, in the inflation of capital values by virtue of which the investment market absorbs excess funds there is no point at which the funds which arrive early in a rising market and might therefore be judged to have been used for the actual purchase of capital equipment can be distinguished from funds which arrive late and might be judged to have contributed nothing but inflation to the industrial process. Even the time factor is irrelevant, since stock-watering goes on early as well as late in any given period, and in any such period later accumulation would not have been excessive had not the earlier preceded it. Consequently there is no distinct fund or stratum of investment which is clearly chargeable with the economic crime of superfluity. The absence of any such clearly marked distinction must have contributed mightily to the failure of the classical economists to recognize even the possibility of excess accumulation. Certainly it is responsible for the confusion which has attended all recent efforts to determine statistically the amount of real investment for comparison with the total amount of accumulated funds.

This means that the amount of funds to be diverted from accumulation to consumption cannot be determined by any qualitative test: the problem is wholly quantitative. Under conditions of depression the magnitude of excess bank reserves and of sums withdrawn from circulation by outright hoarding might be taken as an index to the magnitude of required transfer, not of those particular funds, but of sums in like amount to be diverted from the accumulating function as a whole. But at other times even this index would be lacking, and it is with such other times that we are most concerned since the whole idea is to prevent anything resembling depression from occurring at any time.

Fortunately the other side of the equation is much less obscure. Output and employment are physical facts, susceptible to physical measurement. The two do not exactly coincide. As a result of technological development, physical output might remain stationary or even show some increase in combination with increasing disemployment of men. Doubtless something of this kind was going on during the '20's, although as the Brookings study of *America's Capacity to Produce* seems to have showed, output was far short of the possible maximum even then. But if disemployment be taken as the basic guide, it would hardly be possible to go

wrong. To increase the diversion of funds from accumulation to mass purchasing power proportionately to the increase of disemployment, decreasing the diversion with the decrease of unemployment, would make the punishment precisely fit the crime both qualitatively and quantitatively. The levy would be upon accumulation as such without reference to any other consideration, and it would be directly proportional to the failure of accumulation to achieve in fact the one social consequence by which it is presumed to be justified and necessary.

Do funds exist in sufficient quantity for such an operation? This is one question to which classical price theory provides an answer. For a century and a half it has been a commonplace of economics that the creation of pecuniary values in production cannot be less than the sale value of what is produced. If the total amount of income so created somehow fails to flow into the market, obviously something must have happened to it. Under conditions of depression it may have been destroyed. In that event the re-creation of money values by deficit financing up to the amount of purchasing power necessary to absorb the product of industry at full employment would only be a salvage of purchasing power already lost by its former owners and so to the whole community. It is this circumstance which has led to the recognition of deficit financing by many respectable economists in recent years as a maneuver calculated to implement Say's law. Indeed there is no good reason why such a program should not take the form of the outright issue of currency in the amount so indicated.[6] Insofar as the deficiency of funds at any given moment were the result of sequestration rather than destruction, such action might be inflationary; but objection on this ground is itself a sufficient answer to the question whether funds exist. Insofar as they do exist, the question is answered. Indeed, at the first sign of an inflationary movement energetic measures to recapture and reactivate sequestered funds might well be undertaken in complete assurance that the funds sought do in fact exist and in a form in which they do nobody—neither their owners nor the community—any good whatsoever.

On the basis of our meager experience it would be extremely difficult if not impossible to compute in advance how much income would need to be diverted from accumulation to consumer purchasing power in order

[6]This proposal has been made most clearly and forcibly by Professor E. E. Hale, of the University of Texas, unfortunately never in print.

to bring about full employment at any given time. But one thing we can know: real investment, whether by private or public agency, would suffer not at all from any such diversion. This is true for a number of reasons. In the first place, as the classical economists have been reiterating, lo, these many years, real investment is consumption. Furthermore, as we know, it is a form of consumption which is self-multiplying, since investment in productive equipment releases purchasing power to those who fabricate that equipment who in turn become consumers of the products which the whole economy turns out, thereby further stimulating expansion of the productive mechanism. Real investment therefore works with consumer purchasing power to stimulate total production, not against it. It is also very significant that funds available for investment are uniquely elastic. Some economists have even argued that industrial expansion creates its own funds through the action of the banking system with the assistance of national monetary policy. This is true because real industrial expansion creates values, so that the financing is largely a matter of paper transactions, whether the transactions are by public or private agencies. The decisive factor is the expectation of profits, and it is at this point that the importance of consumer purchasing power is most decisive; for profits can be expected only by virtue of a continued flow of purchasing power. The complete mutual contingency of the productive and distributive aspects of the economy is exemplified by the complete mutual contingency of real investment and sustained consumption.

This, after all, is the central fact. In all the foregoing discussion of the obstacles by which, in the apprehension of many people, the strategy of income redistribution appears to be confronted, and in the attempt to understand how such a strategy and the facts which point to it could have been so generally neglected in the past, no mention has been made of the most important cause of this neglect and opposition. For it is negative. The fatal defect of capitalism has not passed altogether unnoticed. But it has been noted by people whose minds were preoccupied with other things. Malthus was in the main a classicist. Sismondi and Marx were revolutionaries. And even Mr. Hobson, the dean of contemporary "underconsumptionists," has never broken with orthodox price-value theory nor with the legendary history by which that theory is sustained. The "underconsumption fallacy" has never in the past appeared to flow directly from any systematic analysis of the industrial economy of which it was the inescapable con-

clusion—from any way of thinking of which income redistribution was the characteristic expression. It has been a biological sport, without proper intellectual parentage, and therefore without standing. Even Veblen, whose thinking more than that of any other economist did afford a systematic theoretical foundation for such a strategy, failed to carry through at all from analysis to policy. It was his chief failure, and one that has not yet been rectified.

We have only to contemplate the present scene to realize how serious that failure was. Among the democratic peoples of the world two great crusades are now under way upon which they are in effect staking their hopes of a democratic future: the crusade for peace and the crusade for social security. There is a general feeling that these two movements are related, that world peace is somehow contingent upon world economic order and vice versa, but it is far from clear to the community at large just what this relation is. The real force behind these drives is fear: fear of want and fear of the renewal of total war. In appealing to such fears President Roosevelt has given voice to the common apprehension.

But fear does not solve problems. How is social security to be achieved? Sir William Beveridge and the National Resources Planning Board have devised far-reaching plans for dealing with old age, sickness, unemployment, and kindred evils. As a consequence of the circumstances under which it is undertaken it is inevitable that such an effort should be "first and foremost a plan of how social insurance should be organized,"[7] and not a strategy of economic progress. One would never guess, from the *Beveridge Report* at least, that such an undertaking could be anything but a heavy burden of expense to the community. The whole emphasis of the *Beveridge Report* is upon the ability of Great Britain to bear so moderate a cost even after the present war, especially since a considerable part of it is to be borne by the wage-earning class itself. As its author remarks:

> Want could have been abolished before the present war by a redistribution of income within the wage-earning classes, without touching any of the wealthier classes. This is said not to suggest that a redistribution of income should be confined to the wage-earning classes; still less is it said to suggest that men should be content with avoidance of want, with subsistence incomes. It is said simply as the most convincing demonstration that abolition of want just before this war

[7] *Beveridge Report*, p. 103.

> was easily within the economic resources of the community; want was a needless scandal due to not taking the trouble to prevent it.[8]

But how convincing is a demonstration likely to be so long as its tone is one of apology? "Properly designed, controlled and financed," says the famous *Report,* social insurance "need have no depressing effect on incentive."[9] In short, this great crusade is for as much decency as is compatible with capitalism. But capitalism itself is collapsing, and it is collapsing precisely because of the maldistribution of income for which it is responsible. The great need for such a program of social security is not to correct a public scandal but to restore the balance of the economy. Until this is understood apology and timidity will of course continue to prevail. We will enact enough social security legislation to ease our consciences, but not enough to save the economy, and so we will have more depressions and more wars.

For war is the same problem in another guise. All the talk now is concerned with the permanent organization of the United Nations, with the flow of international trade, and with the regulation of traffic on the sea and in the air. Such talk is not "globaloney." World peace, no less than social security, calls for a plan of organization. But here too the atmosphere is negative. World organization, it seems, will require some sacrifice of national self-interest. The argument is that what sacrifices we may have to make are a small price to pay for security from war. One would never guess that in modern times the international trade and foreign policy of each of the leading industrial nations have become, in the words of Mr. Keynes, "a desperate expedient to maintain employment at home by forcing sales on foreign markets and restricting purchases," a policy "which, if successful, will merely shift the problem of unemployment to the neighbor which is worsted in the struggle" and is therefore the "predominant" cause of war.[10] This means that the present cycle of wars can be brought to an end only by the correction of the deficiency of consumer purchasing power which forces each industrial nation into this "desperate expedient." Until that is done, treaties can be nothing more than the rules of the game under which (at first) the next war will be fought.

---

[8]Pp. 165, 166.

[9]P. 167.

[10]*General Theory,* pp. 381-383.

Why does the world so obstinately refuse to see what is so apparent to many observers? These two crusades, against want and against war, in fact are one. Neither can be successful except by achievement of the other, and both together depend upon the correction of the distributive balance of the industrial economy. One set of idealists opposes war; another opposes poverty; and meanwhile the defect of the present economic system which is the cause of both disorders is recognized as such only by still another set of cranks—scornfully known as "underconsumptionists."

Judged by the present scene, our case is hopeless. But such a judgment would not only ignore the possibility of change; more important, it would overlook the process of development which has led to the present situation. Ideas do not originate in vacuum. The abhorrence which intelligent people feel toward war in steadily increasing degree is more than a vague, emotional humanitarianism, and so is the abhorrence of poverty. Both express a deep and growing sense of travesty, a sense still largely inarticulate but none the less genuine on that account, that poverty and war are not only shameful but quite unnecessary, that it is only our stupidity which permits poverty and war to flourish in the midst of plenty. We have not yet brought these ideas to full articulacy. As yet they seem to lack theoretical foundations such as the classical economists provided for the policy of *laissez faire,* and consequently the strategy of income redistribution as yet lacks the force of full conviction. But the facts of which such a theory of economic progress would be a formulation are there and are already dimly realized. Sooner or later we shall achieve a theoretical reformulation of the economic life process of which the strategy of income redistribution will be the inexorable logical consequence, and the prelude to a new age of economic progress.

A PUBLIC OPINION FOR PLANNING

By TALBOT HAMLIN

IN FEBRUARY the national House of Representatives refused to make an an appropriation for the National Resources Planning Board, and in May, the Senate cut it off with $200,000. Regardless of what finally happens to the agency (and it will be lucky now to remain alive), this action is symptomatic of a growing political revolt against governmental planning of any kind—a revolt not alone national, but one which bids fair to hamper, if not to undo, the work of state and county and city planning commissions the country over. Yet planning—that is, the desire to mold the environment in accordance with some basic purpose—is a necessary concomitant of a large population and an intensive industry. Otherwise in the complex relationships that exist in such a society there are too many chances for things to go wrong—overproduction, unemployment, hardship, hunger—as we found out in 1929-30.

And the necessity of planning in this sense is widely accepted. Large corporations plan. The business world, confronted by the problems of war production and the specter of vast reorganizations when the war is over, is forced inevitably to make decisions in accordance with some desired objectives. For example, the Urban Land Institute, developed by real-estate interests, offers plans for urban redevelopment, analyzes the sicknesses of cities, the causes of urban blight, inequalities of taxation, and illusory land values, and offers suggested planning cures.

What, then, are the causes of the growing hostility to expert governmental planning? And what are the essential differences between private industrial planning, which legislators tend to accept, and the governmental planning they seek to strangle? The answers to these questions pierce directly to the heart of the dilemma of democracy today. For the private corporations and the local city planning boards which think along industrial and real-estate lines direct their planning solutions toward two major ends—profits and the preservation of property values. But independent

governmental planning bodies, whether national or local, are directing their energies toward the welfare of the country as a whole. Their aims are to give the American people richer, broader lives, to spread more widely the products of industry, to provide better homes and more pleasant communities. To this human ideal, immediate profit and the preservation of existing property values are merely incidental.

The problem thus becomes one of basic planning objectives. The trend of New Deal national planning, like that of the more enlightened local planning commissions, is to put human values first; that of business and industrial planning is to put economic values first. In the next few years the American people must decide which kind of planning they want. Is the world ahead to be a world of speculators, or one of producers? Is production to be for the many, or for the few? Is money to be king, or will the happiness and richness of human consciousness be the dominant ideal? Are we planning towns to sell, or to live in? Housing to shelter work machines or human beings? A country of great agricultural producing units —farm factories—or a country of farms where agriculture is the basis for a worth-while way of life? These are questions which must be answered.

Thousands of pressure groups exist which have the answers ready. They know what they want. There are big and powerful combinations of industry and finance: they want markets and profits. There are real-estate boards: they want land to sell and big rents to collect for minimum shelters. There are industries and large employers: they want cheap labor, or labor quiet at least and well regimented. And these great groups know and respect the value of planning; they have had unprecedented opportunities in these last months of quotas and control to learn the extent of its power. The techniques of planning are ready to their hands; if we do not see to it that provision is made for other and higher aims than profits and power, these groups are prepared and eager to take over.

II

If those are the alternatives, it would seem that in the case of a democracy like the United States the answer would be overwhelmingly on the side of planning for human values. Yet the hard facts show that precisely the reverse is true. No effective public opinion exists to bring pressure on legislators, but a host of pressure groups of interested organizations is eloquently powerful on the other side. Only a few, comparatively, fight

on the side of human rights—a few bodies of professional men, city planners, architects; a few sociologists, engineers, economists who have not been bought; a microscopic group of politicians who are really servants of the people—these stand alone to protect the mass of future Americans from the dominance of the alien idea that the many must work for and live at the whim of a wealthy class of entrepreneurs, rentiers, and managers. The debacle of planning today is tragic evidence of the failure of the planners to enlist the active support of the great body of people for whom they have been planning. Without wide popular support, such a group is relatively powerless.

No great popular rising prevented Congress from slaughtering the National Resources Planning Board. No wide popular protests have prevented the destruction of the New York City Planning Commission's forward-looking work toward a master plan. No mass demonstrations in Detroit helped solve the sorry mess of the Willow Run housing; there even the vitally interested union suddenly changed its official mind and abandoned its crusade for decent housing. No evidences of broad human interest have had so telling an effect upon those in power in such cases—upon Congress, Boards of Estimate, City Plan Commissions, or Housing Authorities—as the tub-thumping of real-estaters and interested money organizations, anguished at the thought of a nation or a community planned for people and not merely for money.

It will perhaps be worth while to examine the sources of this popular apathy that is dooming humane planning to a slow death. Primarily it is the result of the failure of the planners as a whole to show each citizen how immediate his future is bound up in the planning question, how intimately planning affects his living quarters, his working habits, his educational and recreational possibilities. It is a failure in salesmanship, in popular education. As a result, the great inarticulate public remains in abysmal ignorance, at the mercy of deep but unfounded prejudices, which are carefully stimulated by those who hate and fear the coming of a new and more equitable world.

This popular ignorance is colossal. Ask the ordinary citizen what his local planning commission is for, or what are the true aims of the Tennessee Valley Authority or the Farm Security Administration or the National Resources Planning Board. He may realize that the local planning commission has something to do with streets and sewers and that it

occasionally holds hearings at which disgruntled property owners may vent their spleen at government meddling—the press usually plays that up. But of the larger implications of the planning commission—of its vast potentialities in preventing blighted areas, in curing the causes of urban decay, in bringing beauty and order out of ugliness and chaos, in increasing urban transportation safety, in making a town a center which children will love and not merely tolerate—of all this the average American has not the vaguest conception. Once he does realize it, our cities will be made over in a generation.

That is why the reactionaries attempt to keep city planning commissions to routine tasks—minor zoning changes, street leveling, and so on—to jobs which rarely make the front page and seldom arouse the citizen's excitement. City planning commissions are usually established for the definite purpose of creating a "master plan"—that is, a scheme for orderly growth, for increasing amenity, convenience, and beauty. Many of them, however, are so slowed by meager appropriations that the major part of their task can never even be started. The citizen may be appalled at the blight growing around the vaunted center of his town, with buildings coming down and unkempt parking lots and boarded vacant buildings increasing, with ugliness and waste obvious; but he is never allowed to connect this with the fact that the understaffed planning commission is forced to spend all its time on routine hearings instead of in creative planning.

And it is the same with all the other government planning agencies. The citizen is generally ignorant—and, it seems, is wilfully kept ignorant by the press—of both their purposes and their achievements. To John Doe the T.V.A. is something to do with dams and electric power; of its larger aspects he knows nothing. He does not know that it has bettered the way of life for a whole region; that it has brought new life, new leisure, new hope to thousands in a previously poverty-struck area; that it has been responsible for better agricultural ways, has conserved soil by preventing erosion, and has opened up vast areas of the interior country to water-borne commerce and to recreation.

He does not know what the Farm Security Administration has done to regularize and make worth while the life of migratory farm labor, unless he is one of the few who read the technical journals or some of the more liberal weeklies. What can he know of the immense strides which have

been made in reclaiming decadent farms and in teaching new ways of work and life, of soil conservation and scientific farming, to hopeless, undernourished farmers? Nor can he know or understand the vitally necessary work the National Resources Planning Board has done, on the slimmest of appropriations, in studying our soils, our rivers, our natural wealth; in investigating urban life and economics, and finding out how and why people move from place to place; in building, in other words, a magnificent foundation of facts on which a happier future for America might be planned. He is ignorant of these things because he has never been simply and forcefully told. The press—where it mentions them at all—has usually been scornful and sarcastic, or has wilfully suppressed their social values.

III

Popular prejudices are even more damaging than ignorance, for they may lead not only to apathy with regard to planning but to active hostility. One prejudice we may easily spot—the measuring of all values by the government debt and the tax rate. Naturally the changes which planning seeks nearly always cause expense. Sewage disposal, new roads or streets, parks and playgrounds, better housing—these cost the country hundreds of millions of dollars. "Why," the citizen asks, "pay out these astronomical sums? Look at the tax rate . . . . " And "Look at the tax rate," echo the real-estate people; "it's scandalous!" Strangely enough, though in the large modern city only a relatively small number pay real-estate taxes directly, the bugaboo of increased tax rates controls or stops the thinking of all the rest. Thus no popular backing is built up for improvements which might ultimately pay for themselves in cheaper transportation and lessened maintenance, not to speak of the vast improvements in living conditions they would bring.

Another prejudice against planning which is of great power and is widely held is a fear of planning as somehow undemocratic. This is based on a fundamental fallacy—that planning by the small boards of great corporations or of other financial pressure groups over which the citizen has no control is somehow "more American" than planning by governmental agencies over which he exerts more power than he realizes. Complete planlessness is impossible in this industrialized world; foresight is an obvious necessity, and acting according to foresight involves planning. The

question is, whose judgment shall dictate the planning to be done? Surely it is not a necessary part of democracy that a corporation of private individuals, by erecting a factory in a socially undesirable location, should destroy the emotional balance and way of life of an entire community. Nor is it democratic for a real-estate pressure group to force changes in a municipal zoning act which will destroy the desirability of a whole urban neighborhood, or for a fly-by-night suburban developer to wreck an attractive countryside in order to obtain a measly profit through shady financing. Greed masquerading as democracy is not a pretty sight but it is all too common today. John Doe must be shown that governmental planning, with due popular support and consequent popular control, is not the dreaded intrusion on his rights he has been led to fear but rather the preserver and guardian of those rights, the guarantee that his world will be preserved and improved.

But the most dangerous prejudice of all is the notion that governmental planning for human values is destructive of private property, and especially of private initiative. It is the great stamping ground of real-estate boards, merchants' associations, and other organizations interested primarily in speculative profits. Yet even for them it is perhaps shortsighted. Of course any planning affects values; it lessens some, raises others. But good planning increases the true values of the entire community. It may well diminish occasional dramatic speculative profits (the result of chance or chicanery) in favor of protecting the stability of long-term, low-interest income. It may oppose expansion per se and prefer healthy growth to forced inflation. Property owners who oppose this sensible planning apparently are willing to accept loss on the totality of property owned in order that one or two of their number may make a killing at the expense of the others. John Doe's interest in all this should be obvious, yet he has been so led astray by what he hears and reads that too often he puts himself on the side of the speculators—and pays them double when they win.

But this matter of planning and property values is bigger than the mere question of speculative versus nonspeculative real estate; it penetrates to the very roots of democracy and the democratic life. Confusion of the concepts of democracy and laissez-faire capitalism is widely prevalent, yet the two are basically different. Those who, like many conservatives, consider them identical are guilty of loose thinking. Fundamentally,

democratic living is living free from externally imposed compulsions. As far as possible one does what one wishes, and only those compulsions are accepted as law or custom which restrain one from interfering with the normal desires of others to do what they wish. Normally the most democratic society is that in which the field of individual choice is broadest.

Now compulsions which limit the field of choice can be economic as well as governmental. If I am compelled by a combination of high urban rental levels and bad planning to waste two hours of my day in crowded and uncomfortable travel, my choice of activitiy during those so-called "leisure" hours is just as much circumscribed by economic forces as though the government imposed upon me two hours of extra "work." If the lobsterman on the Maine coast is compelled to sell his lobsters to a single corporation at the price it sets, on pain of a rigid if unofficial blacklisting, or the herring fisherman to dispose of his catch similarly to a single purchaser at its own price, his freedom of action is drastically limited, his opportunity for saving and self-advancement drastically curtailed, by outside compulsions which have nothing to do with government. The "Okies" were driven from depleted farms by economic forces, not by the government. And yet all these are cases of infringements on personality, on the freedom of democratic choice.

In fact, the whole history of the past four or five decades in the United States has been a history of a gradual tightening up of life as the population increased, the frontier disappeared, large agricultural areas became "farmed out" through unscientific use, and as urban congestion and industrialization increased. Class and caste lines developed; the paths of advancement in little individual enterprises were blocked one by one. With all our boasted education, there are relatively more boys today irretrievably bound to menial hand-to-mouth lives than there were fifty years ago. In our world of large industries there are actually fewer positions of dignity and honor and freedom than there were in the world of small business, small enterprises, and individual professional service which existed then, though the population has risen fifty per cent. Thus it is economic, not governmental, compulsion that has made "fighting to the top" today so frequently a relentless, soul-destroying struggle, developing often in the successful their socially least desirable traits and crushing in them that human imagination, kindliness, cultural advancement, broad

self-development, generosity, true tolerance, and fellow feeling which form the very life blood of democracy.

The fact is that laissez-faire economics—the theory of the devil take the hindmost—is democratic only in a country with an expanding economy and a frontier crying out for development. In a closed or nearly closed economy, where the only frontier is the city slum or the hobo's jungle, *laissez faire* is merely a prettified term for dog-eat-dog, a sort of economic and spiritual cannibalism. It is the system by which the dogs who have eaten the most other dogs achieve the right to do what planning is done, unless the government—that is, the commonwealth in its most proper sense—steps in to keep the balance and does some planning of its own.

IV

If planning by the government for the broadest distribution of amenity and opportunity is democratic, it then behooves every citizen who has at heart the future of the country as a whole to rally to its support. For our industrialized society is swiftly approaching a climax, a point at which the path must lead either to the complete regimentation of the many for the sake of profits for the few, or to a democratic, planned control for the benefit of the many. There is no possible middle road. The majority of our cities and great sections of our rural areas are in the position of a business which no longer pays dividends because its obsolete machinery can no longer meet the demands imposed upon it. It must plan, must spend, must modernize itself, or die. Blighted city areas, deserted farms, increasing farm tenancy on a basis of unbelievable submarginal living standards—these all tell the same story. Against the necessity of preserving the fundamentals of American democratic life—the rights of all to the benefits which increased productivity makes possible—no pleas for petty economies, no sentimental reversion to past standards, must be allowed to prevail.

What can the friends of humane planning do? Obviously the need to build up a strong and articulate public opinion comes first, and the techniques for accomplishing this are not unknown. It is not enough for planners to write books for planners, for sociologists and economists to have congresses where these problems are discussed among themselves. A beginning must be made with the plain people everywhere—the farmer, the dweller in the crossroads village, the small-town worker, the inhabitant

of the large city. These are the people to reach, through their local clubs and granges, through settlement houses, through parent-teacher associations, through the schools and colleges and churches. Let every women's club and every grange or lodge devote a program to the problems of local planning and another program to the larger problems that face the nation; let them learn what has been accomplished already, and see how these techniques can be applied to their own needs in the future. Let every planning group and every local architectural society have a corps of interesting speakers to go out to these local organizations. Let pressure be brought to bear to have planning problems and possibilities somehow made vivid to the children in the schools. These are but a few of the available approaches. By their use, little by little the people themselves will come to see the issues at stake, and we may depend on their common sense as a whole to realize where their own hopes and desires point.

America must plan, and plan democratically. The machinery exists in embryo, the techniques are largely known. They must be used, immediately and continuously, or a new and terrible form of fascism—finance fascism—will be the result of our war for democracy.

THE NOVEL IN LATIN AMERICA

By BERTRAM D. WOLFE

THE LATIN AMERICAN NOVEL is still largely terra incognita in the United States. Two masterpieces of the Mexican Revolution, *The Underdogs* of Azuela and *The Eagle and the Serpent* of Guzmán, and three of the best novels of South America, *The Vortex* of Rivera, *Doña Bárbara* of Gallegos and *Don Segundo Sombra* of Güiraldes, were admirably translated on the eve of the era of "good neighborliness," but they dropped into a void of indifference and unpreparedness, reaching the "remainder" stage without so much as paying the costs of publication and translation. Yet their appearance marked a sudden awakening of interest in the spiritual resources of the lands to the south of us.

Or rather, a reawakening, for we had not always been indifferent to Hispanic and Hispanic-American culture. The first golden age of our letters, the period of the transcendentalists, nourished a high excitement concerning Spain and her colonial offspring. In those days, however, Latin America had not yet found its voice. It was still "a novel without novelists," a subject for some great works of our literature rather than of her own.[1] But with the Civil War, our spirit turned inward toward the material conquest of our continent, while our concern for Hispanic and Hispanic-American life withered and died.

The turn of the century marked the beginning of a new interest in the rest of the hemisphere. The Spanish-American War, the seizure of the Canal Zone, the three-decade long imperialist spree that followed, brought with them an increasing awareness: of turbulence and disorder, of stubborn opposition to our "guardianship," of incomparable riches linked to starkest poverty, of the rejection of many of the "practical" values taken for granted by us. Then, with that swiftness of tempo which characterizes

[1]The most notable are Prescott's *Conquest of Mexico* and *Conquest of Peru*. The former is one hundred years old this summer, and is still listed as a best seller among the Modern Library Giants.

our awakenings, came a stirring of anti-imperialist conscience. Among liberals and intellectuals, church mission groups and women's clubs, farmer and labor organizations, and (strange juxtaposition!) among the circles that constituted an embryonic wealthy leisure class, there sprang up an excited sensibility to a different way of life: "legitimate" differences of attitude toward time, money, machinery and commerce; toward politics and power; toward art, love, death and destiny. Thenceforward the Mexican Revolution enlisted as much sympathy as indignation, as much favorable misunderstanding as unfavorable. Writers and travelers returned with reports of the superior color and drama and grace of Latin American life. The plastic arts of Mexico took this country by storm—as if to repeat the old story of a conquering people's being conquered by the culture of the vanquished. As suddenly, the last marines and interventors were being withdrawn, the Latin American doctrine of nonintervention was replacing our doctrine of protective guardianship, and the mighty machinery of State Department, Co-ordinator's Office, Pan-American Union, and wealthy private foundations was being thrown into high speed for the production of cultural interchange, good neighborliness, continental unity. None too soon, either, for the great turn in the direction of hemispheric affairs had hardly been accomplished when World War II was upon us.

* * *

It was easier for the plastic arts to speak to us since they address themselves directly to the senses; to literary intercourse there are subtle-seeming barriers of outlook and tradition and grosser ones of language. Yet we can actually make a statistical index of our awakening interest in Latin America in terms of the translations of its novels into our language. In the first two decades of this century there were altogether two Latin American novels translated into English; in the third decade there were thirteen; in the fourth (1930-39 inclusive) there were fifteen; and in the next three years (1940-43) more translations than in the entire ten-year period preceding.[2]

Another notable feature was the closing up of the time lag. Prior to 1930 an author's work had to have stood the test of time in order to get

[2]This figure includes works already translated and accepted for publication which are scheduled to appear this summer and autumn.

translated; in the '30's a novel popular in its country of origin might see the light in English within a year or two after publication; in the '40's translation may come within the same year and there are even simultaneous appearances in New York and Santiago or Buenos Aires.

The chief cause of this new literary order was the inauguration of the Latin American prize novel contest in 1942 under the auspices of Farrar and Rinehart with the official encouragement and co-operation of the Pan-American Union and its governments. Hundreds of writers competed. Every Latin American republic but Uruguay, whose entry came too late, submitted the winner of its national contest to an "international" jury consisting of John Dos Passos, Blair Niles, and Ernesto Montenegro. The first prize was unanimously awarded to *Broad and Alien Is the World* by Ciro Alegría, an exiled Peruvian *Aprista* resident in Chile. It had been submitted by a jury of Chilean writers as their national contest winner, which suggests something of the continental character of Latin American letters and does honor to Chile's intellectual hospitality. (It could never have been offered as a Peruvian novel because of the official nature of the contest and the degree of governmental control of literature in Alegría's native land, where his *Aprista* Party is outlawed.)

The year 1942 saw a number of other important translation ventures. Farrar and Rinehart accepted three additional manuscripts from those submitted in the contest, and immediately released one of them: *Nayar* by Miguel Angel Menéndez of Mexico. Other publishers, stimulated by the atmosphere created, scouted for current best sellers to translate, or picked up older perennial favorites and manuscripts that had been seeking in vain for a publisher for several years. From Macmillan came a recent Chilean psychological study in colonial witchcraft, *La Quintrala* (1932) by Magdalena Petit. Houghton Mifflin issued a volume of short stories together with four full length novels: *Brother Ass* (1922) by Eduardo Barrios of Chile; *Don Goyo* (1933)) by Demetrio Aguilera Malta of Ecuador; *Fiesta in November* (1939) by Eduardo Mallea of Argentina; and *The Futile Life of Pito Pérez* (1938) by Rubén Romero of Mexico.[3]

Brother Ass is recognized generally in Latin America as the best emotional novel of internal psychological study that this continent has

[3]Dates refer to the first Spanish edition. Dates and statistical material are from a report compiled by the Division of Intellectual Co-operation of the Pan-American Union.

produced, and reveals its author as one of the greatest living masters of this novel form. Yet it waited twenty years to appear in English translation. Or, to take a lesser but certainly not a negligible work, *La vida inútil de Pito Pérez,* appearing in Mexico in 1938, was instantly recognized as a worthy descendant of the great line of picaresque novels that has such deep roots in Spanish and Mexican letters. A number of critics recommended it to American publishers for translation, but it had to wait for the present favorable market. In the same year, however, as if to make the amende honorable and complete the cycle of the Latin American rogue tale, Doubleday Doran brought out *The Itching Parrot* (1816), the earliest and most popular of all Latin American novels with probably the longest and heaviest record as a best seller of any work written in this hemisphere. The manuscript had been making the rounds of publishers for years and had been worked on and edited by many different hands.

Thus the year 1942 offered so varied an assortment of English translations, all of them of some merit, that the American reader without access to the far-flung Latin American publishing centers or without knowledge of Spanish (we might add Portuguese, since 1943 will see the publication in English of two Brazilian novels) may get from this recent crop alone a fair view of the state of the novel in the countries to the south of us. And this article can largely confine itself to these works for illustration.

Before looking at any of them more closely, we can come to one general conclusion. Since there is no magic in literary prizes nor in fortuitous fashions due to nonliterary causes which can suddenly raise the general level of current writing or call forth works not already in existence or gestation, the rich variety in this single year's samplings in translation suggests that the Latin American novel must be in a state of vigorous health. Closer examination confirms that impression.

* * *

Broad and Alien Is the World is by general agreement of the critics in this country and throughout Latin America a fine book. It is no sudden sport, but a culminating exemplar of a number of traditions that have their roots deep in the past of the Latin American novel. Directly, it traces its ancestry back to the work of another Peruvian novelist, the woman writer Clorinda Matto de Turner whose *Aves sin nido* (*Birds without Nests,* 1889) was the *Uncle Tom's Cabin* of the cause of Indian redemp-

tion. If *Aves sin nido,* with its passionate portrayal of the miserable state into which the descendants of the once mighty civilization of the Incaic Indians of the high Andes had fallen, may be said to have started the *Indianista* novel, it remained for the Mexican Revolution of 1910 to develop Indianism into a body of feeling and thought that could sustain a broad movement in the culture and literature of the countries that were the heirs of the high civilizations of preconquest America. In the process of its ripening this Indianist literature of social protest took fresh impulse from the modern "proletarian" novel and merged with a movement to explore the remnants of the ancient cultures. Elements of folklore and poetic idealization lent color and pathos to the protest, fusing the still older literary attitude toward the Indian which viewed him as "nature's nobleman" with the compassionate social realism that sought to portray unflinchingly his fallen estate. Thus the Indianist novel became part of the work of exploration and expanding self-consciousness by which peoples originally colonial become culturally independent nations.

Broad and Alien Is the World combines, or rather, integrates, all these confluent trends, giving them expression in what is to date the finest and most full-bodied example of the *novela indianista.* This it is that gives it the air of having sprung fully grown from lands which most Americans imagined were without a novel of their own, or at best possessed a colonial imitation of the European novel. If we compare it with our own "proletarian" novel of the '30's, we are aware of greater sweep and depth, more essential humanity and genuine emotion, less subjection to formula and party dictate, and, of course, a concern with the fate of the rural Indian rather than the urban proletariat.

It is the tragic story of a long losing battle for existence fought by a communal Indian village engaged according to the ancient ways in primitive subsistence agriculture, against the encroachments of the white landowner engaged in the white man's peonage, cash-crop, export economy, and backed by the white man's law, government, and military force. The struggle takes place in the pleasant upland valley of Rumi high in the Peruvian Andes, but the scene—except for differences of folklore and custom—might be any one of a half dozen countries: Mexico, Guatemala, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, in which the ancient Indian culture continues its tenacious existence and in which latifundia and dictatorial regimes prevail. The story opens in leisurely fashion as a poetic

idyll of patriarchal existence, a portrayal of folk customs, festivals, plantings, harvesting, birth and death and love and serene and respected old age. Then the peace of Rumi is shattered when its immemorial title to its lands is challenged by Don Alvaro Amenabar y Roldán, lord of Umay, master of lives and lands for twenty leagues around. The wisdom accumulated by its patriarchal elders from their ancestors and the length of their own years proves to have no answer to this new problem. The law is Don Alvaro's; legal documents appear as incomprehensible fetishes with power over the fate of men; the judge is his creature; the lawyer engaged by the Indians is suborned; their witnesses are terrorized or corrupted or framed; their very patron saint is deaf and their witch doctor's charms have no power over the whites. A few seek to resist by force of arms but they are outlawed and disarmed of their antiquated rifles by the military acting in the name of the law. The community retreats from its lovely, fertile valley to the barren crags above. When, even out of the bare rock they manage to scratch some sort of miserable yet independent existence, Don Alvaro pursues them there also, for he is determined to compel them to work on his lands and in his mines.

The agonizing story of the fate of the community is largely enough conceived so that we are able to follow the individual fates also of all those who attempt to escape by flight. We follow them as hired laborers in the coca fields, as sharecroppers on the lands of others, as laborers in distant mines, in the pestilential rubber jungle, on the coast, in the big city, as members of an outlaw band. The life of the community as a whole (the true hero) is studied in depth—its labors and sorrows, matings, births and deaths, feuds and factions, songs, superstitions, customs and traditions. But we leave the community again and again to explore extensively rather than intensively the whole "broad and alien world" of non-Indian Peru. Everywhere, despite momentary flourishing of hope, the poor man's fate is injustice, sorrow, and defeat.

* * *

Nayar, second-prize winner in the 1942 contest, is the first novel of a Mexican poet, Miguel Angel Menéndez. It is a flight novel, but not used as that genre has been with us to dwell upon the terror of the fugitive; rather it is akin in structure to a much older storytelling tradition, that of the rogue tale, used for the purposes of the exploration of the regions

passed through and the societies lived in by the wanderer. The hero kills the local judge whom he has caught making love to his wife, then flees with two boon companions through the rain forest and trackless sierra of Nayarit (whence the tale's name), and into remote villages of the Huichol and Cora Indians. Like so many Latin American novels it is a work of exploration and discovery (along with self-discovery) of lands that are still attaining to self-knowledge and self-consciousness. The loose, rambling structure permits the introduction of all sorts of diverse and tenuously connected episodes, bits of folklore and tribal custom, vivid re-creations of the untamed forest, and of strange and terrible rites. The fugitive flees first to the *selva,* which the individual is powerless to tackle alone, then to primitive Indian tribes, who never fully accept him and among whom he can find no peace because within his own breast the two hostile bloods of Indian and white and the two antithetical cultures are forever at war. Though the novel ends with the death of the protagonist, its real climax lies in the destruction of the Indian community in which he has found temporary refuge. First the tribe is caught between two bands of alien whites engaged in an alien conflict; then nature in the form of rain and hail destroys what little the marauding bands have left. This treatment of the Mexican Revolution as something incomprehensible to the Indian, something external, destructive, overwhelming, akin to a destroying storm, reflects a new mood among Mexican novelists to which we shall return later on.

Nayar, then, is a hybrid of the traditions of the picaresque novel, the *Indianista* novel, and the novel of the land. The fusion has not been quite successful, as if the author had tried each of the types of writing in turn. Yet the weakness of plot construction and the lack of mastery of form are compensated in large measure by the high charge of poetic energy with which the whole work is pervaded so that descriptions, episodes, adventures, and catastrophes are all immersed in a poetic field that gives the work a unity of mood to make up for the lack of unity of plot.

It is this virtue which leads one to compare it, to its disadvantage, with the greatest example of the novel of the land, *The Vortex,* by the Colombian José Eustasio Rivera (1924; translated 1935). The "Vortex" which is the novel's real protagonist is the tropical forest, no trim Park of Versailles bearing inscribed upon it the calligraphy of man's mind and will, but

> a trickle of putrefied springs . . . aphrodisiac parasites covering the ground with dead bees . . . flowers contracting themselves with sensual palpitations and sticky sweat that intoxicate one like a drug; the malignant liana whose fuzz blinds animals; the *pringamosa* that inflames the skin . . . the constant noise of the shrieking wildfowl, the snorts of the wild boar, the laughter of the ridiculous monkey. . . .

The jungle is alive, creeping, crawling, binding, tripping, infecting, crushing, a monstrous vortex of fecundity and decay. In English literature there is nothing like this forest conceived as a living thing unless we count as English the novel of the Anglo-Argentine Hudson, *Green Mansions,* where the forest is also alive but with a more benign and less sinister life. These novels of the land could only be produced in countries with an exuberant and overpowering physical environment not fully mastered by man: mighty mountain peaks, torrential rains and long droughts, the uncontained luxuriance of the jungle. The natural landscape has been but imperfectly transformed into the human or cultural landscape. Man can defend himself from these natural powers only in animal fashion by a precarious adaptation and the solidarity of the tribe, akin to the solidarity of the pack. Social life, insofar as it plays a part in *Nayar* or in *The Vortex* is not so much a successful modification of the environment by man as an extension of the chaos of the jungle to the field of uncontrollable relations between men. The rubber-tappers in *The Vortex* are driven by inhuman taskmasters until they lose the mark of their humanity. They steal each other's rubber to make up the impossible quotas exacted from them:

> We tear each other with fists and machetes; and the disputed latex is splashed with red. But what does it matter if our veins increase the supply of sap? . . . And what if my neighbor dies of fever? I see him stretched out on the leafy mold, shaking himself, trying to rid himself of flies that will not let him die in peace. Tomorrow I shall move away driven elsewhere by the stench. But I shall steal the latex he gathered. . . . They'll do the same with me when I die. . . ."[4]

* * *

The two rogue tales in the 1942 crop of translations are keys to other phases of Latin American literature and life. The rogue tale is the true

[4]The first of the above quotations from *The Vortex* is from a translation by Arturo Torres-Rioseco and the second from the English translation by Earle K. James. For the best short survey so far made of the Latin American novel in either English or Spanish, the reader is referred to Arturo Torres-Rioseco's *Epic of Latin American Literature* (Oxford University Press, 1942).

progenitor of the modern European novel though its reign was brief in all but the Hispanic lands, where it sank deep roots and lives on to the present day. Its structure is loose and simple to the point of formlessness, really a collection of short stories or episodes with a single personage, the picaro, as the central figure. His need to leave his native home starts the story, his adventures and experiences during the course of his wanderings make up the body, and his "settling down" or reformation or death brings it to an end. It is a distinctly urban and intellectual story form, prosaic, satirical, mordant, rowdy. It is not hard to explain its perennial appeal to the social thinker turned storyteller, or to the young writer in these new yet tradition-old lands, for within the compass of the loose plot the author can string together the most varied episodes, anecdotes, incidents, scenes and types of writings, can introduce all sorts and conditions of men, regions, pursuits, and ways of life, and continue therewith the work of exploration and evaluation in these still not fully explored lands.

The Futile Life of Pito Pérez differs from the usual picaresque tale in that it is the work of a poet, steeped in provincial and classical tradition and lovingly critical of his native land. Poetic feeling gives unusual color and warmth to a normally prosy and coldly intellectual form. A few sentences from the opening page will suffice to show the story's mood:

> The figure of a man, dark against the sky . . . Pito Pérez, lost in contemplation of the landscape. His great cracked shoes grimaced with pain, his trousers looked as if made of cobwebs; and his coat, fastened only with a safety pin, cried out from all its open seams for the world's pity, and cried in vain. . . .[5]

* * *

The appeal of this simple storytelling structure to the storyteller we have already explained. But a more interesting problem is to discover the secret of the perennial popularity to millions of readers of the first of the Mexican rogue tales, still the most widely read and loved of all Latin American novels.

The Itching Parrot (*El periquillo sarniento*) is one of the biggest best sellers of all time. In Spanish-speaking lands—where the gulf which separates high-brow from popular literature is far less marked than in our own—the tale has been read by every educated man and by every person with enough literacy to read a book. Young people read it for the

[5]Translation by Joan Coyne, from *Fiesta in November*, 1942.

indecorous, hilarious, Peck's-Bad-Boyish adventures of a slow-witted inexpert young rogue's life among sharper, more expert rogues than himself; adults return to it with nostalgia and the erudite seek in it the recreation of a vanished age. The first edition, mutilated by the Viceroy's censor, came off the presses when Mexico was still a colony, in 1816. Since then it has run through at least eleven editions in Mexico, been published in every land where Spanish books are printed, and, until the recent civil war interrupted, was pouring off the presses of a popular Barcelona publishing house in editions which the translator-editor, Katherine Anne Porter, estimates with pardonable inexactness as "over a million a year." If the American reader meeting it through Miss Porter's excellent translation and condensation remains at a loss to account for the hold this book has had, it is partly because the rogue tale has never been an important element in our literary tradition, and much more because this work, like all the picaresque novels, springs from conditions and attitudes that have been perennial in Hispanic lands but fundamentally alien to our own.

Like all the tales of this genre it has no hero but an antihero, whose adventures are ridiculous, degrading, and absurd, an unmoral simpleton living by his "wits," cheating when he is able, more often cheated by those from whom he undertakes to learn. After deceiving his father and swindling his mother, he is orphaned and enters into the company of gamblers, pickpockets, beggars, irreligious and dissolute clerics, venal and corrupt magistrates, charlatan doctors; he lands in filthy prisons, hospitals, and low dives; plays blindman, highwayman, pander; is tricked and robbed by every one he trusts; finds no honor among thieves. This is a world in which only the very old and the very foolish are virtuous, and these are invariably preyed upon. The few windfalls and pleasant moments, the one or two benefactors he meets, are but contrast to intensify the general atmosphere of vileness and filth.

The author, who styled himself *El Pensador Mexicano* (The Mexican Thinker), played a role in early nineteenth-century colonial Mexico analogous to that of Defoe in eighteenth-century England. Like the typical rogue tales of Spain, this first novel of the New World is a sort of *Robinson Crusoe* in reverse. Defoe's epic of self-reliant individualism and constructive labor was a reflection in symbolic form of England's progressive, expanding capitalist economy; but the Spanish picaro represents the anti-epic of individualism seeking to wrest a living by hook or crook from a

society in progressive decline. The first rogue tale, *Lazarillo de Tormes,* appeared as a brilliant premonition while Spain was apparently at the height of her power, when her four centuries of inglorious decay were just about to begin. Spain's influence on the world was so great that *Lazarillo* was translated and imitated (in works of an essentially different spirit) throughout Europe. But the rogue tale fashion died quickly in other lands, while Lazarillo remained alive and became progenitor of an endless line. The picaro continued to live on in Spain and in her lands overseas because he gave expression to a world that is with the Spaniard still.

Conditions in the decadent years of the last Viceroydom in Mexico were singularly like those in which the first great picaresque classics were born. Small industry and common labor were being ruined by the unending flood of gold and silver from the mines. The poor creole (native-born Spanish white), educated like *El periquillo* "above his station," despised the world of dark-skinned toil, sought to live without useful labor, aped the luxurious aristocracy without the wherewithal to develop the graces or cultivate the vices connected with their envied state. Mexico City swarmed with irreligious and corrupt friars and lazy and corrupt officials. Some twenty thousand ragged, improvident *léperos* infested its streets and alleys, homeless, half naked, beggars by day, gamblers, rogues, thieves, pimps, prostitutes, cutthroats by night, living as best they might by the exercise of their wits, scorning the adoption of any useful pursuit as the nadir of degradation. It was to portray and criticize this world and to "improve by entertaining" that *El Pensador Mexicano* abandoned his ordinary political pamphleteering to write this scandalous tale. If it still retains its amazing popularity it is because neither Mexico nor Spain nor many other portions of the Spanish-speaking world have altogether outlived the conditions which make its barbs hit home and its recognizable, albeit distorted image entertain. Of course, there have been changes in the rogue tale through the centuries: from the Erasmian spirit of the satire in the tightly constructed *Lazarillo de Tormes* through the sententious, prolix, baroque critique of Mexican society by "The Mexican Thinker" writing under the spell of the French enlightenment, to the poetic, sentimental and skeptical irony of *La vida inútil de Pito Pérez* composed by one who was becoming aware that, despite the high promise of the Mexican Revolution, the rogue world and the rogue State were in existence still.

Indeed, if we would truly understand the Mexican Revolution in its aspirations and its shortcomings there is no better place to seek that understanding than in the Mexican novel. From the first, painters laid aside their brushes, and writers their pens to enter the fray, and, being artists, they continued to observe what went on around them with a more penetrating vision than other men. Some of the writers put their pens, too, to military uses, serving as literary aides-de-camp of the various guerrilla chieftains, inditing manifestoes, programs, plans, appeals, giving voice to the inarticulate hopes of the peons who had taken up arms. They meant every shining word they put into revolutionary proclamations and that sincerity gave them a standard of comparison, while the habit of ordering their impressions against a background of strongly felt values made them see too deeply into the realities around them to let them believe for long that "the revolution" had triumphed just because the "men of the revolution" had been carried into power. Guerrilla warfare is a brutal and terrible business at best. The *caudillos,* lacking any clear or deep-rooted philosophy of society and government, were too easily seduced by the prerogatives of power into believing that the revolution was now the government and the government was the revolution organized. As generals in the field they had confiscated "enemy" property, made forced levies, issued new printed pesos over their own signatures, acquired estates for themselves and their closest followers by agrarian "expropriation," carried off everything movable in their path. As victors they had their self-designated generalships confirmed, acquired governorships, cabinet posts, presidencies, prestige, power and wealth. Many of the writers, especially those who entered late after the hard years were nearly at an end, were carried along into the new bureaucracy as lesser officials and subsidized propagandists of the men in power. But the only indispensable virtue of the artist, sincerity to the truth of his own vision, caused many of these, too, to forfeit their places and perquisites in a land where no man can live by creative writing alone, for the sake of setting down truthfully what they felt and saw. Others were freed from their golden chains by the whirling buzz saw of Mexican political fortunes. It is at least poetic justice to be able to record that the time servers and those skilled in holding on despite changes of regime have not in general been able to write any of the good books that came out of the Mexican Revolution.

Of all the guerrilla chieftains, the attractive figure of Pancho Villa made the greatest appeal to poets. His audacious and stormy life, his humble outlaw origin and occasional deeds of Robin Hood largess, his martyr's death in treacherous ambuscade, seem made to order for the hero of a popular ballad. His social illiteracy and sporadic cruelty did not make his figure less but rather more attractive. Martín Luís Guzmán, one of Mexico's greatest prose writers, has made himself the novelist-laureate of Pancho Villa's life and miracles. He has made them the subject of two great works, a barely fictionalized biography that is at the same time a novel because the life it treats of is truly novelesque, and an "autobiography," a monologue that will run when completed to six volumes, in which the Villa he knew so well is made to tell the story of his life in such language as he himself would have used if he were dictating it to his literary aide-de-camp.[6]

In between his labors on the life of Villa which depict the Revolution as seen from the vantage point of the latter's camp, Guzmán turned his attention to life in the governmental palaces of the victorious "men of the Revolution" to produce a terrifying and vivid account of political intrigue, treachery, disloyalty, ambush, assassination in the determination of a presidential succession. *La sombra del caudillo* (*The Shadow of the Strong Man*), like his other works is more history than novel, and, like them, history that is more novelesque than it is usually given to the novelist's fantasy to create. So thinly fictionalized is the story that it is impossible for the Mexican reader to keep the real names off his lips as he reads.[7]

[6]Martín Luís Guzmán: *El aguila y la serpiente*, 1928, translated as *The Eagle and the Serpent*, 1930; *Las Memorias de Pancho Villa, Segun el texto establecido y ordenado por Martín Luís Guzmán*, Vol. I, 1938; Vols. II and III, 1939; Vol. IV, 1940; Vols. V and VI, in preparation. No translation of the *Memorias* has so far been made.

[7]There is as yet no English translation of this remarkable book, nor, for that matter, any adequate translation of the word *caudillo* used in its title. Sometimes it is best translated *chieftain*, sometimes *strong man*, sometimes *boss*, sometimes *military dictator* and there are yet other imperfect equivalents. Since this characteristic Iberian and Ibero-American institution is lacking in the Anglo-Saxon countries the word is lacking also. One of the first and greatest studies of a Latin American *caudillo* is Sarmiento's *Facundo*. Written in 1845 it was translated into English by Mrs. Horace Mann under the title: *Life in the Argentine Republic in the Days of the Tyrants, or Civilization and Barbarism*, London, 1868.

If *La sombra del caudillo* shows the Revolution as it looks from the summits of power and *The Eagle and the Serpent* as it appeared to the (somewhat idealized) chieftain in the field, it is to Mariano Azuela's *Los de abajo* (1916; translated into English as *The Underdogs,* 1929) that we must turn for a picture of the Revolution as it looked to the nameless local leaders and the fighting, suffering rank and file who came from the depths of Mexican society. To them the Revolution was first a bitter hatred and a flaming hope, then degenerated into a senseless marching and countermarching, killing and being killed for a succession of victorious leaders who were swift to forget the humble on whose backs they had climbed to power. In lean, nervous, staccato prose, as stark and violent as the deeds it portrays, this military surgeon turned novelist records the scenes of battle, march, and camp. The terrible power of the account is heightened by a tight restraint which forces the reader to react with intolerable intensity because the author has held his own feelings back. The sacrifice and suffering are there, the heroism and hope, the bewilderment and violence and despair. And through it all rings the unanswered question: What for? No one can read it without realizing that this is the great masterpiece of the Mexican Revolutionary novel.

The hero—protagonist rather—is not an individual but, as in so many of the Revolutionary novels, the entire mass of men. This, too, is part of an old tradition in Spanish letters given new impulse by modern social theories. It can be traced back to such classic roots as the popular democratic plays of Lope de Vega, the most notable of which is *Fuente Ovejuna* of which a village is the hero.[8]

* * *

One of the undoubted achievements of the Mexican Revolution has been a substantial redistribution of the land. This and the accompanying cult of the redemption of the Indian has represented not a step toward a post-capitalist society but rather a reversion toward primitive, preconquest subsistence agriculture. In time this reversal may well lead to a new Ibero-Indian fusion and a greater well-being and power over his own destiny for the common man. But how has this great reform worked out so far in practice? Here, too, the novel gives a disturbing answer. In the '30's,

[8]See Bertram D. Wolfe: "The Mass as Hero," in *The Modern Monthly,* March, 1933.

with the civil war a receding memory, we can watch the growing disillusion of the younger novelists. Thus Gregorio López y Fuentes' novel of Zapata's rebellion, *Tierra* (1933), ends with the assassination of Zapata (which took place in 1919). But the Indians have their land, and they have buried their rifles; to them Zapata is living still—the novel closes on a note of hope. Two years later the same writer overleaps a decade to examine the fate of the "redeemed" Indian in his own time. *El Indio* (1935; translated into English with the same title in 1937) is a frightful picture of exploitation and betrayal by politicians who rise to power with promises of redemption on their lips. In Mauricio Magdaleno's *Resplandor,* the Indian who attains to an education and becomes a teacher to his people goes to the big city to plead their cause but is corrupted by politics and forgets their woes. In Azuela's *San Gabriel de Valdivia* (1938) an agrarian leader uses his position to get power over his followers and their possessions and win for himself a governorship. A new champion rouses new hopes which die once more as soon as the latter begins to hint that he would like support in the coming elections. In the same author's *Avanzada* (1940) it is labor leaders who betray their trust.

A characteristic if less honest and less penetrating statement of this recurrent theme is to be found in *Cuando se engorda el Quijote* (*When Quixote Begins to Grow Fat,* 1937, untranslated), by Jorge Ferretis. The novel is weakened by identifying the degenerating revolutionary with Calles and implying that all the evils of omnipresent bureaucratic corruption were sloughed off when he was overthrown. But the symbol is well chosen and the formulations are typical for the whole mood of the younger revolutionary novelists. Writes Ferretis:

> The "indispensable one," the man of iron grew old, and what is worse, grew rich. The apostle of the improvement of the lot of the poor man, faithful to his program, devoted himself to the improvement of the lot of one poor man, himself. . . . One more of those countless aggressive servitors who, with the purity of youth, seek to rise in the profession of righting wrongs. But the Quixote within them rusts and no longer distils holy bile. They are made dizzy by success. Quixote grows faint in them, and then grows fat, as if weary of privations. . . . Like those delicate maidens who once they have secured a husband no longer care whether they overflow at hip and breasts with sleepy and

swollen fat, so our apostles no longer care whether they lose the difficult line of the quixotism which made them sharp of edge. . . .[9]

Such is the verdict of the Mexican novel on the present state of the Mexican Revolution. If it seems gloomy and bitter, it is not cynical nor utterly despairing, for it is set down with honesty and supported by the unstated premise of a still living hope.

* * *

If we could examine the novels of others of these twenty countries as we have the Mexican Revolutionary novel, we would find diversity as great as characterizes their geographical and cultural landscapes. By regions rather than by single lands, they would bear the imprint of their origins: tales of perilous tropic seas, of great mountain ranges and melancholy high plateaus, of rain forests, jungles and mangrove swamps, of oil fields and mines, of endless grassy pampas, of great cities. The cities, too, would differ from region to region: busy seaports facing toward Europe, receptive to all its currents of feeling and thought; bureaucratic centers of population and internal trade in the heart of the high tablelands where they never see the sea; cities of the West Coast, cut off by the Andes from Europe and the rest of their own continent, gazing out upon the immense and empty Pacific; tradition-steeped cities set in the midst of somnolent, unchanging regions; provincial cities "where nothing ever happens"; cities that live on the memories of departed colonial splendor, encouraging their young writers to turn their faces forever to the past.

Though the novelist may write more frequently of the land, it is the city which provides the density of social intercourse and social experience necessary for the modern novel to arise. If we have devoted less attention to the urban novel than to the novels of the land, of the Indian, of the *caudillo* and the Revolution, it is not because urban novels are lacking, nor because they are lacking in interest, but rather because they differ less from those with which we are familiar.

Yet this seeming resemblance grows less as we look more closely. Something impalpable yet essential—a style, a mood, an outlook, a rhythm, a tradition, an attitude toward the universe—sets them apart from

[9]For a documented study of this question of the bureaucratic degeneration of the Mexican Revolution, see Ruth Sedgwick: "The Land Question Enters Mexican Literature," in *Hispania*, December 1942.

the urban novel of other lands and makes it possible for us to say of any one of them, "This is Latin American," just as surely as we can say of the others, "This is French, or English, or Spanish, or Russian," though all local signs be removed.

Even when the same topical themes are treated, their expression takes on an utterly different life. Thus, the urban novelists of Brazil, Chile, Argentina, have explored their great cities in depth, delving into slums, workingmen's quarters, waterfront dives, thieves' dens, houses of prostitution. Never for one moment could we confuse these works with the novels of the underworld of the United States, the Parisian tale of the demimonde, or the portrayal of the vagabond or the lost denizen of Russia's "lower depths."

Or here is Eduardo Mallea's *Fiesta in November* (1939; translated 1942) dealing with a commonplace and contemporary international topic: a decadent, acquisitive aristocracy exhibited against the ominous ground of emergent fascist barbarism. Its setting, too, would seem international: the great world metropolis, even megalopolis, of Buenos Aires, with its dense foreign immigration, its more than four million inhabitants, its European attachments and whirring gadget-fitted modernity. Yet any page of the novel selected at random will tell us that it could not possibly have been conceived and executed in this fashion in any other capital.

So, too, Magdalena Petit's novel of witchcraft (*La Quintrala*), an unusual combination of psychological study, thriller, and poetic evocation of the atmosphere of colonial Chile, could never be mistaken on any page for a novel springing from the tortured Puritan repentance at the witch burnings of colonial New England.

Perhaps the only significant Latin American work in which this special imprint may at moments be lost sight of is *Brother Ass* by the Chilean Eduardo Barrios. Its title is from Saint Francis (Brother Ass is his name for the Flesh) and its theme has deep roots in the Spanish spirit. But its method and mood owe more to Dostoyevsky. The central figure is a monk of arrogant humility standing uncertain on the very brink of sainthood, his emotional nature overwrought, his concern with holiness and damnation obsessive, his spirit all blinding light and terrifying shadow, his actions seeming to spring from demoniac compulsion. The innocently flirtatious young girl with whose soul (or is it her body?) he is so intensely preoccupied might be out of Dostoyevsky, too, as might be

the saintly-satanic paradox where good and evil become one which provides the novel with its explosive climax. But is not this kinship due as much to the kinship of spirit that links Dostoyevsky and El Greco, or the former's Grand Inquisitor with Spain's Torquemada and Loyola? And could this be any but a Chilean monastery which, more than setting, provides the all-pervasive atmosphere and frame of physical reference for this drama of the spirit? Or could the practical mystics and earthy Sancho Panzas of the monastery who serve as counterpoint come from any country not descended from Spain?

* * *

From the novel of the land with its overwhelming natural forces and its anonymous collective folk hero to the interior drama of the individual soul, we have completed a cycle that suggests the wide range of the Latin American novel. We have seen it functioning as the chief form of expression through which the modern urban man of Latin America is becoming conscious of himself, exploring his countryside and continent, examining his society, seeking to comprehend his nature and his destiny. From the two dozen or so of representative works that have been translated into our language we can learn more, I am certain, of the history, culture, spirit of these lands than from all the chronicles, travelogues, guides, sociological treatises, which have sought to serve as interpreters.

WHAT PRICE AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY?

By IRWIN ROSS

THE DIRECTION of our foreign policy toward Europe is clearer than the tangled web of motives that underlie it. The first element in that policy has long since become known as Darlanism—making deals with every renegade fascist in order to speed the day of military victory. The official purpose and explanation of Darlanism—sheer military expediency—is simple, reasonable, and in accordance with the renascent tough-mindedness of embattled Americans, even those whose skirmishes occur only on the home front.

The second element in our war-time foreign policy is more vaulting than mere military expediency. It looks beyond the hurried improvisations of Darlanism, although closely linked with it. Its ambitions encompass the entire political contour of postwar Europe; they embrace the destinies of millions. In sum, we are striving to achieve peace and stability in Europe by reverting to the genteel reaction of the nineteenth century, by promoting a species of despotism that is no less effectively despotic for being rhetorically democratic—monarchy in one country, clerical fascism in another, circumscribed and "safe" republicanism in a third.

This is not the official policy of the United States in the sense that it is the policy enunciated in the speeches of Roosevelt, Hull, or Welles. But it is official inasmuch as this is what our diplomats in the field and our experts in the State Department are doing. There is assuredly no novelty, at this late date, in finding a great gulf between the words of Roosevelt and the deeds of his diplomatic underlings.

I have just spent a month interviewing leaders of the exiled European governments and "free movements." I have talked with people whose opinions range the entire political spectrum from left to right. On one point all the democrats, all the antifascists agree: in North Africa, Spain, Austria, Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy, Germany, our government has been snubbing the democrats and propitiating the reactionaries and fascists. It is our invariable rule.

The activities of the State Department are clear enough. Less clear are the motives for building this grand edifice of reaction. In many minds, the dominating theme is fear of a great upsurge of popular revolt on the continent after the war. The dissolution of the Communist International has not substantially lessened this fear. The working class in Europe is traditionally socialist in the libertarian, pre-Leninist sense. The peasants are land-hungry and consequently amenable to radical suggestion. The menace to property of these popular movements of economic liberation is verbalized into the Menace of Bolshevism. To slay the red dragon, no device then becomes too base.

Others of our diplomatic strategists are immune to the pull of so-called "class interest." Some are persuaded that the hope for stability in Europe lies not in the will-o'-the-wisp wisdom of the populace but in the restoration of legitimacy, based on the traditional dynasties and buttressed by the Vatican. The people, they say, are unstable, uncertain of their own true interests, vagrant in their loyalties. You can only make lasting arrangements with royal henchmen or the square-shooting, tough-minded followers of the shirted leader.

Finally, some of our policy-makers are affected with benign, optimistic inertia. They are the perennial hopefuls. They have succumbed to *drift*. Persuaded that every shady deal is only temporary and for the commendable purpose of hastening the victory of our arms, they are supremely confident that although we bolster reaction today, we will somehow install democracy in Europe tomorrow.

Whatever these conflicts in motives, our actions head in one direction and they are running into powerful opposition. This opposition comes from two sources. From the wilderness of Europe, from the enslaved and oppressed millions, we hear a simple plea for *freedom*—political, economic. The people of Europe look to the leadership of the United Nations for salvation. In many countries they are still hopeful. In others—notably in Yugoslavia—they have grown disillusioned with the crumbs of Anglo-American assistance. They now take their destinies into their own hands, look solely to Russia for external succor and assistance.

From Russia comes the second onslaught of opposition. Russia is again prey to her old fear of being isolated and attacked by the Western powers after this war. She interprets our dubious politicking in the salons of European reaction as being directed primarily against herself. She sees

the wholesome concept of Central and Eastern European confederation perverted into a new *cordon sanitaire* rimming her western frontiers. And she hasn't forgotten Munich and the whole decade of bitter frustration that preceded it.

The Soviet Union has already begun her diplomatic counteroffensive. It takes two forms. First, she is reverting to the traditional capitalist safeguard of territorial aggrandizement. To buttress her frontier defenses, Russia is claiming part of Finland, all of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, a good chunk of Poland, and Bessarabia. Here she is retreating to the psychology that led her to sign the Nazi-Soviet Pact and wage war on Finland. But for the sake of the Fatherland's security, the Soviet Union has simultaneously embarked on another, less orthodox tack: once again she is striving to influence the course of foreign revolutions. The ends in view are new regimes built roughly on the Soviet model. Russia, of course, does not instigate revolts. The more successful policy is to insinuate herself into popular movements once they've got underway, to provide experienced leadership and material assistance. Such is the story in Yugoslavia—a country cursed with a civil war, in the midst of a war of liberation from the Axis invader.

The demise of the Comintern is likely to mean little change in this aspect of the Soviets' European policy. Russia, after all, has no need of a public apparatus to win the underground movements to her side. Liaison work can be carried on without benefit of the International's manifestoes. So long as the dictates of security hold, Russia will continue to befriend European revolution—although "world revolution" has long since ceased to be a goal. Stalin had other reasons for abandoning the Comintern—perhaps to undercut Axis propaganda and/or to aid in another effort at American-Soviet co-operation and/or to help the British and American Communists get back into the fold of the regular labor movements.

Thus we see the danger of the postwar policy of the United States and, to a lesser extent, of Great Britain. We are throwing Europe into Russia's hands. The people of Europe, in the main, owe no particular allegiance to Russia. They want, simply speaking, democracy—in Maury Maverick's phrase, "free speech and groceries." But they assuredly don't want the shopworn type of reaction that we are offering. In recoil from our shabby goods, they fall back on the Russian marketplace. Russia becomes the lesser evil.

The reasons become clearer if we examine the situation in each of the diplomatic theatres of Europe. First, North Africa and Spain—where our unswerving policy has been support for the totalitarians. Moving on to Austria, we find the War and State Departments rebuffing the democrats and assisting the Pretender, the personable Otto. In the case of Italy and Germany, United States officials refuse co-operation to the democratic underground movements. And when we finally reach the harassed refugee governments of Central and Eastern Europe, we see the State Department giving its benign blessing to just about every discredited politician who escaped the Nazi onslaught.

II

Our activities in North Africa are too well known to require elaborate exegesis. Everybody knows that when the liberators arrived, they overlooked the slaves and made a compact with their masters. Once again, not officially. The mellifluous rhetoric was all to the effect that the gates of the Vichy jails would be thrown open, freeing French patriots, Spanish Republicans, antifascists from every land. The anti-Semitic decrees were to be abolished. A semblance of democracy was to be introduced into the government. For weeks none of these things happened. Instead, a number of De Gaullist Frenchmen, who had aided the invasion, were put behind bars. The whole motley Vichy crew remained at the head of the state. To bolster their hand, we imported Marcel Peyrouton from South America. His qualifications were that he was not only a good reactionary but a good administrator as well.

The protests from outraged democrats poured in on Washington. British officialdom felt a little queasy at our blithe Machiavellisms. The Russians were disturbed. After months of mounting pressure, the situation improved somewhat. A number of antifascists were set free. Some anti-Semitic regulations were abolished; certain Vichymen were dropped. And, at long last *rapprochement* between Giraud and De Gaulle has occurred, with Giraud making further concessions. It is important to note, however, that De Gaulle's fight for democratic guarantees seems about to be won *despite* rather than because of State Department policies.

The definitive criticism of our North African policy was recently voiced by Edgar Ansel Mowrer, whose disagreements with our official line caused him to leave his O.W.I. post. Said Mowrer:

> I have nothing against using the men of Vichy. What was wrong was . . . putting them in political control as the price of their aid—in considering them not as our instruments, but as our Allies. In their fight against gangsters here at home, municipal policemen, even the G-men, often accept the services of renegades . . . . But suppose that, let us say, a few years ago in my own city of Chicago, the Capone mob had at one point offered to assist the police in liquidating the North Side mob, on condition of being allowed to govern the suburb of Cicero—allowed to maintain gang rule and jail the honest man. Suppose the police had accepted, what would the country have said to that?

Such is the optimism and gullibility of liberals that our North African policy came as a surprise. Actually, it could have been predicted on the basis of what we had been doing in Spain. First, through the hypocrisy of "nonintervention," we helped kill the Spanish Republic. Then, within three days of Franco's triumph, we tendered him official recognition. And ever since we have been shipping him the material wherewithal to maintain his regime. Our Spanish policy is excused on the basis that here, at last, is appeasement that has worked. Look how we have kept Franco neutral! (We neglect to add that Hitler can still march through Spain any time it suits his purpose.)

And when we read the fawning words that our Ambassador, Carlton J. H. Hayes, addressed to the Franco businessmen, we begin to wonder whether appeasement isn't another name for holding out a helping hand to a brother in distress. Hayes praised Spain for "doing so much with such obvious success to develop a peace economy that can, and will, carry this country into a future period of world peace." Our Ambassador commended the "wise direction of the government which, while fostering works of peace at home, has held aloof from war abroad."

Appeasing North African Vichymen and Franco Spain can at least be rationalized on the ground that we are dealing with persons who wield power, who are able to offer immediate recompense for our favors. No such excuse can be made for the support we have tendered Otto Hapsburg, pretender to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

For years, the handsome, charming Otto—an exile from Austria since the age of six—has been jogging about Europe trying to get support for his triumphal return. A few years ago he shifted his activities to this country. He enjoyed an immediate social triumph. More important was the support he rolled up from government officials. Senator Langer of North Dakota heads his senatorial backers. Representatives Priest of

Tennessee, Eberharter of Pennsylvania, Jarman of Alabama, lead the House contingent. Priest and Jarman have put Otto's speeches into the *Congressional Record*.

These triumphs were minor compared to the great boost he received from Henry Stimson. On November 20, 1942, to celebrate Otto's thirtieth birthday, five hundred guests met with him at the Essex House in New York. They wined and dined, sang the Star Spangled Banner and the imperial national anthem. In a gesture of fine impartiality, the hall was decorated with both the red-white-and-red flag of the late Austrian Republic and the black and yellow emblem of the old monarchy. The climax of the evening came when Otto read a letter from Secretary Stimson, felicitating him on his birthday and accepting his offer to recruit volunteers for the Austrian Battalion, just set up in the American Army. Stimson's letter was significantly addressed to "Otto of Austria," not "Otto Hapsburg." Stimson wrote:

> Your letter is gratefully acknowledged. The offer of your Military Committee for the Liberation of Austria has been accepted by this Department. The assistance of your committee in recruiting volunteers for the Austrian Battalion will materially aid in the success of the Unit. I am certain that the Austrian nationals in the U. S. will seize this opportunity to serve our common cause. Your immediate response to the invitation of the War Department is deeply appreciated.

Stimson's welcome to Otto's recruiting efforts is doubly significant in that there are two alternative groups of Austrian nationals in this country to whom he might have appealed. Both Austrian Action, composed of political middle-of-the-roaders, and the Austrian Labor Committee, a group of Socialists, have unblemished democratic records. Yet they were overlooked. Stimson's action was a profound shock not only to Austrians and Hungarians, but to democratic Italians, Czechoslovaks, Yugoslavs, Poles, Rumanians—people who for years had fought against the Hapsburg yoke. Their ire was further aroused by his insistence that he had consulted the State Department before writing Otto.

The subsequent history of the Battalion illustrated the appeal Otto holds for Austrians in this country. After months of strenuous efforts, Otto recruited less than fifty individuals, two of them his brothers. The Army finally abolished the Battalion.

Although Stimson denies that his actions had any political motivation, it is impossible to regard them in any other light. Otto has never re-

nounced his claim to the Austro-Hungarian throne. He doesn't talk about his pretensions publicly, but won't deny them when pressed. Otto may be no big brain, but he is a clever fellow and very ingratiating. His flair for the histrionic does him credit. When I sought to see him, I had to run the gamut, by telephone, of several of his retinue, all of whom referred to him as "His Highness, the Archduke" and made the conditions of the interview exceedingly complicated. When I arrived at his suite on the thirty-third floor of the Essex House, I was admitted by a stocky gentleman who looked at me a trifle disdainfully, silently noted my name and ushered me to a chair. He left the room. I perched uncomfortably on the edge of my seat and waited for several minutes for something to happen. Suddenly the door burst open and Otto, lanky, daintily mustachioed, handsome in a fragile way, came striding into the room, his face wreathed in smiles, his arm extended for a handclasp. It was a wonderful stage entrance, a neatly executed change of pace. After the restrained, haughty build-up, one couldn't help marveling: what a nice guy, how democratic! And his appearance was well designed to carry out this impression. He was dressed in a loosely-fitting blue-striped suit, which patently jarred with the brown tie he sported. The whole ensemble was moderately mussed, his shoulders a little flecked with dandruff. What a comfortable kind of monarch to have around!

He talked fluently about the necessity of the unconditional liberation of Europe from the Nazi yoke. "If even one inch of conquered territory should remain to the Nazis," he explained, "it would teach the Germans that aggression paid." He came out four-square for the Atlantic Charter. He also came out four-square for the State Department's North African policy. He thought the invasion and the deal with Darlan were handled "magnificently." I asked whether our importing the fascist Peyrouton to North Africa was equally magnificent. Otto suddenly decided he couldn't comment on this matter. It was an "internal French question." Finally I got to the point. I asked what was the logic of a Hapsburg restoration. Otto shrugged. "If the Austrians want it"— he smiled blandly —"they have a right to have it." But no, he wasn't making any propaganda for a restoration. At the present time, that would be "divisive." Said Otto: "I am now devoting my activities to one purpose—freeing Europe from Hitler and Mussolini."

III

Rebuffing the democrats and promoting the reactionaries has characterized our policy not only toward the free Austrian movement, but toward the Italians and Germans as well. Count Carlo Sforza, the grand old man of Italian antifascism, doffed his usual reticence and put the case to me bitterly and bluntly: "A great nation like the Italian is asked to revolt while at the same time secret smiles are directed at the fascist leaders, who have been the supporters and the necessary accomplices of the criminal Mussolini. This war will not be won by diplomatic tricks."

Sforza wouldn't fill out the indictment, but from some of his supporters I got the salient details. At first, the United States government displayed an imaginative, democratic attitude toward the Italian underground movement. It understood that the best ally of an external military assault is revolution behind the enemy's lines. Our officials were consequently careful to differentiate between the fascist criminals and their victims, the Italian people. Last Columbus Day, this belief was implemented with decisive and far-reaching action: henceforth, Italians in this country were to be considered "friendly" rather than "enemy" aliens. The former restrictions on their activities were removed.

Meanwhile, behind the scenes, discussions had been going on between representatives of the underground movement and officials in the Office of Strategic Services and the State Department. The Italians wanted precise and practical assistance: help in getting some of their best underground workers back to Europe; the use of a medium-wave broadcast station; conferences with the military to plan for insurrections within Italy. For a while negotiations were proceeding satisfactorily. Suddenly they broke down. And then the press began to fill up with rumors of the conversations American representatives were carrying on with would-be Italian Darlans—envoys of the House of Savoy, dissident generals like Badoglio, diplomats like Dino Grandi. The Vatican figured as intermediary in these talks. Archbishop Spellman departed for Rome, by way of Madrid and a lunch date with Franco. His mission was popularly supposed to be designed to pull Italy out of the war. This, of course, is all in the realm of rumor, fascinating to conjure with but impossible to check factually. But one thing must be said: we know that American emissaries are trotting back and forth to the Vatican—first Myron Taylor, then

Spellman. We know at the same time that the American government is politely avoiding any collaboration with the democratic, antifascist Italian underground. The inference that we are instead fishing for Darlans is the only hypothesis that remains to explain our feverish diplomatic activity in the Italian theatre.

Our relations with the German underground are a rough carbon copy of the frustrating Italian tale. The representatives in this country of the German movement get no assistance from the State Department or the Office of Strategic Services. Plans and memoranda are piled high on the desks of responsible Washington bureaucrats. They are never decisively rejected, but they have never been accepted. Meanwhile, the O.S.S. is promoting a band of former German officials, with right wing leanings, as its solution of the German problem. These men regard former Chancellor Heinrich Bruening as their ideological leader.

Meanwhile, within Germany, as the Russian armies smash westward, the Communist underground grows constantly in strength and numbers. The democratic underground—handicapped by its alienation from the British and American governments, victimized by Allied blunders in foreign policy—does well to hold its own. Its ranks are not expanding at anything like the pace of the Communists. This information comes to me from official representatives in this country of the German democratic movement.

IV

The shortsightedness that distinguishes our relations with the various "free movements" is displayed equally flamboyantly in our policy toward the exiled governments of Eastern and Central Europe. The refugee Czechoslovak regime is the only exception to the general rule—mainly because the liberal leadership of Prime Minister Eduard Benes is firmly in the saddle. The State Department, against its original inclination, has been forced to treat earnestly with Benes as witness the cordial reception he enjoyed on his recent visit to Washington.

Our dealings with the exiled governments can be likened to our policy toward the Spanish Civil War. Then the morally impeccable rhetoric of "nonintervention" hid the most vicious kind of intervention on the reactionary side. Similarly with the refugee governments today. Washington cannot help but carry enormous influence with them. The

governments of Poland, Greece, Yugoslavia are ranged definitely on the right. Each of them has no more than the barest shred of a popular mandate. So far as we can learn, the masses of their people are far beyond these governments in their democratic aspirations. We therefore have a duty to throw the weight we necessarily possess on the side of the liberals and the democrats in these regimes. To hold back, to "nonintervene" means, in practice, to support the reactionaries who have already jockeyed themselves into office.

The Yugoslav government has the greatest semblance of a popular mandate. It came to power in the bloodless revolution of March 27, 1941. But the Polish and Greek governments hardly represent the freely expressed will of their people, having been formed after their countries were overrun by the Axis.

When we examine these regimes one by one, their ultra-conservative character becomes appallingly evident. The Polish government is theoretically middle-of-the-road, since it is a coalition of the four major political parties. The cabinet consists of two members of the Nationalist party; two members of the Labor Party—about as laborite as the French Radical Socialist Party was radical socialist; two members each of the Socialist and Peasant parties; and four nonparty people. Three of these latter are distinctly men of the right. So are the laborites. As for the ultraconservative Nationalists, their number tips the balance securely in the direction of tough-minded conservatism. The left has only four members—the Socialists and Peasants. Premier Wladyslaw Sikorski, nonparty, mediates between right and left.

Polish reaction has already got itself embroiled in conflicts with the Czechs and Russians. Several months ago the Czechoslovak and Polish governments signed an agreement approving the principle of confederation and initiating conversations looking to its realization. Recently the Czechs suddenly terminated the talks. They have become increasingly perturbed about the character of the Polish government and its difficulties with the Russians.

These difficulties are complex, but enormously significant. The Soviets are claiming the Polish Ukraine and White Russia. The Poles are vociferously resisting. The Russians rest their legal case on a plebiscite they held in these regions after the Red Army took over in September, 1939. The plebiscite—quite understandably—was almost unanimous for the Soviets.

The Poles reject this vote, call it a mockery and insist on Russian adherence to the 1921 Treaty of Riga, which recognized Polish sovereignty over the disputed territories. The Poles are certainly justified in ridiculing the 1939 plebiscite. On the other hand, the Russians have a better case in the undeniable fact that the Ukrainians and White Russians were mistreated by the Poles, that they had comprised a genuine irredentist element in prewar Poland, and that it was only as a consequence of Russian weakness in 1921 that they had been surrendered.

Czech officials privately insist that the Poles are less concerned with the illegality of the 1939 plebiscite and more with the desirability of maintaining their great landed estates. Some Poles are really startling in the scope of their imperialist dreams. They see postwar Poland embracing all the territories that had historically ever belonged to her. In this connection, the Czechs regard the election to the Polish National Council—a sort of parliament-in-exile—of a Pole who comes from Teschen as indicating a continuing Polish claim to this region, which belonged to Czechoslovakia before Munich. The Czechs are more than a little annoyed.

To an outsider, the best solution to the ticklish Polish-Soviet border dispute would seem to be a plebiscite—held after the war and under the auspices of an impartial United Nations commission. Whatever the solution, it is apparent that the present Polish government, by its day-to-day activities, openly seeks to be the keystone of a renascent *cordon sanitaire* against Russia. A number of highly placed American government officials like the idea; certainly Washington, scrupulously nonintervening in Polish affairs, does nothing to discourage it.

The Greek government in exile presents almost as sorry a spectacle as the Polish. It is composed, for the most part, of former collaborators of the Metaxas dictatorship, which ruled the country from 1936 to 1940. Prime Minister Emmanuel Tsouderos headed the Bank of Greece for three years under Metaxas. The present finance minister, Varvaressos, succeeded Tsouderos in this post. Aristides Dimitratos, fascist labor chief from 1936 to 1940, was retained in the Tsouderos cabinet for many months. Other cabinet members never possessed any political power in prewar Greece and have only their competence as prime minister's yes-men to recommend them for office.

For decades Greece has vacillated between republicanism and monarchy. Today the question is once again a burning issue. The fairest

method of settling it would seem to be a postwar plebiscite. But the government is adamant on this point. Although the cabinet promises to resign once it returns to Greece, no freedom is to be allowed the people to decide for or against the King. Since it is impossible to find substantial support at home for George's repatriation, the cabinet has curried favor with the British and American governments. They toured the King in this country, generally built him up as a hero. The British support George, grateful for the resistance he put up to the Axis. Greek democrats consider the British gratitude misplaced. If the King and Metaxas hadn't led the struggle—they say—such was the overwhelming anti-Axis sentiment of the people that the government would have been overthrown, as was later to be the fate of the appeasement regime of Prince Regent Paul in Yugoslavia. Should the British persist in supporting the King, they will forfeit the friendship of the Greek people. And in Greece, as elsewhere, as British and American prestige falls, Russia's stock bounds upward. Communism then seems the only road to freedom.

The familiar pattern of exiled governmental reaction, blessed with British and American support, is also to be found in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia, indeed, presents a preview of what may occur throughout Europe as a consequence of our diplomatic blundering. After the country was overrun by the Nazis in the spring of 1941, General Draja Mihailovich organized the scattered remnants of the defeated Yugoslav army and proceeded to make things hot for the Germans. The first trickle of news stories about Mihailovich soon swelled into a flood of heroic accounts. The British were rumored to be dropping him supplies from the air. Mihailovich was rumored to be immobilizing countless Nazi divisions. In one of the saddest hours of United Nations campaigning, Draja—as Serbians in this country fondly call him—was of inestimable value in maintaining morale.

Later it became apparent that Mihailovich was meeting opposition from among his compatriots. Guerrilla bands that soon became known as Partisans accused him of being too easy-going in fighting the invaders. They would do it their own way. When Mihailovich turned to give battle to the Partisans, who were also being attacked by the Axis forces, he was accused of open collaboration with the enemy. The Partisans also opposed Mihailovich because, as minister of war, he was the immediate representative of the exiled government. They distrusted the government

for being bent on establishing Serbian hegemony over the other two peoples that comprise Yugoslavia—the Croats and the Slovenes.

It is difficult to determine the justice of the Partisan claim that Mihailovich wasn't fighting vigorously enough. Louis Adamic, who knows more about Yugoslavia than perhaps any other American, inclines to the Partisan view. He characterizes the Mihailovich forces as representing the appeasement viewpoint, and the Partisans as favoring thoroughgoing resistance. According to Adamic, the Partisans want to kill Germans any time, any place, the more the merrier, whereas Mihailovich thinks in terms of traditional warfare—enemy casualties are not the end so much as the gaining of strategic positions, preparing the way, acting as the advance agent of the Allied troops soon to invade the Balkans.

As for the Partisan charge that the Yugoslav government favors Serbian hegemony, this is doubtless true. The government is on record as being opposed to Serbian hegemony and as favoring Serbo-Croat-Slovenian unity. Off the record, Yugoslav diplomats and other government officials —although by no means all—are most energetic in stirring up Serbs throughout the world against the Croats. Their principal grievance is the massacres the Serbs have suffered at the hands of the Croat fascist bands. Serb chauvinists blame the whole Croat nation for these crimes.

The result of this virtual civil war is that not only are Great Britain and the United States opposing Russia in the diplomatic double-talk about the postwar world that goes on incessantly, but that here, for the first time, the Allies are ranged on opposite sides of actual barricades. We and the British are supporting Mihailovich; the Russians are aiding the Partisans with advice, propaganda, and perhaps armament. So far the Partisans have fared best. By last fall, they had not only conquered an area in Yugoslavia larger than Connecticut, but they called a constituent assembly in the little town of Bihac in northern Bosnia and set up a republic. They have a functioning government apparatus, a well-disciplined army, a number of newspapers, even a national orchestra.

The situation in Yugoslavia offers a neat foretaste of what we may expect if the present policy of our State Department blithely continues on its way. Bolstering reaction in Europe in order to isolate Russia in the postwar world will result not in isolating Russia but in extending its sway over the minds and hearts of the subjugated peoples of Europe. In Yugoslavia the Communist Party is not a large factor. Yet Yugoslav

democrats of all persuasions welcome Communist leadership of both the Yugoslav and Russian variety because of their dissatisfaction with the leadership offered by the Western democracies. Russia becomes the savior because America and Great Britain have made themselves into the devil incarnate.

Recently there have been rumors that conversations were under way between representatives of Mihailovich and the Partisans. There is even a hint released by the Yugoslav information office in New York that Allied governments are proffering their good offices in order to patch things up. The future would indeed be bright if a truce in Yugoslavia's internecine war would indicate a more extensive accord between this country, Great Britain, and Russia.

Actually, such an accord is quite possible. At no point do the interests of Russia clash with those of the Western democracies. Russia is no longer concerned with world revolution as such. Britain and the United States have long since ceased to be aggressively imperialist. Hence they can easily get together.

For two decades Russian foreign policy has revolved around the search for national security. If the United Nations could agree *now* on a genuine system of postwar collective security—and if the United States government could cease underwriting reaction in Europe and instead befriend democracy—Russia would see no need for satellite states to protect her borders, or puppet Communist regimes in Central Europe to guarantee her against future attack. Russia's recent action in recognizing Czechoslovakia's frontiers indicates that she is eager to co-operate with democracies who bear her no ill will. The excellent relations that exist between Benes and Stalin are one of the few hopeful auguries of the future. The rest is up to us.

JOHN C. CALHOUN, PHILOSOPHER OF REACTION

By RICHARD NELSON CURRENT

THE SHADE of John C. Calhoun, who died in 1850, still haunts the Southern scene. He, after all, was the original architect of the Solid South. He it was who took Jefferson's liberal doctrine of State Rights and identified it with a policy of reaction. He, more than anyone else, made the presence of the Negro an occasion for repressing white men along with black. Wherever contemporary Bourbons take counsel together, somewhere in their midst hovers the ghost of the Great Nullifier.

Today the keepers of the reactionary tradition find much to take counsel about. Fissures are appearing in the masonry of their Solid South, with all which that implies. The cross winds of the New Deal have shaken the venerable structure, and the disturbing currents of the Four Freedoms are giving it another buffeting. Not that the time has come to predict its early collapse, for it withstood the disruptive gusts of Populism in the 1890's and recovered quickly enough from the inroads of Republicanism in 1928. Indeed, the Solid South was created in the first place as a windbreak against external storms of popular aspiration—as a defense, that is, against the threats of "outside agitators"—and the harder the winds have blown, the more urgent has been the motive to patch and shore it up. No matter what political realignments may be in store for 1944 or 1948, such are the repercussions of the challenge of the new democracy, from Hindustan to Harlem and beyond, that reactionary leaders in the South will be bound to maintain some kind of effective solidarity behind the Mason and Dixon front.

The problem they now face is remarkably like the one Calhoun had to contend with in his day, for the vicissitudes of a century have altered the picture only in its details. *Plus ça change, plus la même chose.* The central theme of Southern history has remained the same, but this theme is not what the older school of Southern historians said it was—the maintenance of white supremacy. It is the maintenance of the supremacy of *some* white men, and as a means to this end the fiction of a general white

supremacy has been extremely useful. In Calhoun's day the myth took the form of the "proslavery argument," which in truth was inspired not so much by the agitation of Northern fanatics as by the democratic questionings of Southern slaveless farmers. One of Calhoun's own proslavery arguments was this, that simply to turn the Negroes loose without giving them full civic and social rights would not be to free them at all but only to change the form of their bondage: they would cease to be slaves of individual masters and become slaves of the community as a whole. As applied to the group servitude which Calhoun thus foretold, abolition continues to be a live issue in the South. The W. P. A., for example, was abolitionist when it provided alternative employment at unwonted wages for low-paid "colored help." So is the war-time industrial program, wherever Negroes are allowed to compete freely for jobs. So, too, are the world-wide stirrings accompanying this second war for, ostensibly, the establishment of human rights.

The preservation of a South solid against the Negro may well depend on what interests *outside the South* can be enlisted in its defense. This, also, the prophetic Calhoun realized in his day. When he called upon the South to unite, as he did again and again, he was often accused of having "something very sinister," like secession, in mind. He disavowed such aims and assured suspicious Northerners that a "union" of Southerners was a distinct benefit to the larger Union itself and to all concerned. It was, in fact, essential to the smooth working of the machinery of the federal constitution. "The machine never works well when the South is divided," Calhoun declared, "nor badly when it is united." He strove consistently to win Northern sympathy and support for his united South. In these efforts there lurked something really more sinister, in its significance for American democracy, than any thought of disunion.

The true meaning of Calhoun's career has not been clearly understood. In the minds of most students of American history, the South Carolinian stands as the pre-eminent spokesman for the contemporary planting interests of his state and section and, by virtue of that position, also as the chief political foe of the rising captains of industry in the North. He was, of course, the planter champion, yet he himself insisted that he was "no enemy of manufactures or of manufacturers, but quite the reverse," and he was heard to say that the "interests of the *gentlemen* of the North and of the South" were "identical." There is ample ground for

taking him at his word. Although he detested the political program of the industrialists, he beheld another danger far greater than what they had to offer. In the rise of a proletariat in the industrial states he foresaw a menace to the security of factory owners and plantation proprietors alike. While, both as a politician and as a theorist, he defended the slave system against the encroachments of the capitalist economy, at the same time he aspired to a grander role as leader of a combined conservatism against the universal forces of revolt.

Historians have completely overlooked the key to Calhoun's political philosophy. That key is a concept of the class struggle. Before Calhoun, other Southern thinkers, notably James Madison and John Taylor of Caroline, had given expression to more or less well developed ideas of the conflict of social classes, for this was a notion familiar enough to a generation of Americans brought up largely on the history of ancient Greece and Rome. But these others took a liberal view, John Taylor, for one, favoring co-operation of farmers and artisans against their mutual enemy, the moneyed power. Calhoun was strictly the reactionary. Unlike the others, moreover, he used a terminology and treatment which in many respects anticipated the later "scientific" approach of Friedrich Engels and Karl Marx.

He started, as Marx and Engels were also to do, with John Locke's so-called labor theory of value. From that assumption he deduced that in all contemporary and historical societies, except the most primitive, there existed a system of exploitation of a working class. "Let those who are interested remember," he once wrote, "that labor is the only source of wealth, and how small a portion of it, in all old and civilized countries, even the best governed, is left to those by whose labor wealth is created." On another occasion he repeated that "there never has yet existed a wealthy and civilized society in which one portion of the community did not, in point of fact, live on the labor of the other," and that "it would not be difficult to trace the various devices by which the wealth of all civilized communities has been so unequally divided, and to show by what means so small a share has been allotted to those by whose labor it was produced, and so large a share given to the nonproducing classes." Unlike the Marxists, Calhoun did not define the capitalistic producing and nonproducing groups in terms at all precise. He referred to them variously, and loosely, as "the poor" and "the rich," "labor" and "capital," "the operatives" and

"the capitalists," "the ignorant and dependent" and "the intelligence of the community," "the needy and corrupt" and "the wealthy and talented," and so forth—terms slightly descriptive but extremely evaluative.

Calhoun anticipated a number of the other Marxist doctrines. Among these were the following: (1) the eventual division of society into only two classes, capitalist and proletarian; (2) the gradual expropriation of the bulk of the population by the capitalists, so that the propertied would become fewer and fewer and the property-less more and more numerous; and (3) the ultimate impoverishment of the masses to a bare subsistence level. All this would come about through capitalist control and use of the powers of the State. Thus, in a conversation in 1831, Calhoun "took the instance of 100 men without a Govt. [and] showed the equilibrium that would prevail. Supposed a Government that would give $5000 to ten of the hundred and then traced the tendency of the Capital to erradicate [*sic*] the possession of the soil, and to reduce the 90 to a state of simple operatives." There were various fiscal means by which governments might present a bounty to a favored group and so enable it to expropriate the rest, but the chief of these devices (as John Taylor also had pointed out) was the protective tariff. Such governmental "intermeddling" in economic affairs was the cause, in Europe, of the "unequal and unjust distribution of wealth between the several classes or portions of the community." The first effect of the tariff in the United States had been to enrich the North and impoverish the South, but the time would come when it would redistribute property as between the social classes rather than the geographical sections. "After [the planters] are exhausted," Calhoun warned,

> the contest will be between the capitalists and operatives; for into these two classes it must, ultimately, divide society. The issue of the struggle here must be the same as it has been in Europe. Under the operation of the [protective] system, wages must sink more rapidly than the prices of the necessaries of life, till the operatives will be reduced to the lowest point,—when the portion of the products of their labor left to them, will be barely sufficient to preserve existence.

As a result of the exploitation and expropriation of the working class, according to Calhoun, there would follow an inevitable social conflict, which would grow more and more severe as the conditions producing it became more extreme, until it must eventuate in a revolutionary crisis. "It is useless to disguise the fact," the gentleman from South Carolina frankly informed his fellow Senators in 1837. "There is and always has been in

an advanced stage of wealth and civilization, a conflict between labor and capital." This "tendency to conflict in the North," he said at another time, "is constantly on the increase." And again: "Where wages command labor, as in the nonslaveholding States, there necessarily takes place between labor and capital a conflict, which leads, in process of time, to disorder, anarchy, and revolution, if not counteracted by some appropriate and strong constitutional provision." Calhoun explained this a little more fully when he wrote that

> as the community becomes populous, wealthy, refined, and highly civilized, the difference between the rich and the poor will become more strongly marked; and the number of the ignorant and dependent greater in proportion to the rest of the community. With the increase of this difference, the tendency to conflict between them will become stronger; and, as the poor and dependent become more numerous . . . there will be . . . no want of leaders among the wealthy and ambitious, to excite and direct them in their efforts to obtain the control.

Here Calhoun doubtless had in mind the history of the Greek city-states and the Roman republic, but he was nevertheless predicting the defection from the bourgeoisie of leaders to aid the proletariat in its revolutionary struggle. This was an idea to which Marx and Engels attached a great deal of importance in the *Communist Manifesto.*

In his political prognoses Calhoun revealed a rather definite notion of historical determinism. As he watched "the unfolding of the great events" leading to the European revolutionary movements of 1848, he was confident he could predict the outcome, for he had the benefit of "principles . . . drawn from facts in the moral world just as certain as any in the physical." He insisted "it ought never to be forgotten that *the past is the parent of the present*" (he underlined the words). But he did not believe the historical process was always one of continuous growth. Thus "the past condition of Europe," though it had "given birth" to the most advanced civilization hitherto known, might have, "indeed, contained within itself causes calculated to retard or prevent a further progress." The continued advance of material improvement, growing out of the many inventions and discoveries of the preceding century, could be expected only if the changes in means and methods of production and distribution should be accompanied by suitable changes in the organization of society and government.

"What I dread," wrote Calhoun, expressing his own concept of cultural lag, "is, that progress in political science falls far short of progress

in that which relates to matter, and which may lead to convulsions and revolutions that may retard or even arrest the former." When he took a long-run view, however, he was optimistic. The myriad discoveries and inventions, particularly "the application of steam to machinery of almost every description," though they would "cause changes, political and social, difficult to be anticipated," must in the end accrue to the good of mankind.

> It is, however, not improbable, that many and great, but temporary evils, will follow the changes they have effected, and are destined to effect. It seems to be a law in the political, as well as in the material world, that great changes cannot be made, except very gradually, without convulsions and revolutions; to be followed by calamities, in the beginning, however beneficial they may prove to be in the end. The first effect of such changes, on long established governments, will be, to unsettle the opinions and principles in which they originated,—and which have guided their policy,—before those, which the changes are calculated to form and establish, are fairly developed and understood. The interval between the decay of the old and the formation and establishment of the new, constitutes a period of transition, which must always necessarily be one of uncertainty, confusion, error, and wild and fierce fanaticism.

The chief of the "erroneous opinions" characterizing this transitional period would be the belief in rule by the "numerical majority," a belief based upon the "false conception" that men had once lived in a state of nature and could therefore claim liberty and equality as natural rights. It was this error—the Four Freedoms of that time—which was "upheaving Europe" in 1848. The falsity of the democratic dogma would soon become apparent, because, according to Calhoun's dialectic, an overextension of liberty must lead to "a contraction instead of an enlargement of its sphere." Unlimited democracy would be followed by anarchy, and then an "appeal to force," and finally dictatorship, "monarchy in its absolute form." Out of the contradictions in society that produced the chaos, however, an entirely different synthesis might emerge through the application of political science. And by "political science" Calhoun meant of course his theory of "concurrent majorities" with all its paraphernalia, including some scheme of federation and the power of "interposition" by the member states, that is, Nullification or its equivalent. Hence, in 1848, he cherished some hope for Germany, where there already existed the elements of a federation out of which the "dread" of French radicalism might produce "a federal system somewhat like ours." About the fate of France her-

self he was pessimistic and, accurately enough, predicted that she would soon "find herself in the embrace of a military despotism."

In no single writing did the Carolina philosopher-statesman systematically develop his views on the class struggle and his materialistic interpretation of history. He gave fragmentary expression to these ideas on scattered occasions—in private letters, public reports, conversations, and speeches, and in one of his two treatises on government. From these various sources the parts must be extracted and rearranged if they are to make a systematic whole. For Calhoun was interested less in composing a well rounded statement of the theory than in using it for the practical purpose of defending the property of the planters.

On behalf of the planter class he appealed again and again to fellow conservatives among the bankers and manufacturers of the North. As each great sectional issue came to a head between 1828 and 1850, he was ready with a new instalment of his class-struggle argument. He made the first public statement of his thesis (anonymously) in the famous South Carolina *Exposition* itself, in which he denounced the tariff of 1828 and proposed his Nullification procedure as a remedy for the South, but in which he also warned that protectionism would ruin the planter class and leave Northern employers to fight alone the coming battle with their employees. In 1834, when the bank issue was intensified by a sharp financial crisis, he took occasion to point out that a banking system with power to swell and shrink the money supply was as dangerous as the protective system in causing an uneconomic distribution of wealth and hastening the day of revolution. In 1836, reporting to the Senate on "incendiary" abolition literature, he told the propertied classes of the North that they ought to be as much concerned in this matter as the Southern slaveholders themselves, because "a very slight modification" of the arguments used to attack property in slaves "would make them equally effectual" against property of all kinds. In 1851 he criticized Henry Clay's distribution bill (for dividing among the several states the proceeds from the sale of public lands) by asserting that its effect would be to array "one class against another." And during the Mexican War he took his stand against the conquest of *all* of Mexico (large areas of which were unsuited to slavery) on the ground that the creation of an American empire would lead to dangerous social changes within the older Union.

The main point in Calhoun's case against abolition—that the elimination of slavery in the South would prepare the way for social revolution in the North—was a distinctive contribution to the text of the proslavery argument. The Carolinian reasoned that the conflict between capital and labor, with all its "disorders and dangers," could have no place in the Southern scheme of life. "The Southern States are an aggregate, in fact, of communities, not of individuals. Every plantation is a little community, with the master at its head, who concentrates in himself the united interests of capital and labor, of which he is the common representative." Naturally, according to the reasoning of the planter mind, this arrangement made slavery "a good—a positive good" for both the master and the slave, a creature better fed, clothed, and housed, and happier than the Northern workingman. But Calhoun emphasized that it made slavery a positive benefit for the Northern capitalist as well. "The blessing of this state of things," he said, "extends beyond the limits of the South. It makes that section the balancer of the [constitutional] system; the great conservative power, which prevents other portions, less fortunately constituted, from rushing into conflict." For this reason, the capitalists should not oppose the extension of slavery into the West; they ought to realize that they had as much to gain as the planters themselves in preserving an "equilibrium" of slave and free states. And if the quarrel over the territories should threaten to end in disunion, the Northerners and not the Southerners were the ones who ought to count the cost of that event. The South could live safely to itself, for the very need of defending its peculiar institution would "bind its various and conflicting interests together." The North, however, possessed no such "central point of union," and if deprived of the stabilizing influence of the "conservative" section, would soon be torn apart as a result of social conflict.

Not only American capitalists but also the British ruling classes had a stake in the preservation of Southern slavery. According to Calhoun's logic, there was no real difference between the subjection of one man to another, as in the South, and the subjection of one class to another, as in the British Isles, or the subjection of one nation to another, as in the British Empire. Hence, in encouraging abolition, the rulers of the Empire were attacking the very principle upon which their own position rested, and were giving rise to such "convulsive" movements as chartism in England and socialism in France.

Calhoun's appeal to the Northern capitalist before the Civil War was like Marx's appeal to the Northern workingman after the war had begun: both the great reactionary and the great revolutionary, though for exactly opposite purposes, contended that the destruction of capitalism would come only after the destruction of the slave economy.

Calhoun believed it was possible to find a basis for the resolving of planter-capitalist quarrels, for he thought their causes less fundamental than those which provoked the labor-capitalist conflict. Between the planter and the manufacturer there was no ineradicable antagonism of economic interest. From no such contrariety had abolitionism arisen: it originated in "fanaticism" and gained strength only because of the close division of parties in the North, which gave politicians a motive for catering to antislavery sentiment. Nor would protectionism, once the tariff question was rightly understood, remain a barrier to co-operation between the cotton grower and the textile maker. Calhoun would advise the manufacturers—"if they would hear the voice of one who has ever wished them well"—that the domestic market was entirely "too scanty" for their resources and their skill. They should abandon the protective system, which limited exports in proportion as it checked imports, and "march forth fearlessly to meet the world in competition." Once they had "commanded" the foreign market, "all conflict between the planter and the manufacturer would cease." Upon such a policy of commercial imperialism, with cotton going out of the country not as raw stuff but as yarn and fabric, millowners and plantation proprietors might unite in mutual prosperity.

Or so Calhoun averred, at any rate. And if he had thus found an economic basis, he was even more confident that he had discovered a political basis for the alliance—his familiar doctrine of State Rights and Nullification. This was his "common constitutional ground, on which the reflecting and patriotic, of every quarter of the Union, might rally to arrest the approaching catastrophe" of social revolution. His scheme of polity, as outlined in many reports and speeches and summed up and reformulated in *A Disquisition on Government* and *A Discourse on the Constitution and Government of the United States,* provided for "State interposition" to veto acts of the federal government and for secession by the individual state as a last resort. But he himself minimized these negative aspects and emphasized the positive, constructive, "conservative" features of his sys-

tem. The arbiter, in case a disaffected state interposed to challenge the validity of a federal law, was to consist of three-fourths of the whole number of states. A group of commonwealths comprising one more than a fourth of the whole, Calhoun admitted, could negative the interpretation of federal powers made by the rest. This very requirement of widespread unanimity among the "concurrent majorities," however, would tend to make the leaders in all the states less demanding, more conciliatory. It would create union and strength, not division and weakness. It would ameliorate, not worsen the relations between the sections. And thus it would enable the planters of the South and the capitalists of the North to act together harmoniously in the face of a wave of revolution that threatened to engulf them both.

Presenting as he did a common ground for planter-capitalist collaboration against the class enemy, Calhoun intended his theory not merely as a bogey with which to frighten the manufacturers into yielding on the sectional issues of the day. Anyhow, he was not so naïve as to suppose that his words, by themselves, could induce the capitalists to see the light. "That any force of argument can change public opinion . . . ," he wrote in 1831, "I do not expect; but I feel assured that the coming confusion and danger, which I have long foreseen, will." Though the revolutionary movements then under way in Europe failed to have the repercussions which he anticipated for the United States, the time of confusion and danger finally seemed at hand when the financial crisis of 1834 beset the nation. Calhoun now persuaded himself that his doctrines were rapidly growing popular among the well-to-do in the North. Thousands were beginning to look to the South for protection not only against the "usurpation" of Andrew Jackson, but also against the "needy and corrupt" among their own population. "They begin to feel," Calhoun congratulated himself, "that they have more to fear from their own people, than we from our slaves." A year later, though the financial crisis had passed without fulfilling his expectations, he still nourished a hope that the capitalists would be converted sooner or later through fear of a mass uprising. "The first victims would be the wealthy and talented of the North," he thought.

> The intelligence of the North must see this, but whether in time to save themselves and the institutions of the country God only knows. But whenever their eyes may open, they will be astonished to find that the doctrines which they denounce as treason are the only means of their political salvation, while those

which they so fondly hugged to their bosom were working their certain destruction.

In 1848, when Calhoun was completing his *Disquisition on Government,* he similarly felt that he could win Northern converts only after the "failure and embarrassment of the French experiment" should have "prepared" the "publick mind" by putting the capitalists in a receptive mood. Not his persuasions, then, but a crisis in the class struggle itself would bring the Northern capitalists into an alliance with the Southern planters.

Thus Calhoun supposed that, in the United States, the decisive clash between proletariat and bourgeoisie would appear before the decisive clash between bourgeoisie and landed aristocracy—an order of events that in Marxian theory was to be reversed. If his anticipations had been met, the American Civil War would have been a class war in which Northerners and Southerners fought together against a common foe. To explain why it was actually otherwise would involve a retelling of ante-bellum history, but in part what happened seems to be this: Just as the plantation politicians had succeeded in solidifying Southern opinion through the proslavery argument, so the politicians of Northern business eventually unified the diverse interests of their section with antislavery propaganda. In both parts of the country domestic discontent, or much of it at least, was deflected upon objects away from home, on the other side of Mason and Dixon's line. The point to be made here, however, is that, though Calhoun did his part in creating a sectional patriotism in the South, he persisted in hoping it would be impossible for labor and capital to achieve a similar unity in the North. Eventually, he thought, the harassed men of business would be only too glad to meet the plantation leaders on the latter's terms.

After Calhoun's death some of the apologists for a solid, proslavery South went much farther than he had gone. Jefferson Davis, horrified at the spread of strikes throughout the free world, made more explicit the parallel between abolitionism and socialism as twin attacks upon property. George Fitzhugh took a very different but even more extreme stand. In his *Sociology for the South, or the Failure of Free Society,* published at Richmond in 1854, he admitted the accuracy and justice of the socialist case against capitalism but asserted that the socialists overlooked the need for a master at the head of each of their ideal communities—a need which the Southern plantation system, or something like it, alone could meet.

Fitzhugh praised slavery as the only workable form of socialism and urged the whole world to adopt it, at once, as the sole cure for class conflict and the other ills of competitive society! The proslavery propagandists were firm believers in what was later to be known as the *Führerprinzip,* at least in so far as it could be applied to local affairs.

But it is the spirit of Calhoun, not that of his more forthright followers, which lives on. It is a spirit that may be about to materialize in new and startling forms. Now, if ever, is the time for right-wing Republicans to join with Bourbon Democrats in the sort of reactionary alliance that Calhoun envisaged. The shibboleths of these allies will be not Nullification, indeed, but certainly State Rights; not the Four Freedoms exactly, but Liberty with the connotations it had for Calhoun and for the American Liberty League. The real objects of their attack will be the social controls which liberals will seek to maintain in the interests of world peace, and the democratic aspirations which have been let slip with the cry of havoc but which cannot be chained up again with the dogs of war. The leaders of the new movement will no doubt point with pride to Thomas Jefferson. But the Sage of Monticello is not their man. Let them look, instead, to the political metaphysician of South Carolina, John C. Calhoun.

MYSTICISM IN CONTEMPORARY POETRY

By CHARLES I. GLICKSBERG

THE MYSTIC CONSCIOUSNESS, whether in poetry or in religion, does not easily lend itself to objective description. In the introspective reports of the mystical experience—the only testimony we have to work with—there is the repeated despairing admission that it cannot be captured in the net of words. And rightly so, for the mystical experience is not dependent on the world of sense; it transcends the mundane realm of matter; it is opposed to the laws of science and the categories of logic; it escapes the inherent limitations of time and space; it envisages a Reality that is as far beyond the reality our senses encompass as God is beyond man. Since this is so, the nature of the experience can be neither investigated nor communicated; it must be taken on faith.

Mysticism is, by definition, a negation of the rational. Since it is the expression of a state of mind that can be neither communicated nor experimentally verified but only felt, it must base its appeal on the testimony of direct and unique experience. To feel its transfiguring glory, we must ourselves pass through the experience. By means of the mystical experience we do not merely transcend and annihilate the rational; we enter a new dimension: a kind of apprehension that cannot be reduced to rational knowing. It cannot be explained in terms of conceptual thinking, and yet it lays claim to a higher and more genuine "knowledge," to a knowledge which is true though ineffable.

Mysticism in poetry is by no means a strange phenomenon. Donne, Vaughan, Crashaw, Traherne, Francis Thompson, William Blake, Walt Whitman: the roll call of poets who have given voice to the mystical vision is long and illustrious. But the expression of true poetic mysticism in modern times has become progressively rare if not anomalous. In part the rarity of its occurrence in contemporary poetry is to be attributed to the breakdown of moral and religious values attendant upon the advance of rationalism and the growth of the scientific temper. There is, however,

one school of poets, the surrealists, who—outwardly at least—have much in common with the mystics. The former represents a spurious, muddled, desperate kind of mysticism: an attempt to behold and communicate a super-reality by a Caesarian birth of the unconscious. Intellectually we may feel little sympathy for the mystical temperament, but we cannot help respecting it when it expresses a genuine vision of the world. The religious mystics, for example, abnormal as many of them undoubtedly were, caught a perception that is as old as the history of philosophy, namely, that beyond this terrestrial sphere there lay a higher reality, a supernatural order, and that the two were related to each other as shadow to substance, as a fleeting second of time to the vastness of eternity.

The surrealists, on the contrary, dabble only in the superficial and what might be called the theatrical aspects of mysticism. Exploiting the limits of the unutterable, they cash in on the infinite possibilities opened up by the repudiation of reason; they derive a sense of heightened power from rejecting the rigid outlines of the material world and picturing the sublimely grotesque and disordered universe projected by the creative eye of the unconscious. But they are impelled by no profound and urgent vision of life, they possess no lofty and liberating insight into the nature of man and the fate he must undergo during his trial on earth; they are not holy seekers after salvation. At best, they are practitioners of verbal magic, alchemists of the word, poets who make of the dream and the neurosis the secret principle of all art. They have no unifying faith to sustain them in the anarchic universe of flux, no philosophy to guide them in their life or work. All they can do is to parade before us the bleeding pageant of their unconscious minds.

For they came to surrealism, most of them, not through the gateway of vision but through initiation into the "scientific" mysteries of psychoanalysis. It was the contributions of Freud which led them to experiment with automatic writing and the creative potentialities of the subliminal life. Their work constitutes not an interpretation of experience, but a total negation of experience, a repudiation of meaning as well as of sensible reality. It represents a triumph of nihilism in poetry: the defeat not only of reason but of all communicative efficacy. It is this perversion of the uses of art, this sickly flight to the limbo of the unconscious, which is one of the dangerous signs of degeneration present in contemporary Western culture.

Now we know enough about the mystical mind to know that it takes root and flourishes only in darkness. Every assertion it makes is an attack on the sovereignty of the rational intellect; before it can come into its own, it must, like surrealism, destroy the grounds of normal cognition, undermine confidence in empiricism. That which is "mysterious" in the religious sense is the "wholly other," for which there are no translatable terms in the lexicon of the intelligible. That is the essence of the "numinous" consciousness.

Many times in the past the sense of reality has broken down and man has glimpsed intuitively, with frightened but fascinated eyes, the shadows and splendors of another world. Why this breakdown should occur offers a challenge to the powers of the psychoanalyst and the historian. Why do people during certain critical periods of history behold the outlines of a supernal order, a transcendent sphere of being, more lasting (since it is eternal) than the fugitive aspects of everyday existence? The revolt against rationalism, the persistent attacks on logic and the scientific method, the search for a super-reality, a higher essence, a spiritualized universe not subject to the empirical laws or the limitations of time and space—these are reaffirmations, in symbolic but secular terms, of man's craving for certitude and unity. Wishing to assert once more his faith in the supremacy of the soul, he smuggles in Christianity, but this time in the form of the religion of art, the thaumaturgy of the unconscious.

While surrealist painters have attracted a great deal of public attention in their sensational efforts to explore the terra incognita of the unconscious, it is the writers who have made the movement articulate, given it an aesthetic habitation and a name. It is they who have led the offensive against rationalism and realism, against a life reduced to the confines of logic, an art circumscribed to conform to the objective world. Instinctively sensing the enemy in the life of reason, they exalt the life of feeling, giving the heart primacy over the head. This results in an indictment of reality, in a feverish quest for a mysterious absolute. Realism carried to extremes forced upon the surrealists the necessity to escape from reality altogether. Freedom for the creative spirit was to be achieved by denying the validity of science or by studiously ignoring it or by going beyond it.

What use they intended to make of science is plainly revealed in the cultural gods they worship. The character of a movement may often be assessed by examining its ideological antecedents. Who are the literary

progenitors the surrealists claim as their own? Consider this amazing collection of spiritual ancestors: Baudelaire, Lewis Carroll, Franz Kafka, Lautréamont, Monk Lewis, Mack Sennett, Paracelsus, Novalis, the Marquis de Sade, Mallarmé, Charles Chaplin. But this extraordinary list of influences is by no means complete; it includes among the founding fathers such figures as Chateaubriand, Empedocles, Heinrich Heine and Victor Hugo, Karl Marx and Leon Trotsky, Nietzsche and Edgar Allan Poe, Leonardo da Vinci, Jonathan Swift, and Edward Young. By performing this incredible feat of cultural miscegenation, by this fusion of incompatibles, surrealism effects its mad flight from the prison of consciousness and gives expression to the nihilistic anti-intellectualism of our age.

André Breton has been most active as the theorist and propagandist of the movement, but the one who added a touch of wild genius to the surrealist obsession was Salvador Dali, a Spaniard by birth who inherits the perfervid mysticism of his race. He has himself declared that the only difference between him and a madman is that he is not mad. Gifted with an astonishing facility in making visible the fantastic life of the unconscious, he has coined the term "paranoiac-critical activity" to describe his method of stimulating the creative process so as to give birth to splendid and delirious images, a flowing medley of dream-pictures without continuity or causal connection. He imagines a breeze having its hair shaved close, he describes a watch as soft as "tender Camembert cheese running like a sore." But in reality, he tells us, in truth,

> All these strange objects
> Heaped in such a suspicious way
> Don't form anything but
> The cruel carcass of a disturbing
> Dazzlingly beautiful
> And agonizing decaying ass.

Equally incomprehensible is the poetry of Paul Eluard, one of the truly gifted poets of this group. Another poet, Tristan Tzara, creates a number of baffling "metaphysical" conceits, images, and ideas weaving in and out with the fortuitous, unpredictable suddenness of scenes in a dream. Judged by strict literary standards, the specimens of surrealist poetry thus far produced in England, France, and the United States[1] are stammer-

[1]For the general reader, the best volume to consult is the 1940 edition of *New Directions*, which contains a generous anthology of surrealist poetry and prose.

ingly ineffective—verbal illuminations that trail off in a tail of smoky nonsense.

Against the excesses of surrealists seeking creative salvation in a world of reality from which the last drop of romantic originality has been squeezed—against such excesses one can only point to the simple yet redeeming truth that freedom is to be found only in the kingdom of necessity. Creation is not a barbaric frenzy, a release of instinctual energy. Psychological reality cannot be violated without exacting a severe penalty. Art calls for discipline as well as ecstasy and intoxication. Fire without light, substance without form, dream without design, beauty without meaning—that constitutes a denial of art, which is both logical and lyrical. As Paul Valéry declared in *Variety*: "The true condition of a true poet is absolutely distinct from the state of dreams."

It was the Freudian discovery of the unconscious which had given a number of modern poets the courage to seek unconditional freedom of expression. By means of the unconscious they could find surcease from the tyranny of reason, the rigor mortis of the mathematico-scientific intellect. In the pullulating depths of the unconscious lay riches, perceptions, potential creative visions, values, and perspectives, not vouchsafed to the conscious mind. Hence arose the cult of surrealism with its violently disordered associations, its nightmares and dreams and deliriums. Hence, too, there sprang up a school of imagists who trafficked in the unintelligible, whose work, despite its surface impression of beauty and strangeness, could not be understood. Tired of rationalism, sick of the sterile fruits of science, the modern poets devoted themselves recklessly to the mysticism of the Word. Writing on "Psychology and Art To-Day," W. H. Auden (who is neither a surrealist nor a slavish disciple of Freud) admits that, technically, what he derived from his study of Freud was the art of using words "in associational rather than logical sequences." He concludes that there must always be two kinds of art, "escape-art, for man needs escape as he needs food and deep sleep, and parable-art, that art which shall teach man to unlearn hatred and learn love." The poetry of surrealism is escape-art of the worst kind, irresponsible and anarchic.

Not that the surrealists were the only ones who feared and hated science. For obvious reasons, some modern poets angrily reject the notion that poetry is a criticism of life, that it can be or become parable-art. William Butler Yeats, for example, hated science consistently, much preferring

theosophy, a shadowy twilight to the full glare of day. As a believer in esoteric Buddhism, he felt that science represented a negation of life, a truce with death. Only the vision-illumined poets could gain access to true religion. In short, Yeats came close to drawing up a religion of art, a religion based upon the affirmations of the great poets. D. H. Lawrence, too, was a passionate and confused mystic whose central struggle consisted in the effort to achieve universality by throwing off the bondage of self. Convinced that the inordinate development of consciousness was injurious to the creative spirit, he announced that the instinctive impulses of the blood, the imperious voice of intuition—that these mattered everything in life as in art. Opposed to reason and logic, contemptuous of science, Lawrence sought to construct a science based on vital intuitions—a subjective science. Here again we have the religion of the artist, the accent this time being on the primal vision, the dictates of the heart and blood.

The philosophers and psychologists have aided the poets in their determination to affirm a mystical principle at work in the creative process. Unable to discover any causal connection in psychic events, C. G. Jung, in *Modern Man in Search of a Soul,* acknowledges that the creative life "baffles all attempts at rational formulation." He therefore concludes that the creative process will forever elude the human understanding, and praises the type of artistic creation which is Dionysian and which suggests the primordial. Thus with one romantic leap we are plunged into the subterranean world of mysticism, the mysticism of the unconscious, of Walpurgis-night mysteries, of visions of madness and ineffable ecstasies. It is a wild dream of aesthetics, magically removing us from the world of reality and transporting us to a realm of flaming darkness and clairvoyant dreams, the Eleusinian outposts of the unconscious.

Jung thus furnishes the psychological groundwork for the surrealist aesthetic, the foundation for inspired mysticism in art. Intuitions, he asserts, point to things that are unknown, hidden from the myopic eye of reason, essentially secret, not disclosed to consciousness. The poet is in communion with the gods and goblins, the demons and spirits of the other world; he falls back upon mythology to give a fitting symbolic expression to transcendent, primordial visions. That which appears in the poetic vision is the product of the collective unconscious.

All that Jung says is extremely revealing in that it strips the poet of the element of free will, of the power of shaping his work, of consciously

controlling his destiny. The creative impulse springing from the unconscious becomes arbitrary, domineering, demonic, causing a man to sacrifice everything for the consummation of his creative purpose. The poet simply acquiesces in the summons of the unconscious imperative, without the intermediation of human consciousness. It is therefore not at all surprising that Jung speculates whether art must contain a core of meaning. Meaning may be imposed on art hungry for some sort of rational coherence, but Jung argues that it "needs no meaning. The question of meaning holds nothing productive for art." If reputable psychologists hold such views regarding the genesis and significance of art, it is no wonder that many writers have of late sought to improve upon this aesthetic and have given free rein to the disintegrating forces of the unconscious.

Long before Jung, Bergson, by his concentrated attack on the limitations of science, had furnished the writers with formidable arguments to buttress their metaphysics of the irrational. Words, he contended, logical in character, cannot describe facts which are supralogical, nonrational. The metaphor rather than the abstractions of logical discourse are best suited to express this reality. While the master must not be held accountable for the aberration of his followers, Bergson is in large measure responsible for the current of anti-intellectualism that has made so much headway during the twentieth century. His doctrines made it possible for some poets freely to indulge their antiscientific animus. They could now throw reason out the window and find excellent metaphysical reasons for so doing. As Karin Stephens declares in her penetrating study of Bergson's attack on intellectualism, *The Misuse of Mind,* his philosophy gained wide popularity because it gave voice to a feeling "which is very widespread at the present time, a distrust of systems, theories, logical constructions, the assumptions of premises and then the acceptance of everything that follows logically from them." Away, Bergson cried, with the bloodless, ethereal abstractions of thought, the formal ghosts of the intellect! Let us return to the earthy, the actual, the concrete, the pristine, palpitating fact. Bergson, a poet of daring imagination, argues that our direct experience is falsified because we are the victims of preconceived ideas, presuppositions that arise from our intellectual habit of relying upon theories and explanations rather than direct knowledge. The laws of nature which science invents are but frames around a picture, a way of visualizing and interpreting the physical universe. There is a world of forms and percep-

tions not included within this frame. Hence poetry, because it is suggestive rather than definite, because it does not have a one-to-one correspondence with reality, is a means of escaping from the limitations inherent in the scientific use of language. Metaphors may make real relationships vivid and meaningful, and do so more effectively than the syllogisms of science.

The metaphor is thus the heart not only of poetry but of all language. Seizing upon this illuminating truth, many contemporary poets have pushed it to extremes, with the result that it has become a dysfunctional ornament, not organic to the act of expression, a subjective caprice, a surrealist extravaganza. The poets now boast of their rich ambiguity, their cult of obscurity. They are eager to recover the unknown, the non-human world, the animistic relation to objects and natural events that characterized primitive man, the intimate awareness of a supernatural force felt in the prescientific epoch.

Mysticism is not alien to the contemporary mind, though we must distinguish as carefully as we can between the genuine and the spurious variety. That mysticism can legitimately form a part of poetry is evident in the work of a number of poets, each with his distinctive view of life. What characterizes the genuine mystical vision, in poetry or in religion, is the perception of the Real lying at the base of the visible and fugitive world of time. What distinguishes the mystical poet from his sham Freudian brother, the surrealist rhapsodist, is the effort or willingness of the former to annihilate his insulated self; he seeks to merge with humanity, to lose himself in the Absolute. The surrealist, on the other hand, is essentially a practitioner of magic; his exploitation of the subconscious by means of devices learned from Freudianism, is conscious and deliberate; the will is active; the intellect bends its energies to prevent any interference with the upward flow from the depths.

The scientific method has not destroyed the mystical consciousness in poets; it has, in fact, helped to destroy the validity of the material, sense-projected world by portraying life as a state of vertiginous flux and by driving home the fact that all is change, diversity, multiplicity. What the mystic seeks is a pattern of unity in this surging chaos of indestructible energy. Again and again, in *Leaves of Grass,* Whitman voices the vision of transcendental union, reveals the miracle of creation, the symbols of God, in the faces of men and women, in animals and the work of the

stars, in grass and the silent night. And while contemporary poets have for the most part tried to render the truth of their immediate world, the social life of man, they have not been blind to these lofty intuitions. Richard Eberhart, author of *Reading the Spirit,* is a mystic who resembles Donne and Blake in his soaring intensity, his penetrating intuitions, his surprising imagery and compact expressiveness. Though heir to the doubts and confusion of his age, he peers confidently into the heart of things and has the courage to give an honest report of what he beholds. There is the recognition that man is composed of the same essence as mountains and dreams, as solid as the earth and as fleeting as shadows. Man is what he thinks, what he dreams, what he sings; for thought and dream and song are as whole as sunlight and as permanent.

Like the surrealists but with a different purpose in mind, the three English poets, Spender, Auden, and Day-Lewis, have derived from Freudianism the secret of eternal flux, the importance of the subterranean jungles of the mind, the subconscious, which they explore by a process of free association. Out of these sources and others they have formed the conception that the individual is organically linked, in a continuity of time, blood, myth, and memory, with the past—a conception that obviously owes much to the influence of Jung. This is extended to include kinship with some natural or supernatural being, some heroic ancestor, from whom they can draw strength and inspiration.

W. H. Auden, perhaps the most gifted and original of the three, believes that the cardinal sin of man is an exaggerated self-consciousness, the enhancement of the cerebral ego at the expense of the normal dynamic life. After experimenting with the technique of free association, with social satire exposing the decadence and the contradictions of modern life, Auden, in *The Double Man,* finally began his quest for philosophical and spiritual integration. The spectacle of a world plunged in war has led him to stress the mystical virtue of the need for loneliness, for each man in the privacy of his soul to face the congregated hosts of darkness, the menace of death, the meaning of life. Though there is little room for hope he is now convinced that "true democracy" begins "with free confession of our sins." For once each man realizes his true condition, his state of imperfection and sin, no one will dare lay claim to supreme authority. Unique as we are, we must be bound together by the cement of love.

As Silone has shown in his recent novel, *The Seed Beneath the Snow,* the revolutionist is giving way to the seeker after salvation, the party agitator and fanatic is being replaced by the mystic. Kenneth Patchen, a poet of powerful originality, has made his choice. At first he took the road which led to "proletarian" art, rooted in reality, concrete in meaning, challenging in its criticism of the contemporary social world. Then, as if disillusioned with Marxist politics and Communist eschatology, he turned inward into a private world of associations. He has now reached a stage where his love of life, his worship of its overwhelming beauty, its infinite profusion and variety, leave him groping for words that will shadow forth, however dimly, his vision of this radiant super-reality. Where Freud in his clinical explorations discovered the death-wish implanted in human beings, the hidden but irresistible impulse to self-destruction, Patchen the poet discovers it in the civilization of his time. Patchen's *The Dark Kingdom* is an outpouring of horror, an outburst of compassion instinct with the violence of mystical passion. The savior must be born anew; man must make his peace with death.

The conclusion is thus unavoidable that the surrealists are not mystics but irresponsibles, children who mistake their play for imaginative daring. In allying themselves with the forces of the unconscious, they seek to escape from rather than to comprehend or change reality. Far from mastering their creative material, they simply follow the direction of their instinctual desires. This is the law of their being: to sink back into the womb-like warmth of the dark unconscious. Their basic mistake lies in their belief that the unconscious is an inexhaustible reservoir of creative energy, and that whatever rises to the surface can be accepted as God-inspired.

The trouble is not that their poetry is irrational. It is of the essence of mysticism to transcend the limits of the rational, and the poet in his intense creative moments is not afraid of contradictions. What makes surrealist mysticism particularly objectionable is that it is neither poetry nor mysticism; it is a self-induced, calculated form of introversion, touched with hysteria, charlatanry, and paranoia. Determined to break the hegemony of science, it goes to extremes in order to consolidate the cult of genius. What it opposes to science and the scientific method is a species of magic, an infantile concern with alchemy and astrology, the erotic and the psychopathological. It makes a fetish of the illogical, the grotesque, the

fantastic, the unintelligible. The visions that have inspired the great mystics of the past—the perception of the tragic brevity of life, the inevitability of death blotting out the human personality, the realization of the insignificance and yet the divinity of man in the cosmic scheme of things—these visions do not appear in their work. For the most part they are preoccupied with the task of self-expression rather than with the spirit and substance of the mystical experience.

The liquidation of the surrealists with their melodramatization of the unconscious and their disparagement of the life of reason does not mean that mysticism in poetry will suffer eclipse. Mysticism of some kind will probably always appeal to the creative mind, though in times of collective stress and strain it may be drawn to mysticism as a spurious solution of its conflicts. The scientific synthesis brightly illuminates the area of knowledge on which it is focused, but it does not take in all of existence. There is a penumbra of the unknown, the mysterious, the still unfathomable, which the poet persists in exploring. He keeps on asking *why* things happen as they do, even though humanity in its long pilgrimage on earth has found no satisfactory answer to these questions. For what purpose was man created? Since death finally strikes us down, how shall we spend our days in order to make the most of life? What is good and what is evil —for man? In short, the mystic pursues the same goal which every philosophical intelligence seeks to reach: how to formulate a way of life, a principle of faith, which is more than a functional adjustment to the challenge of his immediate environment. He is in search of some absolute to which he can cling in the midst of a universe in flux. It is only those poets who can conquer the world of the spirit, without abandoning the truths of science, who have the best claim to our devotion and praise. Their achievement lies precisely in this: they not only enrich the vividness and value of experience; they also make possible an orientation that extends beyond the limits of the precarious and the provisional; by interpreting life for us, they restore our faith and give meaning and beauty to our adventure on earth.

THE CONFLICT OF FASCIST AND DEMOCRATIC IDEALS

By MELVIN RADER

No GULF separates the War from the Peace. The manner in which we fight the War now will determine the spirit and organization of the postwar world. We cannot hope to favor antidemocratic forces in North Africa, Spain, India, the Balkans, or on the home fronts, without undermining the very basis of a just peace. We cannot suspend democracy now, and hope that it can be re-created, suddenly and magically, at the peace table. If *now* we achieve the fullest co-operation between the United Nations, if *now* we mobilize the full power of the democratic forces, we shall be doing far more to secure democracy and unity in the postwar world than by any number of paper-programs.

In Africa, Asia, Europe, America, the task is the same: to enlist the support of common people everywhere. We cannot do this unless we indicate, by word and deed, that we are devoted to a democratic peace.

By word and deed! In combining the two, we possess an immense advantage over the Axis. Fascism cannot afford to be truthful: it *must* exhibit a cleavage between promise and performance. The Axis leaders, to achieve power, have promised all things to almost all people, but have brought intolerable agony even to their own followers. The "propaganda of the word" has not been matched by the "propaganda of the deed." "Jam yesterday, jam tomorrow, but never jam today." This duplicity is no accident; fascism could not eliminate it without preparing its own funeral. But since actions speak louder than words, the inability of the fascists to fulfill their pledges is like the heel of Achilles, a vulnerable object to attack which no ideological armor can cover.

Although the psychological and military aspects of the War cannot now be separated, the time will eventually arrive when the contest of guns will cease. In less violent form, the more basic contest will even then continue to rage in the minds of human beings: the war between the principles of democracy and the principles of fascism. Unless *this* war be won,

the silencing of the guns may be no more than a pause before a still more terrible conflict.

Because of the basic and integral role of ideas in the War and the Peace, any thoughtful person must deplore the superficial attitude of most people toward fascist theory. We all tend to think of fascism as a foreign and alien movement to be licked—to be licked rather than to be thought about. Most Americans think they understand fascism well enough; they consider the discussion stale. Since, however, the fascists have proved themselves masters of psychological warfare, we must, to win ultimate and complete victory, understand the meaning and function of fascist ideology, and shrewdly prepare our counteroffensive.

Our attitude toward fascism is much too externalistic. We fail to recognize the fascist tendencies within our own democracy, and we do not realize that we as a nation have helped to create the deep and tragic frustrations which have culminated in the revolt against civilization. Too often we simply dismiss fascist theory as an outburst of irrationalism and emotionalism, not realizing that a frustrated and defeated people naturally express themselves in terms of feeling and impulse rather than of thought. We rightly loathe the cruelty of the fascist bombers and Jew-baiters, but we do not understand that, as the psychologist Jung has pointed out, those who wilfully torture others are almost invariably themselves suffering.[1]

As enemies of fascism, we are tempted to suppose that its ideas and objectives are entirely false and regressive. Yet no significant social doctrine, however bad, is wholly false: if it were so, it would be merely silly, and hence innocuous. Fascist theory, we must not forget, has won a vast number of adherents, many of whom have fought like demons. There has been a great and genuine, even though tragically misguided, resurgence of national spirit, especially in Japan and Germany. The fascist "new order" would not have such a broad and intense appeal if it were utterly baseless —a mere phantom structure in a cloud cuckoo land, the dream of a few fanatics. It would not have such a strong appeal if our civilization were not in a state of chaos, and if a great many of its adherents were not convinced that, the poverty and injustice of the present world being intoler-

[1]In the above paragraph, and to a certain extent in my argument as a whole, I have profited by the excellent criticism of my friend, Professor Donald Piatt of the University of California at Los Angeles.

able, a new beginning *must* be made. It would not be so appealing if its problems were not of long historical standing, deep problems which our civilization has disastrously failed to solve.

The enemy, in other words, is within as well as without, and the virtues we seek are without as well as within. This means that our task is much more complicated and subtle than we are prone to believe. The effectiveness of the democratic strategy, in war and in peace, depends upon a recognition of this fact.

II

Instead of thinking simply in terms of a black-and-white opposition, therefore, we should attempt to understand and resolve those conflicts which concern us and the fascists equally. We should examine the problems which are so universal, so crucial, and so fundamental that the very fate of Western civilization depends upon their solution. I propose to examine three problems of this type: freedom versus organization, absolutism versus relativism, and aristocracy versus democracy.

No issue is more basic than the clash between freedom and organization. The vast unregulated interplay of modern institutions forces statesmen to design comprehensive systems of integration, but bureaucratic absolutism threatens to be the result of any such colossal organization. A planned society, many people have said, is too complex for democratic opinion to control; and when so much power is concentrated in the state, the effect is to stifle, congest, and devitalize. Such a society, we are told, cannot be healthy: it will be "apoplectic at its center and anemic at its extremities." There will perhaps be efficiency, but it will be the efficiency of disciplined slaves. Total organization seems to be desperately needed; yet totalitarian dictatorship, it is said, will be the inevitable result of the attempt to achieve it.

The conflict between absolutism and relativism may seem more abstract, but it is none the less crucial. Our society is divided into warring gangs of many types: nation is pitted against nation, class against class, creed against creed. Each group claims to possess its own truth, its own law, its own virtue. The universe of principles has been split into a chaotic multiverse. Unless we can find certain universal and enduring principles which transcend these conflicting particularisms, there would seem to be no chance to avert the violent death of millions and millions of human

beings in World War III and its awful sequels. Yet every set of universal principles is denounced as a new absolutism, "smelling of fustiness and faggots."

The conflict between aristocracy and democracy is likewise very grave. This is the ancient clash, never more intense than in recent years, between the democrat who prefers the common goods and the aristocrat who prefers the choice goods. The aristocrat agrees with Spinoza that "all noble things are as difficult as they are rare." He contends that democracy involves sharing without excellence. Its effect, he declares, is to popularize and thus vulgarize. In its lust for equality, it levels all distinctions and exults in the average. This indictment of democracy, although as ancient as Plato, seems to be especially applicable to a complex industrial society. As the problems of this society become ever more technical and recondite, the opinion of the average man seems to be ever more inept and irrelevant. Yet the masses, as Ortega y Gasset has warned us, are in a dreadful state of revolt. They demand food, education, power. They declare that every government *of* the few is a government *for* the few. They insist that excellence *can* be shared, that the good life is possible even for the multitude. This is the essence of the democratic dream, and there is none more daring.

If we can somehow resolve these problems, we shall emerge into the glorious ferment of a new springtime of human culture. If we definitely fail to solve them, our Western society will join Egypt, Babylon, and Rome in the limbo of lost civilizations.

The fascists have struggled to solve these problems. We cannot agree with their "totalitarian solutions," which are not real solutions and which are very far from total, since they reject the great scientific, democratic, and humanistic traditions of mankind. Yet democracy, in its present organization and mode of operation, exhibits, in a much less virulent form, some of the same weaknesses and contradictions that so sorely beset fascism. And fascism, in some of its attitudes and policies, suggests, at least indirectly, possible remedies for the evils that so deeply trouble our democracy.

III

In their acceptance of the principles and practices of totalitarianism, the fascists notoriously prefer organization to freedom. The basic concept of totalitarianism is expressed in the words of Mussolini: "All within

the state, nothing against the state." The Nazis have nominally rejected such political totalitarianism, maintaining that the state is merely an instrument of the Nazi party and the German race; but actually they have adopted it under the disguise of the "racial community" and the "people's state," and have transformed it into an even more drastic totalitarian creed.

The Italian theory, as articulated by such fascist philosophers as Alfredo Rocco and Giovanni Gentile, is mainly a perverted Hegelianism. The individual, it is contended, is saved from incompleteness only by entering into social relations. By engaging in the life of the community, he achieves ethical salvation. All the manifold interests of the community, however, are integrated within the state. When the citizen obeys the state, therefore, he is obeying his own deeper will, achieving that social-mindedness, that identification with a larger whole, in which true freedom and welfare consist. The state, however, does not exist simply for the sake of the citizens, since, as a kind of group mind or social organism, it has a supreme intrinsic value not to be found in the individual minds of its members. Hence the government, within which the state's power resides, has the right and duty to coerce recalcitrant citizens into obedience, and to co-ordinate all aspects of the national life within its comprehensive, monistic integration.

The German theory of totalitarianism, as expressed by Hitler and Alfred Rosenberg, is based upon the concept of the racial community. The theory can be traced to various antecedents, such as Fichte's Germanic nationalism, Wagner's folk-mysticism, and Gobineau's Aryan myth; but the essential pattern of thought is to be found even in the Old Testament. Although they torture and murder the children of Israel, the Nazis have revived the ideology of ancient Judaism—the myth of the chosen people and its Messiah, who is destined to lead them from bondage. As the new Messiah, Hitler has emphasized the tribal values implied by his Teutonic adaptation of this myth—the supreme worth of the German folk-community, the spiritual unity of the chosen people. "True idealism," he has declared, "is nothing but subjecting the individual's interest and life to the community." This means anti-individualism and vague racial mysticism, employed to justify the forceful co-ordination of all activities within the ambit of the state.

The Nipponese people have similarly been taught that "Japan is the only divine land," inspired by a God-Emperor, and providentially destined to dominate the world. To achieve such hegemony, however, the people must be molded by the state into herdlike unity.

Fascism, in practice, represents something additional: a managed monopoly capitalism, in which authoritarian economic, political, and military interests coalesce and interpenetrate. This is a kind of collectivism, if you please, but very far from a democratic socialism. Such massive, undemocratic centralization produces congestion in the bureaucratic centers of power, and devitalization in the vast spread of the society. Our healthy dislike for this type of society, however, should not blind us to the limited validity of the accompanying collectivist ideology. The fascists are, in a measure, right in denouncing the vast unregulated interplay of competitive interests and institutions, which produce an anarchy as capricious, and therefore as destructive of true freedom, as the untamed natural forces which bedevil primitive man.

When we consider the answers given in the democracies to the problem of freedom versus organization, we find that opinion is tragically divided and confused. A certain number, in a period of deep crisis, would favor a fascist solution, appropriately disguised here in this country as "Americanism." We would like to think that this number is very small, but we must not be too complacent. We have no assurance that a profound depression will be averted in the postwar period. It was the mounting armaments race culminating in World War II, rather than any *adequate* constructive program, which brought full employment and utilization of plant capacity. Unless we discover another way to banish mass poverty and unemployment than by the manufacture and use of lethal instruments, a terrific new crisis will be sure to develop. The "revolt of the masses" will rapidly assume immense proportions, the men of property will fly into a panic, demagogues will offer crackpot solutions. Under these circumstances, can we be sure that the dupes, the demagogues, and the dynastic families will not combine to create an American fascism? We must not slacken in our democratic offensive on the home front, now and henceforth, if we wish to avoid this dire catastrophe.

A very large number of people in the democracies choose freedom as opposed to organization, and, in effect, favor the individualistic "*status quo.*" This point of view is reinforced by the "liberal" tradition, which

has looked upon organization and freedom as necessarily antithetical. Summing up the liberal thought of his day, Tom Paine declared that the government is best which governs least. Even Thomas Jefferson, though his egalitarian creed logically entailed a vigorous reconstruction, distrusted strong government. Southern aristocrats, like John C. Calhoun and Jefferson Davis, thought of freedom in terms of local autonomy. Abolitionists, such as William Lloyd Garrison and Wendell Phillips, conceived liberty as the right of every man, black or white, to own and control his own person. Frontiersmen, such as Davy Crockett and Daniel Boone, identified freedom with the hard-hitting individualism of the West. In other democratic countries, thought took a parallel course. John Stuart Mill, in his famous essay on liberty, for example, protested mainly against the subordination of individuals to institutional controls.

Although such "liberalism" contains a very precious element of truth, it is inadequate, and, in its traditional form, survives mainly as an anachronism. It provides the main slogans for the enemies of progress in the United States, for Westbrook Pegler, Martin Dies, Hamilton Fish, the National Manufacturers Association. It is used by all those who are endeavoring to divert the people from the path of orderly, democratic revolution. Many of its loudest spokesmen would prefer an American fascism to a democratic socialism.

The truly democratic choice is neither the "liberal" nor the fascist position. Freedom without organization is a delusion; organization without freedom is a strait jacket. These two values, instead of being pitted against each other, must be interfused: so that freedom is no longer merely freedom nor organization merely organization. There must be a new quality in both and a new ideal as a result of their union: *organized* freedom and *free* organization.

Anything so precious as freedom exacts a price—it can be achieved only when we plan and organize to achieve it. We tend to think of freedom abstractly, as mere absence of legal constraint, as "the freedom of both rich and poor to sleep under bridges"; we too seldom think of it concretely and operationally as the opportunity for right development, which depends upon planning and organization. In considering a problem of this kind, it is very important that we should get down, as William James would put it, to the pressing concrete particulars of the matter. When we

think in these terms—of remunerative work, good food, decent clothing, and adequate shelter, of sufficient rest and carefree holidays, of education sufficient to evoke one's talents, of the right to speak one's mind on the job without fear of economic reprisal, of the right to a happy and secure old age, with more than a beggarly pension—we realize that a welter of competing selfishness is not a free society. The failure to think in this manner betrays itself in confused and sentimental ideas. For example, Mr. Hyde, Secretary of Agriculture in President Hoover's cabinet, once said, in the depth of the depression, that it is a blessing we have our national parks, because the unemployed are now *free* to amuse themselves in these public playgrounds.

The truth is that we cannot save ourselves, cannot establish civilization upon a secure basis of health, without deep-ranging and far-reaching plans. If we should mobilize our national resources for public welfare in peace time as we do in war time, we could work a wondrous transformation in a single generation. We know at last what a vast deal we can produce, and we begin to see that it is sheer folly and cruelty to perpetuate poverty when we have all the necessary resources to eliminate it. Our planning, of course, must counterbalance directives from the leaders above with initiatives from the masses below. It must unite free men within an organized democratic community.

We must find some basic principle upon which to build our postwar world, just as medieval civilization was built around the church and fascism is built around the race or the totalitarian state. That principle must be, I think, the free, organized community. It cannot be the free individual, because human beings cannot be free in an individualistic system of devil take the hindmost.

In thinking out the philosophical basis of such a democratic community, we must avoid the mythically organic collectivism of the fascist, and the disorganic pluralism of the out-of-date "liberal." Society must be conceived neither as a monstrous Leviathan of which individuals are but cells, nor as a mere arithmetical sum of self-enclosed egoists. We should recognize that human beings are profoundly social, united one to another by essential relations. We should try to do justice to both sides of human nature, the individual and the communal.

IV

In respect to our second great problem, relativism versus absolutism, the answer of fascism is again fairly unequivocal. Its choice is relativism —not a purely individualistic perspectivism, of course, but a group relativism and opportunism—a denial of the universality of law, truth, value, and human rights.

This principle takes two forms, the first of which might be called a relativism of the moment. Mussolini, for example, emphasizes the extent to which fascist doctrine is relative to changing moods and situation. "Fascism," he says, "has never attempted to clothe its complicated and powerful mental attitude with a definite program but has succeeded by following its ever changing intuition . . . . If relativism signifies contempt for fixed categories and men who claim to be the bearers of an external objective truth . . . then there is nothing more relativistic than fascist attitudes and activity." The fascists, in these terms, seek to excuse their unprincipled opportunism.

An elaborate metaphysical rationalization for opportunistic behavior is to be found in the "actualism" of Giovanni Gentile, the most reputable of Italian fascist philosophers. All reality, as he conceives it, is nothing but mind in flux. Man's whole life, including all standards, is reduced to evanescence and subjectivity—"the mind as pure act." Proclaiming ever-changing practice to be the only truth, Gentile declares: "The true decisions of Il Duce are those which are simultaneously formulated and executed."

A similar point of view is embodied in the "existentialism" of Jaspers and Heidegger, which is, significantly, about the only pre-Hitler school of philosophy that has prospered under the swastika. In fact, Heidegger, as a result of Nazi patronage, was elevated to the rectorship of Friborg University, although he later somewhat lost favor. In the works of these two Nazi philosophers, there is an almost morbid emphasis upon crisis, forced option, the immediacy of death. The only fact is that nothing endures. All institutions, systems, principles—all that is objective and universal—must be repudiated for the sake of a momentary dramatic intuitionism.

This type of philosophy, when applied to law and politics, means that a social policy is nothing more than the command of the leader—each man, each group, each situation, must be dealt with by an individual de-

cision. It means that the Gestapo is told: do not worry about legal precedents or principles; deal with each case as you see fit. "Science" is no longer objective, morals no longer impartial, art and religion no longer universal. "Culture" becomes nothing but propaganda—the subjection of all thought and expression to transient expediency. The deeper intuitions of mankind, as Professor Whitehead has so eloquently maintained, rebel at this conception of life as a "bagatelle of transient experience."

The anti-universalism of fascist theory assumes a second form—an extreme group-relativism. The elite and the masses, the Gentile and the Jew, the white man and the black, the *Herrenvolk* and the vassal races, are to be sharply distinguished, the one to be honored, the other to be contemned, persecuted, or even murdered. As Josiah Royce, who formulated the "philosophy of loyalty," would have said—the fascist loyalty is intense, but excessively narrow and predatory: it wars upon the loyalties of others, and hence is not loyal to loyalty.

Applied to the various spheres of culture, such group relativism involves the most intolerant doctrines. The German people, for example, have been told that there is an exclusively "Aryan" physics, mathematics, history, anthropology, a peculiarly "Aryan" art, music, literature, a distinctively "Aryan" law, morals, religion; and that no non-Aryan culture is truly valuable or important. In Italy and Japan, likewise, the idea of a universal humanity is renounced in favor of racial and nationalistic bias.

When we turn to the democratic nations, we once again find a strange division and uncertainty. There are many whose position is, *mutatis mutandis,* not very different from the fascist. In the halls of Congress, the ideal of a united mankind is denounced as so much "globaloney." A prominent industrialist announces that we are not fighting this war to give milk to the "Hottentots." Our cities swarm with anti-Semites; the defenders of "white supremacy" are to be numbered in the millions; on every side, we hear the Japanese denounced as *yellow* bastards. The average American, if told that the Puerto Ricans are starving, shrugs his shoulders, and turns to matters of real concern. A good many Englishmen, who would think it intolerable if one-third of the English people were illiterate, consider it no very deep tragedy when ninety per cent of the Indian people are.

Nationalistic and racial bias is clearly not confined to the fascist countries. It can be shown historically that nationalism has grown more

and more intense in almost every country, and that imperialism, with its cruel exploitation of subject races, is a well-nigh universal phase in the development of modern capitalism. The fascists have carried these tendencies to mad extremes of sadism and xenophobia, and consequently it is a gross distortion to maintain, for example, that there is "no difference" between German fascism and British imperialism. Yet we need to pluck the motes out of our own eyes and to see how deeply the cancer of racialism and nationalism has eaten into the healthy tissue of the democratic organism.

In its devotion to universal and enduring principles, democracy must advance a world charter of freedom and enlightenment. We can bring to the war of ideas no weapon more potent than this—the ideal of universality, the solidarity of mankind. The very possibility of an enduring peace depends upon the organization of the international community upon a basis of common justice.

It is not impossible to discover that basis. The fundamental material needs of human beings are universal, or nearly so. If there is anyone so odd that he prefers to starve when he might have a full stomach, to shiver in the cold when he might be sheltered, to be ravaged with disease when he might be healthy, to be overworked and insecure when he might have work that is neither overanxious nor overwearisome, he is at least so rare a bird that he can be left out of account in the building of a world order.

Nor need we throw up our hands in despair when we consider the subtler, psychological values. Health and disease in the personality are quite as amenable to study and control as health and disease in the human body. We can discover, for example, what human needs are so basic that their repression leads to mental and social breakdown: to neurosis, insanity, and suicide in the individual personality; to crime, depression, war, and revolution in the society. A good beginning of such research has already been made by W. I. Thomas, a sociologist, and by G. V. Hamilton, a reputable psychiatrist. The fundamental human needs, as they define them, are first, the need for security—freedom from want and freedom from fear; second, the need for love and companionship; third, the need for constructive expression of one's talents, with the resultant status and self-respect; and fourth, the need for adventure, variety, freedom of expression.

My point is that we do not need to rely on vague intuitions in working out our plans for a good society. We can define a good civilization as one in which the basic wants of human nature are most fully satisfied; and by studying man and society, we can find out the nature of those wants. We can then make a scientific inventory of our available resources for meeting fundamental human needs; and, finally, by means of social science, we can achieve a planned use of these resources.

Yet in planning such a world civilization, we must recognize that mental flexibility and differentiation are necessary to democracy. As William Blake declared: "One law for the lion and the ox is oppression." Without sacrificing principles to expediency, without emphasizing differences at the expense of agreements, men should welcome variations as an enrichment of the basic theme of life. A society of identical twins is not necessarily the *summum bonum*.

In our search for flexibility, we can find a measure of truth even in fascist tribalism, at least in so far as it emphasizes the need for regional differentiation. A world state is too colossal, remote, impersonal—too monotonous in its universal sway—for the innumerable human beings on this planet by its means to achieve social unity in ways that are intimate, spontaneous, homelike. The solution is to unite the greater with the lesser loyalties: to encourage a varied and decentralized articulation of group interests, but to eliminate the injustices and predatory biases that interfere with the ultimate loyalty. The problem is to make catholicity and parochialism, world-citizenship and regionalism, the great state and the small community, interpenetrate and support each other. We cannot otherwise peacefully enclose in a single world framework national cultures so diverse as the Chinese, the Russian, the German, and the American.

V

In dealing with our third fundamental problem, aristocracy versus democracy, fascism is somewhat equivocal. It confides one set of doctrines to the "elite"; but uses another set to ensnare the masses.

By its formulation of an ideal of power and violence for the elite, fascism advances a standard utterly different from the fundamental principles of Western civilization—the Greek ideal of the rule of the wise and the Christian ideal of the brotherhood of man. In defining the charac-

teristics of the fascist "elite," the Axis spokesmen have stressed "heroism" and the will to mastery rather than reason or sympathy.

Plato's description of "timocracy," which is the name he gives to the Spartan system of military dictatorship, fits, on the whole, the fascist regime, although the avaricious nature of Plato's "oligarch" also enters basically into fascism. If we are searching for an historical precedent, we shall find it not in the earlier Sparta, when the timocracy was relatively uncorrupted by the lust for wealth, but in the Sparta of the Fourth Century, B. C., when the soldier caste had become poisoned by plutocratic corruption.

This doctrine of a fascist elite is often veiled, and for a very good reason. A total war cannot be fought by a few "select" champions: it must engage, so far as possible, the total will and energy of the people; but the people are not apt to be won by an authoritarian creed which asserts the right of the few to domineer over the masses. Consequently, the fascist propagandists must be somewhat chary of advertising the concepts of authoritarianism, and must advance a popular doctrine. This popular creed is formulated in the theory of social imperialism. According to its tenets, Germany, Italy, and Japan are proletarian nations, fighting for their rights against "plutodemocratic" enemies, who have monopolized a vast inequitable share of the world's territory and wealth. Economic justice cannot be achieved so long as the "have" nations selfishly withhold the riches of the world from the "have nots." The Axis peoples are not only poor but racially superior, and hence have a biological as well as economic right to a greater share of the world's goods. If the world is divided up properly, with Europe for the Europeans, Asia for the Asiatics, and America for the Americans, the superior races within each area will find the *Lebensraum* for a new life of happiness and prosperity.

This argument has a triple character. In its economic phase, it appeals to the ideal of sharing, the right of the masses to economic goods and all that can therewith be purchased. In its biological aspect, it appeals to the pride of birth, the assumed racial superiority of certain peoples and their "right" to dominate others. Finally, in its "geopolitical" aspect, it maintains that there are vast regional areas that must be organized as a whole if the economic resources thereof are to be effectively utilized. This ideology, which combines gross errors and deceits with the rightful demand for sharing and for broad regional integration, has been abominably suc-

cessful in winning support from the Axis masses, who remember the terrible suffering and frustration of the great depression and are therefore eager to grasp this new straw of hope.

The answers given in the democratic countries to this problem of the many versus the few are, once again, confused and divided. Our tories apparently think that we can successfully combine political democracy with economic autocracy. In the United States, they still talk glibly of "the American system of free enterprise," concealing the fact that the American economic structure has become dangerously akin to the monopolistic structure of fascist industry.

Yet the common people are slowly turning, despite temporary retreats and alarms, to the creed of *total* democracy—of social and economic, and not merely political, democracy. They tend, however, to underestimate the difficulty of the task ahead: they seldom understand the immense power of the monopolists, and so are not prepared for an adequate program of action.

The true situation is summed up in the authoritative report of economic concentration prepared by the Temporary National Economic Committee, which declares: "We know that most of the wealth and income of the country is owned by a few large corporations, that these corporations in turn are owned by an infinitesimally small number of people and that the profits from the operation of these corporations go to a very small group."[2]

Although President Roosevelt is very worried over these trends, his administration has been unable to withstand them in the present war-period. All authorities, including the Truman Committee investigating the war program, agree that the tendency toward monopoly has been accelerated by the system of war contracts, over seventy per cent of which have gone to one hundred big corporations. In view of this fact, we begin to wonder who has whom under control: whether the government has business, or business has government. If democracy is to survive, it must ultimately assert its mastery, either by stringent antimonopolistic regulation or outright social ownership.

Such a militant program will require an immense mobilization of democratic idealism. Total democracy must become a great fighting

[2] *Final Report and Recommendations,* S. Doc. 35, 77th Cong., first session, p. 9.

creed. But in our devotion to this ideal, we must be careful not to sacrifice the choice out of love for the common. The two basic social values are sharing and excellence. The civilized world has experienced a good deal of each individually, but not much sharing *of* excellence. This ideal, and not the fascist attempt to combine an elite with social imperialism, represents the valid reconciliation of democracy and aristocracy. First, we must share the good things of life, and second, we must make the things shared just as good as possible. Our objective should be to combine a broad horizontal culture in terms of participation with a high vertical culture in point of attainment. Only in a real social democracy can there be the most effective and best use of talent.

Fascism, far from sharing excellence, debases all values, and inequitably distributes such goods as it achieves. Its only "solution" of the problem of economic depression has been to link the productive system to the arts of death. Even the boasted "efficiency" of fascism is not really fascist, as the ineptness of Mussolini's war effort and the incorrigible inefficiency of fascist Spain clearly indicate. The Nazi efficiency is German, not fascist, and there is every reason to think that a real German socialism would be at least as efficient. The strength of fascism is not in attaining either a real democracy of sharing or a real aristocracy of excellence, but in so combining the two ideals, in a bogus but alluring form, as to appeal simultaneously to the masses and to the men of domineering will.

The counteroffensive of the democracies requires ideals no less popular and dynamic, and much more honest. There is only one way to win ***both*** the War and the Peace: to open far more wide the gates of social justice than we have ever done in the past. As long as there is a very basic cleavage between rich and poor, there can be no dependable order within or between nations. In a world where war has become total, the equitable sharing of wealth and privilege is, therefore, of the deepest practical concern to all. There must be more real equality, a better standard of living for the common man, not only in the United States and Britain, but in India, China, Russia, Africa, Latin America, and not less so in Germany, Italy, and Japan.

Our surest guarantee of victory, our greatest prospect for enduring peace, is to be found in a positive program, a demonstration of the creative

potentialities and high ideals of democracy. Not forgetting that we have mortal enemies, never compromising with fascist degradation, determined to use force to the limit required for complete victory, we must generously envisage the ideal and match thought with deed.

THE WORLD'S MOST UNBUILT CANAL

By LAWRENCE and SYLVIA MARTIN

CRYING OUT to be America's postwar project number one is a blueprint more than four hundred years old. It is a dream created through the uneasy centuries not by a person or a people, but by nations and the forces of history—by Spain, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Caribbean America, and the United States— by imperialism, the struggle for power in the Western world, the American Civil War, dollar diplomacy, and world war. Men have died for it, nations have intrigued and fought for it. And the fact that after 412 years of scheming and planning it is nothing but a project still is one of history's colossal ironies.

In Nicaragua the San Juan River is drier than it was when French, English, and Dutch pirates sailed up to sack Granada on the lake. Aside from that, it is much as it was early in the sixteenth century, when the Spanish governor Pedrarias sent a lieutenant to survey a route for a canal across Nicaragua. He couldn't know, but he suspected, what we know today—that the river, and the great Lake Nicaragua which it drains to the Caribbean, almost split the American Isthmus from ocean to ocean. But he probably did know even then what the British awoke to a century later—that the nation which controlled the Isthmus would control the New World.

Four hundred years later. 1940. In Managua, Nicaragua's steaming capital, we met a blond young American Army engineer who danced at the luxurious clubs with a kind of fury, as if hammering the hours away. He was blood brother to that New World Spaniard who blazed the trail for other centuries of surveys.

To the countless blueprints of the past, young Major Bunker had added still another. He sent it to Washington in August of 1940. The months passed slowly. They became half a year—a year. He waited. Nicaragua waited. President Anastasio Somoza waited, pacing the tiled floor of his Moorish palace on La Loma with Tarzan, his pink bulldog. The American Minister was worried. "Don't talk about it," he begged us. But

President Somoza talked about it without prompting: "We need that canal. It would do more than any other one thing to bolster the country's morale and prosperity."

Nicaragua's revolutionary past and its lack of development owe much to the hard geographical fact that east and west are practically two separate countries. The main population centers are all on the western side, between the two lakes of Managua and Nicaragua, and the Pacific. Eastern Nicaragua, little exploited save for oases along the coast at Greytown, Bluefield, and Puerto Cabezas, is so difficult of access save by plane that official Nicaragua treats it as foreign territory. It issues special visas for those going to it from the west, and gives the baggage of those who come from the east coast a second customs inspection at the capital. Revolutions have usually rolled up from the remote eastern shore.

This natural division was a convenience to the nations of Europe whose rivalries clashed in the Caribbean. While freebooters made merry up and down the San Juan, and Britain seized the Mosquito Coast, and revolutionists were aided and abetted by European agents, the cities could only man the guns and wait for trouble to come near enough to be fought.

Communication is so uncertain that even today the capital never knows but that tomorrow may find a ragged army of rebels pounding at the gates. The President makes secret scouting trips by plane to check up on the state of that part of the nation.

A canal would buy unity for Nicaragua—from the viewpoint of American policy a very desirable object. It would stimulate settlement along the canal route, and trade in all parts of the country and even into El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica. It would for the first time give Nicaragua ready access to American gulf and eastern markets, which means that it would, conversely, enlarge American commerce with the heart of Central America. It would open vast virgin lands between the Nicaraguan lakes and the Caribbean, create new industries, build up new communities.

Nicaraguans from Somoza down, bearing this in mind, view the San Juan and the canal route as a lifeline aborted for a hundred years by El Tío Sam. As an American correspondent in Managua put it for them: "The United States, by tying up the canal route, has blockaded Nicaragua's greatest avenue to wealth until the United States itself shall open it." The world struggle for power in the Western world, ending with the

victory of the Monroe Doctrine, served notice on Europe and on all the Americas; in effect: If anyone is to build the Nicaraguan canal and control it, it will be the United States. We made that official in 1916 by securing a 99-year renewable lease over the route.

Few countries have been so much a pawn of history as Nicaragua because of that precious canal route. She was a major prize in the long struggle that broke Spain, ended the Dutch dream of far-flung empire, checked the ambitions of France, and made England supreme in Europe and the United States master of the Western world. She had, as Laurence Greene aptly phrased it, "nothing but location. But that location was a prize worthy of the mightiest king's utmost strivings. To bridge Nicaragua was to marry the oceans, and to marry the oceans was to control the seas and to be Britain herself, or as great as Britain."

In the sixteenth century Granada, on Lake Nicaragua, was a treasure city, a center of trade with Spain, Panama, and the Indies. Walking her tranquil dirt streets today, you would not know that for two centuries she was harassed by the pirates of all nations. Drake and Hawkins and Henry Morgan sailed up the San Juan. Horatio Nelson, legend has it, lost his eye when Nicaragua's Molly Pitcher sprang to the cannon to save Granada from him.

Europe tried ceaselessly to get control of the canal route. The saga of frustration is typified by the experience of the Dutch. In 1829 General Verveer of Belgium[1] arrived in Guatemala with a familiar mission—only to find it blockaded by Salvador and Honduras in one of the many Central American battles. Unable to deal with any of the embryonic nations under the circumstances, he tried to mediate a peace treaty. He had to wait until the Central American Federation Congress met in 1830, and was rewarded at last with a concession giving the Netherlands a monopoly over coastwise trade and the canal route. While the United States protested, General Verveer sailed for home only to discover his own country torn by revolution which resulted in the secession of Belgium.

While Dutch and French extraofficial diplomacy played its tricks on the American Isthmus, England became our most powerful adversary. Here in Nicaragua, the United States and Great Britain came several times within a gunshot of war—as in 1849, when an American ultimatum

[1]At that time part of the Netherlands.

forced the British, at the zero hour, to haul down their flag in the Bay of Fonseca. By then it was plain that a stalemate had been reached. Britain was strong, but remote; we were weak, but near the scene of action. The result was the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, whereby both powers agreed not to try to control the Nicaraguan canal route.

In those days Americans knew Nicaragua much more intimtaely than they do today. During the Gold Rush the wily Commodore Vanderbilt got the rights from Nicaragua to build a canal. He never built it. Instead, he offered the eastern forty-niners a short cut to the west. He brought them down to the San Juan from New York or New Orleans, ferried them up the river and across the lake, then sent them over the thirteen miles of land to the Pacific in sky-blue carriages. Some of the passengers were singed by the bullets of local revolutions in which Europe still had a hand.

The opening guns of our Civil War were fired in Nicaragua. Our Manifest Destiny sent Louisiana's William Walker, with his "58 Immortals" to carve a slave state out of Nicaragua and write one of the most romantically mad chapters of history. He almost succeeded. He became king of Nicaragua for a period more brief than glorious. He would have succeeded, had it not been for the machinations of Great Britain, and of the Commodore, whose transisthmian route he had unwisely seized.

Granada was one of Walker's forts. When he was outfought there and forced to retreat, he burned it to the ground and left the inscription: "Here was Granada." But the city rose again, built by the need of river and lake for an economic outlet.

While we were busy with civil war, Louis Napoleon's engineers surveyed the canal route on the inspiration of Maximilian, who dreamed of extending his rule in Mexico to the Isthmus. But Maximilian died unpleasantly before a firing squad in Querétaro, and the end of our civil war checked the isthmian ambitions of France. The newly united Americans began their long debate over the Nicaraguan route versus the Panamanian for a canal which there was now no question must be built.

Panama was built—but our State Department has known for a long time that it is not the final answer. Today the long drama of frustration lifts the curtain on still another act.

Our need for the Nicaraguan canal has become pressing in the last ten years. In September of 1931, the Japanese fell on Manchuria—the opening move in the war now raging all over the world. Three and a half

months after the Manchurian incident, Major General Lytle Brown, Chief of Engineers, United States Army, reported to Secretary of War Hurley the conclusions of a 1929-31 survey of the Nicaraguan canal route:

> A second canal would have important advantages, including a saving in time and increased dependability to shipping, an increase in trade and commerce, improvement in international relations, and added safety and speed in the mobilization of our naval forces in the event of a national emergency.

"However," he added, "the advantages do not appear to be sufficient at the present time to warrant immediate action for the construction of a canal across Nicaragua."

Statesmen and soldiers being too rarely gifted with hindsight, foresight can hardly be expected of them. After ten years it is apparent that Japan had given the signal that the time did "warrant immediate action," and that we were drifting toward a "national emergency" in which the "added safety and speed of mobilization of our naval forces" would be necessary to our national existence. If the United States had then decided to build the canal, it would now be ready and we would have double insurance against round-trip bombers.

But those were depression years, and we weren't spending. It was thrift, too, that influenced us in choosing Panama over the better Nicaraguan route in the old days.

In 1901, the Isthmian Canal Commission recommended the Nicaraguan cut over the Panamanian. The French Canal Company, which had made some futile diggings, thereupon reduced its price for the rights, franchises, and work done to a figure that made Panama attractive. In the interests of a bargain the Commission changed its recommendation.

The Panama Canal, still the greatest engineering job on the planet, was a mistake. It was a mistake because the Nicaraguan route is more defensible, has a natural lake which cannot be bombed dry, is nearer home, and saves time and freight charges on two-thirds of the traffic between oceans.

While President Somoza, Nicaragua, and young Major Bunker waited, the United States began to pour two hundred million dollars into a third set of locks at Panama. Those dollars could not buy canal security; hence could not insure that one navy can face two ways. Not even a fourth, a fifth set of locks would buy security. By nature of the terrain, new locks would be in the same bombing radius as the old. Besides, the

weak part of the canal—anybody's secret—is not the locks but artificial Gatun Lake. If the great dam is seriously injured Panama becomes useless. Army engineers estimate that it would require ten years to fill the lake again.

When in 1939 President Roosevelt greeted Nicaraguan's Somoza with the warmest reception ever offered a Latin American *caudillo,* it seemed clear that he was thinking of the vital need of the United States for a second transisthmian canal. The latest of centuries of surveys was undertaken in such amazingly quick time, after it was personally spoken for by Somoza, as to suggest a secret understanding between the two Presidents that the canal should be pressed with all speed.

In May, 1939, Roosevelt replied encouragingly to the request, practically by return mail. Appropriations of a hundred thousand dollars were slapped on a deficiency bill and rushed through. The army engineers were already one day at sea when the bill passed. After the surveyor's recommendations had gone to Washington, the Nicaraguan President drafted a decree for a three-day fiesta to celebrate the good word when it should come over the diplomatic wires. Then he spent anxious days, holding the bag on La Loma in the most hotheaded and revolutionary republic in Latin America.

His confidence had had much to feed on. Between the day of his extraordinary reception in Washington and the close of the survey, the United States drew closer and closer to war. While the engineers were setting up headquarters, England opened formal hostilities. While they were making the final drawings, the total collapse of France put a desperate face on Britain's chances and ours. By the time the Secretary of War picked up the report from his desk, the Battle of Britain was on.

There was never a doubt in Nicaraguan minds that the historic old dream was about to come true. Why should there be? Uncle Sam's need was as plain as that of Nicaragua had been for hundreds of years. Diplomatic decks had been cleared for action. And the 1931 survey had not only proved once more the canal's feasibility, but had added to the arguments in its favor:

1. Two interocean canals would be safer than one for commercial shipping as well as for naval transit. The danger of complete stoppage from sabotage, accidents, slides, would be less. (Traffic through Panama

was cut off for seven months in 1915-16 by a landslide. World trade was dislocated with tremendous business losses.)

2. A twin-lock canal would solve problems of overhaul and give considerably more traffic capacity than the third set of locks at Panama.

3. The Nicaraguan canal would shorten sailing time for two-thirds of the traffic now using Panama. That would mean reduced rates, increased trade, and a stimulus to the United States merchant marine. Industries on the three coasts of the United States, and even far up the Mississippi and its tributaries, would be benefited.

4. The canal would increase our trade with Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and El Salvador, do more than any other one thing in advancing economic development in Central America, and bring the republics more firmly and naturally into our orbit.

5. "National defense affords an impelling reason for the second isthmian canal. The prospective theater . . . of the future naval operations of the United States cannot be confined to either the Atlantic or the Pacific Oceans. To maintain sufficient naval forces for adequate defense in both oceans would be prohibitively expensive, and division of our naval strength would be fundamentally weak. . . . Since the construction of the Panama Canal, the weapons of attack against a canal, particularly the aeroplane, have increased in power and effectiveness" and "in the element of surprise." Nor is it twice as arduous to defend two canals as one.

6. The construction plans are fully worked out. We are in a much better position to build this canal than the last one. Technology has advanced greatly in thirty years. The engineering and medical corps of the Army know what is necessary down to the last tent and bed. We shall not need to foment a revolution, for the Nicaraguan government is more friendly toward us than at any other time in the country's history, and the Costa Rican complications have been ironed out.

Warned the 1931 report:

> With such a positive solution (the Panama Canal) indorsed and executed, it is human, and with the United States it is historical, that after a short period of exhilaration the sense of security lulls to lethargy. . . . The Panama Canal is not so invulnerable at it was at the time of its completion. The ability to concentrate our battle forces and the power of access to either ocean is, therfeore, no longer beyond the possibility of prevention.

The construction of a Nicaraguan canal "might be vital" to the United States.

As Nicaragua waited, shelving her fiesta plans, American diplomats in Managua walked on tiptoe, the American Minister grew gray—and Pearl Harbor happened.

In the spring of 1942 Washington spoke at last—but the words were not golden. Nicaragua was to have, not a canal, but a two million dollar road to link east and west. It would save ten days in the movement of freight and passengers between the United States and the interior of Nicaragua. Rudely awakened from a rosy dream, President Somoza, the realist, made the best of it. He pinned a decoration on Major Bunker's chest. The most unbuilt canal in the world would retain its well deserved title.

The generating idea of the latest of too many surveys was to spy out a barge canal which might serve later, if needed, as the groundwork for a second Panama. This hypothetical barge canal was to be wide enough to accommodate the largest ships, and be equipped with dams and locks that could be used for the full-sized canal. It was to be a ship waterway in practically everything but depths.

At much of the still unpublished 1940 report we are compelled to guess. But this much we know: it lays down the sad ultimatum that a barge canal and a ship canal must remain two entirely distinct projects. They cannot follow the same route. The barge canal is the river improved, buttressed, dammed, and locked. The ship canal must cut across country, using the river where it can, but only incidentally, for large ships cannot cannot follow a river's windings. To build a ship canal half-deep and call it a barge canal would cost so much and take so much time that it would be better to start with the major job from the beginning.

The main recommendations of the report must have been a blow to Washington, where it had been assumed that in constructing a barge route, a ditch and a half could be dug with one spade. The barge canal with parallel highway, harbor works and dams, from Greytown on the Caribbean to San Carlos on Lake Nicaragua, could have been built in eighteen months for about seven million dollars, and would have been the greatest boon ever bestowed on Central America. But it would leave the United States as far as ever from a ship canal, which would take ten years to build and cost three-quarters of a billion dollars.

However, the new road, which planes are even now routing from the air, is something more than just another Good Neighbor gesture. Such a road would have had to be built before canal construction got under way, for transport of workers and material through the wilderness of the Nicaraguan hinterlands. It may actually be the first step—unless our traditional lethargy takes hold of us again until a third world war catches us once more unprepared.

Until the canal is built, the untamed San Juan, Lake Nicaragua, and the thirteen miles of land that separate the natural water road from the Pacific, will keep their ghosts and their undefiled, jungle-grown battlefields where history was made. And until it is built, Washington will be haunted by the specter of military insecurity—and the laughter of the gods.

WAR FOR DEMOCRACY— OR RESTORATION?

By DAVID DEMPSEY

WE ARE FACING one of those decisive moments of history, when opinion can make events. Within the next year our role in shaping the peace will be defined. We can patch up the old one, which didn't work, or we can lay the foundations for a new one, which will. Can we seize the opportunity before too many victories endow us with the complacency that produced isolationism, "normalcy," and Harding after the last war? We can, in Max Lerner's words, "own the future," but only if we present our claims now.

The military crisis for the United Nations has passed. The crisis in peace has just begun. The conflict of interests within the nations of the United Nations, and among the United Nations as a family, has started in earnest. Unified war aims, comparable to our unification of military strategy, with specific implementation for carrying them out, must accompany our armies in their invasion of Europe. They will be no less important, in the long run, than ammunition. As Wilson's Fourteen Points were said to be worth that many of the Kaiser's divisions, our own aims must have the directness of weapons; they must be in a position to counter Hitler's propaganda should our armies be stalemated in Europe; they must be in a position to shorten the war when victory for the Allies appears inevitable to the peoples of the Axis.

Properly conceived, aims can do four important things: they can maintain our own fighting morale, both in the field and at home; they can swing the neutrals to our side; they can demoralize the enemy, and they can build support for a stable peace and a democratic postwar world.

PRESENT LIMITATIONS OF OUR AIMS

For the average American, who is apt to be fighting to avenge Pearl Harbor or to get rid of Hitler, Mussolini, and Tojo, the right kind of aims can give the war a center of moral orientation. We have failed to do this. We have not yet conceived aims as powerful in their emotional impact as

Mr. Wilson's Fourteen Points, or his crusade to "make the world safe for democracy" (which were not wrong, as a cynical postwar generation assumed; what was wrong was that we failed to carry them out); nor have we proposed anything as specific as the League of Nations to put them into practice.

The Atlantic Charter suffers not only by reason of its regional limitations, but it is a positive liability to us in the Orient. As a propaganda weapon it is known chiefly for those points which Mr. Churchill has repudiated. Not one man in a thousand can tell you what it proposes to do for the world. Its emphasis on restoring the Western World to its *status quo ante,* without a parallel emphasis on those progressive changes which the historical situation demands, leaves it an essentially conservative document. Its vagueness is as billowy as the ocean on which it was written, without any of the grand swells of that ocean, or even the gentle undulations of the Potomac, which at once gave both sweep and preciseness to the Fourteen Points.

The Four Freedoms have fared somewhat better. They hold out the promise that the world will someday be set free from the tyranny of fascism and imply that democracy will make good on the one freedom on which it has defaulted—freedom from want. It has been left to Mr. Wallace, Sumner Welles, and a few other government spokesmen to pin freedom down to its specifics—principally the specifics of the common man. It has kept the liberals fairly happy without compromising Mr. Roosevelt's freedom to bargain.

There is probably some design in this division of official labor. The President's statements must be general enough to inspire without being specific enough to bind him against unforeseen developments. He can state that we are fighting for the Four Freedoms "everywhere in the world," but he cannot promise milk to the Hottentots. He can support the principle of self-determination of nations but he dare not admit what the actions of the State Department imply, that we are more than a little interested in who does the determining. During the first year or so of the war this was probably good politics. No one, not even the Tories, could disagree with such good intentions. But for dynamic war aims the usefulness of this policy has entered a phase of diminishing returns.

The Wallace-Welles bloc has suffered because of the relatively minor audience they command compared to Mr. Roosevelt. It is surprising, out-

side of liberal circles, how few people know of Mr. Wallace's "Price of a Free World Victory" or what, in general, he stands for. Sumner Welles' statements are even less known. The general public is rather dimly aware that our government proposes to do something beneficent for the world after the war; it is much more keenly aware, thanks to the coolness of the press toward the "common man," that these proposals have been characterized as globaloney.

The fate of our war aims at this juncture is critical. It is clear that the administration's strategy of letting the lesser spokesmen send up the trial balloons has failed, at least to the extent of rousing widespread public support for really progressive aims. Meanwhile the opposition has not been idle.

The Lineup of Forces

The People: According to Gallup polls, isolationism in its prewar sense is dead. The great majority of voters is willing to support United States participation in some sort of world federation. The war has convinced them that we have an obligation to take our place in world affairs, that we cannot play the ostrich without getting into another war. This may be temporary, especially if postwar domestic problems loom large to take the people's minds off the international scene. The important thing to remember is that the public is fickle and that unless peace aims are linked up with the will to victory, victory itself may leave them vulnerable to the sophistries of the isolationists.

The Army: Thanks to our antiquated theories of indoctrination and the rise of comic books, the Army is just not interested in anything but winning the war and getting back home. The British Army provides its men with fortnightly current affairs bulletins for group discussions, and trains men in the techniques of leading them. The Russian soldier, when he is not on the front line, receives as much as two hours political "indoctrination" a day. Observers in North Africa report a keen political grasp of the war on the part of both French and British soldiers and an almost appalling indifference on the part of our own. Our failure to teach the Army what it is fighting for may have disastrous results when 10,000,000 soldiers come back to vote.

The Press: The majority of the newspapers support the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms and the idea of continued American

membership in the United Nations after the war. The notable exception is the Hearst-McCormick-Patterson press. On the other hand, the press is inclined to be hostile toward postwar reform at home, and as the issue of world federation is likely to be linked with this the outlook for press support when it is really needed is none too hopeful. You might say that the newspapers are in favor of the generalities under which they know this war has to be fought, but that secretely they hope that as few as possible of them will be put into effect.

Labor: To the extent that labor has declared itself it is, with the exception of Mr. Lewis's United Mine Workers, more solidly in favor of a democratic world and a realistic peace than any other single group in the nation. It goes without saying that labor is in the vanguard of reform at home.

Business: If anyone thinks that business has changed its prewar attitude toward the role America must play in the postwar world, I refer him to the numerous public statements, and articles, by business leaders on this subject. Examples: Professor Fred Fairchild of Yale, speaking before the annual convention of the United States Chamber of Commerce, told those of the nation's businessmen who could afford to pay their expenses to New York that "we must abandon the grandiose notions of America policing, feeding, reconstructing the world. We must give up the Atlantic Charter and all the things it proposes to do for the world, and do for nothing.... America cannot afford to do those things." Fred C. Crawford, president of the National Association of Manufacturers, in a speech before the Economic Club of Chicago on May 5, 1943 urged the President to make a "Churchill-like" statement to the effect that there will be no basic changes in our economy, and pled for the formulation of a "national labor relations policy which will restore industrial harmony and increase production." I refer the optimist who thinks that businessmen have grown up, to the opposition to the renewal of the Reciprocal Trades Act and to the ten negative votes cast by ten Republicans of the House Ways and Means Committee when the measure was up for renewal. I refer him to the May issue of the *Nation's Business* as a fair sample of what the men who are running the United States Chamber of Commerce are thinking on the momentous issues of world co-operation, in particular to a thinly-veiled attack by Senator Butler on the Lend-Lease Act, and to what ap-

pears to be the Chamber's opening salvo against the N.R.P.B. Report, by Gustav Stolper.

The real danger in such statements and attitudes as the foregoing is not the proof that isolationism is far from dead but the danger, assuming the usual persistence on the part of the globaloney bloc, that they will penetrate the public opinion vacuum which separates the area occupied by Mr. Wallace's ideas at the top and the area into which the Roosevelt-Churchill oratory has begun to condense at the bottom. Like all vacuums it is most easily filled with hot air. Certainly the "strategy of truth" will have a harder time filling it than Mrs. Luce's histrionics. Unless the proponents of a free world begin now to win the support of this highly strategic group—the great mass of people whose opinions are still largely unformed—the offensive will be checked to the opposition. For nothing is more certain than unless the issue of world co-operation is presented dramatically and forcefully by those in whose hands lie the power of action, inertia will remain a weapon of the isolationists. And even a second-rate program, backed by second-rate people, can win with inertia on its side.

The Outlook Abroad

The prospects are not much more encouraging among the United Nations' family. The aims of the Polish Government-in-Exile conflict with the aims of Soviet Russia over the question of frontiers and, what is more fundamental, over the structure of interests that will dominate Europe internally after the war. The aims of British imperialists conflict with the aims of the new China and, more drastically, with the aims of her subjugated colonial natives. The aims of the Left who are fighting Europe's underground war are frequently at odds with those of the Right, who hold the diplomatic reins in London. The plans that Mr. Hoover has for Europe after the war are quite different from those of Mr. Stalin's. The aims of big business in England are not those of big business in America on the question of world markets and airways. The conflict between the privileged and the masses has not been fundamentally altered in a single one of the democracies. All the seeds for another war are here, waiting only for Hitler to evacuate the plowed fields of Europe in order to sprout.

It would appear, as in so many issues, that the President is the one man in the world who can lead the way in resolving these differences. He has the authority to lay down the outlines of a progressive war and peace policy for the United States and as the spiritual leader of the United Nations he commands the respect of their rulers and peoples. Furthermore, Congress is in a more favorable mood to back him up now than it may be later.

Yet he has almost obstinately refused to take this leadership—or at least to show his hand. This is certainly not because he feels himself incapable, or that he honors freedom the less. It should be remembered that the President is a consummate tactician who prefers to play his politics on a chessboard; not until after the game is over is the strategy of his moves always apparent. Mr. Willkie, his only serious contender, has also begun to play political chess, and as this is an exciting game with such a player at the board, the number of his kibitzers has enormously increased. The President would do well to brush up on his moves too, for Mr. Willkie's skill may not be wanting when the big match comes off.

Liberals who have become discouraged at the stagnation of our aims might well ponder Mr. Willkie's latter-day rise. Curiously enough, it is he who has formulated most eloquently a "free world" program—freedom for the colonial peoples, recognition of equality for the Asiatics, co-operation with Russia, the revival of free trade among nations, an end to imperialist exploitation. I do not say that these are not also part of Mr. Roosevelt's aims. But he has not been able to back them up in a manner that will gain public support and confidence. Mr. Willkie has stepped into the breach. In so doing he has lost the support of the powerful in his own party, but he has gained what is worth far more—the support of the American people. His *One World* has sold more than a million copies. He has the ear of the people second only to Mr. Roosevelt and he has gained it not by bargaining with freedom but by making it the first order of business. The response which his utterances have drawn is a clear demonstration that the public is ready for the kind of bold and daring leadership on the world front which Mr. Roosevelt gave them at home in 1933.

Good Reasons Are Not Always Right Ones

Officially, the haziness of our war aims is explained by our desire to stay "neutral" in questions involving the politics of our allies (the anti-

Vichy French, for instance); or of the neutrals (Spain); or of our desire not to interfere in the purely British problem of colonialism (India); or of the necessity for not jeopardizing the military progress of the war.

Such a policy can lead us nowhere, least of all to peace. As if we had not learned the lesson of "neutrality" in Spain and the lesson of colonialism in Burma and Malay. In a war in which we are implored to rush our forces to the defense of Australia, is it "interfering" to ask that the natives of India be given that measure of freedom which will make *them* allies, rather than sullen spectators, in our fight against the Japanese? This is not ill-tempered criticism of an ally; it is a warning that the war is being lost in these "testing places" of democracy and that not to make ourselves heard now is almost surely to court disaster when it comes time to rely on the good will of those subjugated millions who, as much as any of us, have a stake in the peace.

The argument that military victory must take precedence over the immediate application of war aims is an important one. It holds that until victory is won no general realization of our ideological ends is possible; that if it is necessary temporarily to compromise our ends for the sake of winning a battle, then the better part of wisdom is to compromise. This is a policy that has worked with only fair success in North Africa. Unquestionably the establishment of a *modus operandi* with the ex-Vichy regime in North Africa saved thousands of British and American lives at the time of the invasion. Indeed, without the help of these men the whole campaign might have failed. Yet the public's sensitiveness to this arrangement was so great that the President found it necessary to reassure us as to the temporary nature of the Darlan appointment, and the failure of this "temporary" regime to restore even a semblance of democratic rule brought forth a succession of protests that eventually succeeded in liberalizing the regime to some extent—not, however, before disillusion and cynicism had infected the ranks of liberals everywhere. At present the status of our compromise is not clear. There have been notable changes in administrative personnel, and a restitution of certain democratic procedures. But there has been no decisive indications that these will be followed by genuine democratic rule, even when victory is complete.

Compromise in itself cannot be condemned so long as its expedient character is recognized; so long, that is, as it remains an expediency. But those who choose such a policy must always remember that to compro-

mise one's ideals now involves a certain difficulty in "uncompromising" them later on.

North Africa is a leading case in point. Upon our success or failure there we may gauge the future that is in store for us in Europe. In maintaining an illusion of political neutrality we have actually been forced to support the *de facto* Right, as we shall probably be forced to support it in Europe proper when the showdown comes. To say that we are "neutral" in these matters is to draw the curtain of charity and take the State Department at its word. Actually, our snubbing of De Gaulle, our unsavory record in Spain, and our encouragement of Otto of Hapsburg can hardly be called neutral.

When the war is over, will we remain neutral in the fight between Mihailovitch and the Partisans in Yugoslavia? Between the remnants of the Metaxas regime and those who seek a republican Greece? Between the Sikorski Government-in-Exile and the Polish patriots now in Russia? Failure to declare ourselves in favor of a genuinely democratic French North Africa has already cost us heavily in the esteem of our allies but it is nothing to what we will have to pay for collaboration with "moderate" elements inside Europe. That price will be, at least, a reorientation of European democratic faith toward the Soviet Union and an almost certain reversion to the power politics of the last twenty years, in which communism, rather than fascism, is the villain.

This is the cost of trying to fight a political and ideological war solely on military grounds: an ideological and political position is forced on you, negatively, in the absence of your own positive position. This is the most charitable interpretation that can be put upon our actions—the negative one of supposing that ends can somehow be dissociated from means. A more cynical attitude would imply that our actions are not negative; that, in fact, we are fighting a war and counterrevolution at the same time. We fight, in a word, for democracy, but for a democracy without risks to those whose special interests are at stake—the democracy of Giraud and not De Gaulle; of Churchill and not the Labor Party; of the State Department and not the liberal wing of the New Deal.

What Kind of Aims and How Can We Get Them?

As the war continues it will be increasingly difficult to maintain morale with brass bands, movie stars, and war-bond rallies. If Axis prop-

aganda lives up to its reputation we will be offered some very appealing reasons for making a negotiated peace. It may not be enough to say, as Churchill and Roosevelt declared at Casablanca, that we will fight for complete and final victory. It will be more important to say what complete and final victory will bring us.

If we begin to answer that question now, in specific terms, we can set the stage for a democratic postwar world. Nothing less than a really revolutionary set of aims will do. If this means an end to the British Empire, as now constituted, so be it. (This is the implication of Mr. Willkie's position and Great Britain has not yet entered diplomatic objections; public opinion would reject them.) If it means not doing half the things to the German, Italian, and Japanese people that we feel like doing, so be it. We are still Christian and the Christian dynamic no less than the political dynamic must help build a new world. If it means a radical transformation of the social system at home in the direction of industrial democracy, so be it. (If you read Mr. Wallace's speeches straight, this is what he is saying.) If it means merging the sovereignty of nations in the greater sovereignty of a world federation, so be it. We are in a revolution, whether we like it or not, and if we are to control its direction we must be participants, not spectators. If the democracies do not unite the world the fascists will. The alternative to all this is not defeat; we will probably win whatever our aims may be. The alternative is more likely another war, twenty years hence, which we may not win.

It is easy to win the peace with a typewriter. The practical difficulties that stand in the way of asserting a set of specific war aims—no matter how much agreement there may be as to their need—are immense. They are the sort of difficulties that always beset democracy in times of crisis: the difficulties of resolving pressure-group interests, of finding a common denominator into which every integer of our pluralistic society can be divided and still come out even.

The only realistic answer to this dilemma is to invoke that other principle of democracy and admit that we will have to sacrifice some interests for the good of the common cause. If our cause is freedom, then those interests whose programs will work against freedom must not be allowed to shape our policy. If the price of freedom is international federation and drastic change at home, then let us take the bull by the horns and prepare the public's mind for federation and change. The public

stood for "drastic change" in 1933 and—cognizant of the instability of our current boom—they are psychologically ready to support change in favor of employment for 10,000,000 soldiers when the war is over.

It is pretty generally recognized that the United Nations will attempt some sort of postwar world federation. It is not the purpose of this paper to outline any particular plan but rather to point out the strategic necessity for a plan now. An average of a book a week is performing blueprints for peace and one can pay his money and take his choice.[1] For the United States to take the lead in formulating a plan for world federation will go far toward dispelling the fear that we may revert to isolationism. It will steal the march on the Wheelers, Nyes, Lindberghs, especially if it is offered as a bipartisan measure, ratified in its larger aspects by Congress. The danger of a one-man peace movement, such as Wilson conducted in 1919, would be averted. It would dissolve at once the Machiavellian shadow that keeps so much of our intentions in darkness, and begin to redeem democracy in the eyes of six hundred million colonial subjects abroad and millions of underprivileged at home. The esteem and faith of these millions will be needed when the real job of building peace is started.

Without attempting to formulate too rigidly the mechanism by which this can be done, let us agree on a minimum program which the United States can now offer as a basis for the postwar world.

1. Any world federation for the maintenance of peace must include all the victorious powers, the defeated nations, and direct representation by the colonial peoples.

2. Such a federation must aim at superseding the sovereignty of individual nations in the realm of world affairs. It must impose binding commitments on its members for the enforcement of peace while retain-

[1]As this is being written the State Department announces a series of 26 weekly radio programs to acquaint the people with the nature of the postwar world and domestic problems incident to it. Such an educational endeavor is admirable. But considering the source one is justified in the not-too-rash prediction that Mr. Hull and the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace (co-sponsors) will not come to grips with the really basic problems of social reorganization and that their program will be more revisionist than revolutionary. If this is true it is all the more necessary that labor and liberals in this country make known the kind of world *they* want.

ing sufficient flexibility as an instrument of adjudication to minimize the necessity of force. The federation must not make the mistake of the League of Nations in attempting to maintain a static balance of power.

3. A world federation must guarantee an end to the colonial system. It must provide for immediate freedom for those who are ready for it and it must guarantee the security of those colonies which are being educated for self-government. It must likewise recognize the Oriental and African peoples as the moral equal of the white man.[2]

4. The federation must recognize that the problem of peace is also the problem of prosperity and it must have some power to regulate international trade, control tariffs, develop a world currency, and guarantee each nation just access to the world's undeveloped resources.

Utopian? Perhaps. Yet as the price of rebuilding a peaceful world it is cheap. The alternative is permanent revolution.

What About Russia?

It is frequently said that Russia is the enigma in this war and that she will be the enigma at the peace table. Nothing could be further from the truth. Great Britain and the United States are the enigmas. Russia's position is quite clear. As the only true revolutionary state among the United Nations she will not try to reverse history. She is opposed to imperialism, colonialism, and the ideology of capitalism. She is not likely to join a federation set up for the doubtful purpose of maintaining these privileges on a world-wide scale. The idea that she is concerned only with questions of frontiers is foolish. Her sense of historical change is too keen for her to suppose that peace can be kept simply because her own borders are secure. As she seems to have abandoned the idea of "world revolution" her desire to see the capitalist nations engaged in a fraticidal war is dead. For the lesson of appeasement, for Russia, was that capitalism was at last approaching a truly international stage. International capitalist con-

[2]It is interesting at this date to note a proposal by the Japanese government, after the last war, to incorporate in the Covenant of the League of Nations a clause recognizing "the principle of equality of nations and just treatment of their nationals" and seeking to prevent "distinctions on account of race and nationality." Although supported by a majority of the League's Council, the proposal was defeated by British and American opposition. President Wilson objected that it "would raise a race issue throughout the world" and Lord Cecil admitted that the suggestion "raised extremely serious problems for the British Empire."

solidation failed at Munich but not before it had made inevitable the Russian protective pact with Germany. She will not wish to restore the conditions for a repeat performance. Hence she will insist on a world order in which the Soviet Union has security—that is, a world which is friendly, though not necessarily committed to socialism.

When the League of Nations was being compounded out of one-part Wilsonian idealism, one-part French fear, and one-part British imperialism, the Soviet government—which had not been invited to join—sent a note to President Wilson setting forth four proposals for a real League. Reading them today we are struck by the irony with which history takes us back to the scene of our crime.

Chicherin's note[3] proposed (1) self-determination of all people, including those under allied imperialism (a fundamental issue in the present war); (2) cancellation of all war debts (eventually done, but not until the Allies had helped ruin themselves and Germany financially in the attempt); (3) expropriation of the capitalists in all countries and organization of international economic co-operation on a basis of collective economy (pure naïveté on the part of the Bolsheviks and later abandoned as a basis for co-operation by the realistic Stalin); (4) international disarmament (a recognized imperative for world peace which the great powers, because of their imperialist rivalries, were incapable of achieving).

The issues today are not basically different from 1919, except that we have had twenty years experience and a new war to confirm the failure of our policy. Yet with victory more certain now than it has ever been the hazards of a conqueror's peace confront us. Can we accept the challenge? We are at the turning point of the war. Dynamic war aims, made now, will hold us steady on the road to a free world, amid the countervailing winds that have already begun to blow from Downing Street and Wall Street. The choice is clear. We can finish this war as we began it, as a war for democracy, or we can finish it as a war of restoration, in which case it will not be finished. Can we be as radical as Roger Williams and say with him: "Having bought Truth deare, we must not sell it cheape, not the least graine of it for the whole world"?

[3]Summarized in *World Politics* by R. Palme Dutt.

STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC WAR

By JOSEPH ROSENFARB

ALLIED AIR POWER by itself cannot subdue Japan any more easily than German air power could subdue England. Indeed not nearly so easily. For the distances in the Pacific are far greater than in the European theatre. Indeed the distances which aerial striking power has to traverse in order to reach Japan is nowhere less than a thousand miles, which is the maximum bomb load radius for even our largest bombers. In order to bomb Japan we shall have to acquire bases for our air force on islands or on the Asiatic continent; and when you have admitted that fact, you have admitted that air power cannot be the exclusive weapon but that its strength must depend on traditional land and sea power to acquire and protect such bases. And when you have said *that*, you still have not answered the hypothetical question as to whether bombing by itself (regardless of its striking power) can force a nation like Japan to surrender.

Quite as clear as the weakness of air power by itself is the footlessness of depending upon a major land offensive on the Asiatic continent to bring Japan to her knees. For even if the difficulties of supply and transport were overcome in sufficient degree to drive the continental Japanese army into the sea, our forces would still find themselves essentially in the position of Napoleon up to 1812 and Hitler in 1940 after the fall of France looking helplessly across the Channel into an invulnerable island fortress. This should not be taken as an argument against assisting China in her own offensive against Japan on the continent; this assistance must be given if only to prevent Chinese collapse now and to assure a strong, independent China for the peace. It is an argument solely against a dependence upon a land offensive as the major weapon for assuring Japanese defeat.

There remains, then, the major question of a sea offensive. And here the complex of sea power in the Pacific will surely consist of the traditional combination of surface units; submarine fleets for attritional warfare against Japanese shipping, which will preclude the Japanese from

concentrating and maintaining amphibious forces for any sustained attack or defense; air power, land-based and carrier-based, and amphibious land forces, which have demonstrated their superiority in the southern Solomons against tremendous odds, in one of the bloodiest and rarest campaigns in military annals. Such is the necessary composition of the military team, indivisible and irresistible.

A Sea Offensive

Since the air offensive as an exclusive weapon is incapable of bringing success in the war against Japan, and since the Asiatic land offensive is unlikely to be a decisive factor, there remains the sea route as the highway to Tokyo. Yet that is not the end to the exploration of a victorious strategy. Geography—space or distances, weather, and land distributiveness—combined with the complex of weapons of sea power confronts us with a number of alternative routes. The correct choice is not a simple matter of the application of technical rules, but involves some large-scale issues of strategy, tactics, and logistics about which controversies have arisen.

In order to be able to make the correct choice among a number of sea routes, it would be well to indicate what conditions and characteristics it is desirable that the route chosen should possess. This can best be done by examining the following hypothetical naval campaign.

Let us assume that our high command, impatient with preliminary peripheral moves, decides to strike directly at the heart of Japan. Acting upon this plan it sends out an invasion force of several hundred ships—a force large enough to establish a bridgehead on the main islands of Japan. Accompanying this amphibious force is the combined Allied battlefleet—battleships, aircraft carriers and the rest—numerous and powerful enough to operate at least on even terms with the Japanese navy in the Western Pacific. It is the function, of course, of the convoying battlefleet to destroy the Japanese fleet and clear the way for a landing of the convoyed army. Such a naval enterprise is utterly out of the question and for reasons which are very illuminating. First, no battlefleet commander would wish to engage a first-rate opponent in a decisive naval engagement while simultaneously preoccupied with convoying duty. Attempts by the commanding admiral to reconcile these functions would likely lead to total disaster as in the case of Rozhestvensky at Tsushima in 1905 when the Russian fleet from European waters arriving in the Far East was destroyed

when it was forced by the Jap fleet to fight a major naval engagement while busy protecting considerable convoyed shipping.

Since then the danger of such an enterprise has been considerably enhanced because of the advent of the airplane and submarine. The Japanese fleet would, of course, choose the most favorable time and place to launch its attacks. By night, submarines, destroyers, and cruisers would take their toll of the convoyed ships. By day, airplanes, based on the several Japanese islands in the Pacific and from Japan as the convoy approached its goal, would wreak havoc. A battlefleet constantly harassed by the burden of its double duty would not be at its best for a major naval engagement. If such an hegira could conceivably reach Japan it would be so whittled down as to be hardly in a position to establish a bridgehead against the full might of the Japanese army and land-based air force. But assuming that a bridgehead could thus be established, this nightmare naval campaign would have to be repeated in order to bring in additional troops and supplies. It is inconceivable that our high command would undertake an action which might involve the drowning of hundreds of thousands of our troops in running the gauntlet of the main Japanese navy and might jeopardize the existence of our whole fleet. The first principle or condition for a successful sea offensive then emerges: in order to get at Japan, the Japanese fleet must first be removed as a menace.

But it may be asked, how do we manage to convoy troops and supplies across the Atlantic and how have we just completed a major invasion and campaign in North Africa with the remarkably low loss of only slightly over two per cent of the total shipping? The answer is that this was done in waters where there is virtually no opposing surface navy or land-based air power opposition. Such units of the German fleet as exist are bottled up by the British home fleet. The French fleet was largely neutralized and the guns of the Italian fleet have retained their customary reticence even in *mare nostrum*. It is interesting to note that no landing was possible at Casablanca until the guns of the Richelieu stationed there were silenced. It is also noteworthy that some of the greatest losses sustained by Allied convoys have been on the route to Murmansk where Germany has the advantage of plane and surface raiders based on Norway.

How then have we been able to convoy successfully our troops and supplies to Australia and the Southern Pacific? The answer lies chiefly

in the vast expanses of the Pacific. Prodigal as the Japanese have been with their ships, they have kept their battlefleet very much out of harm's length and have not sent it out into the Eastern Pacific scouring the seas for possible convoys, thus running the risk of being whittled down by a surprise from air power and naval task forces.

A naval and landing expedition against Japan proper is then out of the question until the threat of the Japanese fleet is eliminated. If so, then the hypothetical naval campaign should be modified only to the extent of sending our fleet out first to destroy the Japanese navy before we undertake an invasion proper. Only on first blush, however, does this appear feasible. What if the Japanese navy refuses to accommodate the American navy which has steamed out to the Western Pacific and refuses to enter into an engagement? The Pacific is large enough for any navy to hide in if it so chooses. It can retire to the Sea of Japan or anywhere within the spiderweb of the Japanese-occupied isles, in which case it would be foolhardy for the American navy to run the risk of mines and torpedoes, and of planes from hidden airfields. Likewise a navy cannot cruise about for any protracted period. Needs for supply, fuel, and repairs for a navy operating at such great distances from its base would render it necessary for the American fleet to return to its base with its mission of destroying the Japanese navy unfulfilled. This procedure could be indefinitely repeated without producing results. If an invasion of Japan is impossible without the prior destruction of the Japanese fleet and the latter can be avoided by refusing engagement with the American fleet, then it is obvious that the Japanese navy will not fight the American fleet unless under exceptionally favorable circumstances. Our navy, therefore, has the problem of obtaining contact with the enemy under circumstances which are at least not too favorable to the enemy. Fortuitous encounters cannot, of course, enter into the planning as a factor to be relied upon. There are, therefore, two ways of obtaining contact with the enemy fleet: by opposing it in its attempts to attain an objective, or by seeking ourselves the obtaining of objectives which would so jeopardize the enemy's position that the possible loss of these objectives to the enemy would compel risking the fleet. Since the first occasion depends on the enemy's initiative, it must also be left out as a reliable factor, for we cannot compel the enemy to undertake another Midway expedition. The second occasion must therefore be explored.

What is so important to Japan that its threatened loss would be cause for risking the Japanese fleet? As was already indicated, Japan's ability to fight depends on the contact maintained between Japan proper and its island empire, and on the immunity of its industrial system, naval and air bases, coast defense, and land armies from air attacks. Therefore, our obtaining of island bases from which such contact between the Japanese homeland and the conquered islands can be severed and the softening up by air and sea power can be undertaken through the destruction of air and sea bases and coast defenses as well as of the industrial plant, would constitute an objective which the Japanese navy would at all costs seek to prevent us from achieving. If we obtain such bases then these results must follow because of the demonstrated superiority in quantity and quality of our air power and its destructiveness in the European war theater. Such land bases would permit so great a concentration of air power that it would be beyond even the capacity of all the aircraft carriers that we could reasonably accumulate. From such land bases Japanese naval bases could be pulverized or at least rendered untenable for the navy. The Japanese air force could be swept from the skies of Japan and the result of further resistance would be a Tunisia combined with a Rotterdam. No contact could be maintained with the empire because the sea lanes would be dominated by Allied sea power supplemented and protected by an air umbrella. If the Japanese fleet survived that point it would be without naval bases and air protection and become completely ineffective in defending the Japanese shores against an invasion, if that remained a necessity for a *coup de grâce*. Then our battlefleet, furnished with a land-based air umbrella in addition to carrier-based air power, could lead an amphibious force to establish a landbridge on a coast deprived of the protection of an air force. The Japanese navy or what remained of it by that time could not offer serious opposition against a navy protected by our air force possessing complete domination of the air.

Obviously such bases must be comfortably within the range of air power of Japan proper. As already indicated, we do not now possess such bases. And to prevent us from obtaining such bases the Japanese navy would be forced to fight. Why not, then, in our campaign to obtain such bases, re-create the conditions described where the Japanese navy would be forced to fight under disadvantages resulting from opposing

the unbeatable combination of superior sea and air power, both land- and carrier-based? In other words, from where we are now, let us proceed to advance by amphibious operations to obtain intermediate bases under an umbrella of air power. This, of course, is not the slow strategy of reconquest island by island which has been justly condemned. The pace and range of our offensive is geared to the range of air power. We want only those islands suitable as bases which lie in the direction of Japan proper and are within air power range of the preceding base—a range between 500 to 1000 miles under current bombing ranges of air power.

As we proceed on such an offensive the Japanese command is placed in a serious dilemma: if they send considerable naval forces in trying to stop us they risk cumulative attrition; if they do not, they suffer a worsening of positional strategy. The need for constantly having to make such great decisions tends to indecision, hesitancy, and divided counsel. The result is usually a compromise and therefore failure. Too late and too little. This is already apparent in Japanese strategy. In our successful campaign in the southern Solomons, the Japanese lost tremendous naval forces, shipping, and men. Yet the result was failure because the Japanese never were daring enough to send great forces sufficient for the task instead of considerable driblets. This would have been easy because of the nearness of the Solomons to the central Japanese naval base at Truk and our naval unpreparedness in the summer of 1942, only a few months after Pearl Harbor. The same defect in Japanese strategy was apparent in the Bismarck Sea disaster where at least 15,000 Japanese were drowned in a convoy which decided to ride with the storm but which did not elude American heavy bombers, due to the unreliability of the weather. The blight of not enough has also characterized the Midway attacks and the Aleutian campaign of the Japs. Had the Japs risked greater forces in any of these campaigns the result might well have been different and the losses to Japan smaller. As it is, the losses were great and they had to retire in each case.

The dilemma of choice enforced upon a cornered enemy on the defensive is a very disintegrating element. In the last war the 1918 German spring offensive in the west missed by a hair because not enough troops were shifted from the east. Awaiting an invasion of Europe by England and the United States, how should Hitler distribute his forces and on

what principle, defense or offense? This problem is not calculated to result in unity or decisiveness in the German general staff.

The foregoing analysis of the prerequisite conditions of a successful sea offensive against Japan certainly does not underrate the role of air power. Indeed it is very largely fashioned by the capacities and limitations of air power. But the indicated use of air power is calculated to get the most out of the great weapon by harnessing it to sea power and land operations to form an unbeatable team. Air bases on the Asiatic continent would not likely be decisive because they would not dovetail with amphibious operations. Our fleet advancing into the Western Pacific would not get the benefit of land-based air power in encounters with the Jap fleet. Finally, air power based on the Asiatic continent could not sever the lines of communication between Japan and the conquered island empire because these lines could shift to its eastern side out of bomber range.

In sum, the sea offensive would have to be amphibious throughout; its operations to be conducted under a continuous umbrella of air power, land- and carrier-based; and its pace and direction toward Japan determined by island bases spaced within air power range.

Sea Routes to Japan

Three routes are usually identified as leading to Japan: the so-called northern route through Alaska and the Aleutians, the central route through the middle Pacific, and the southern route leading from Australia northwest to Japan. Which of these routes is best suited for the development of the sea offensive delineated in the foregoing analysis?

The northern route is now in the limelight because of the current American campaign to retake Attu and Kiska. It has also aroused great controversy, particularly since the occupation of these two islands by Japan in the summer of 1942. If Japan considers these islands worth the loss of considerable shipping, both naval and merchant, these islands must be of great importance. So runs the argument. Of course we cannot adopt uncritically the strategic considerations of the enemy whatever they may be. We must be guided by our own independent judgment. The Aleutians may have an importance as meteorological stations, for weather conditions seem to move out of the Bering Sea both east and west. Thus it is possible in the Aleutians to predict weather conditions both in Japan and on the West Coast of the United States. The Aleutians also jut out

toward Russian Kamchatka, thus serving as a bridge, in addition to Alaska, between the United States and Siberia. Their possession would thus serve as a lookout station for Japan in case of war with Russia and a possible springboard to Alaska to sever contact between the United States and Siberia. The latter is rather problematical for if Alaska was not attacked soon after our fleet was put out of commission at Pearl Harbor, it is difficult to see how Japan could hope for success in such an enterprise in the future, particularly since we built the Alcan road connecting continental United States and Alaska. Attu and Kiska could possibly be useful to Japan as submarine bases against our shipping to Alaska, but could not be equally useful in that respect to us, for Japanese shipping is not to the north of Japan but southward from Japan.

Whatever defensive value the Aleutians may have, their purely offensive usefulness is severely circumscribed. They could not serve as a major base for the bombing of Japan into submission. The distance between Attu at the westernmost edge of the Aleutians, and Paramushiru, the northern naval base of Japan, is about 800 miles, but the distance from Attu to Tokyo is about 2000 miles, well beyond the effective bombing range even for present-day heavy bombers. The northern route although hailed as the shortest route is hardly short enough for strategic purposes. More important, weather and terrain rule out the Aleutians as a center of air power. General Mitchell was quite correct in attributing to Alaska supreme importance in the age of air power, but that will occur only when air power shall have conquered its greatest enemy—weather. Of all the battlefronts of this global war, the Aleutians are the least suitable for the utilization of air power. The terrain is barren rock protruding from a submarine mountain chain. Though about a year in possession, the Japs have not managed to construct useable airfields on Attu and Kiska. Perpetual fog, almost interminable rain, snowstorms, ice, and even unreliable functioning of the radio beam, all combine to make the Aleutians an aviator's nightmare. Clear days suitable for flying are in the very low numbers. Only on rare occasions could bombing expeditions be undertaken against Japan. Certainly these are not the conditions for a strategic application of air power, whose first prerequisite is the uninterrupted capacity for bombing. Nor are these conditions suitable for amphibious or naval operations in those regions. There are no islands on the way which can serve as good naval bases nor could very effective naval opera-

tions on a large scale be conducted there because of the meteorological and terrestrial conditions described. The American navy operating against the Japanese in the north would be deprived for most of the time of the services of the carrier-based air power. Should we undertake major naval and amphibious action against Japan, without benefit of air power, the one weapon in which we can surpass Japan in both quantity and quality as in no other instrument of war? The northern route would require us to do just that. That alone is sufficient to eliminate that route from consideration. The Aleutians are suitable perhaps as subsidiary bases, but certainly not as chief bases for the defeat of Japan.

The central Pacific route leads from Hawaii through Midway, Wake, the Marshall, Gilbert, and Caroline Islands, Marcus and Guam to Japan. When Congress refused to fortify Guam we lost hold on any island capable of development into a great base of operation on that line and the route became completely unsuited for development of an Allied sea offensive, at least in its initial stages. Japanese illegal fortifications and naval and air bases in the Marshall and Caroline groups have drawn a screen across that approach to Japan which would have been hazardous for our fleet to penetrate because of the possibility of surprise from many quarters, naval and air. At least in the initial stages our fleet would have been without land-based air protection because of the spacing of the islands which are adaptable for air naval bases. In the incipient stages our offensive would have to have its origin elsewhere.

And logic and the course of events assigned the Allied offensive route to Japan from Australia and the South Pacific generally. The integrity of the United Nations made it impossible to write off Australia and New Zealand without a defense. Therefore it was necessary to concentrate troops in that area if for no other purpose than defense. But Australia and New Zealand have great strategic value as well. For one, in our hands, they prevented Japanese and German contact around Cape Horn. It should be remembered that Argentina lying astride this route is the only South American country which has not severed relations with the Axis. Australia and New Zealand in our hands have served the same purpose as the Middle East in our hands—prevented juncture of the European and the Asiatic parts of the Axis. Likewise, Australia and New Zealand in Japanese hands would have been a springboard for an attack on the West Coast of South America in the same way that Dakar in Nazi possession

was a menace to Brazil. South America would have been indefensible against a synchronization of both attacks. The successful North African campaign and the defense of Australia and New Zealand have in this respect served the same purpose. The strategy of individual campaigns should not be evaluated in local focus but in a global framework.

But the main value of the South Pacific lies in its offensive possibilities. Australia, New Zealand, and the surrounding islands furnish us with the greatest possible naval, air, and land bases, about 3000 miles from Japan. This is a curious fact: although the route to Japan from the United States through the South Pacific is the longest route from the standpoint of shipping because it is V-shaped, the distance remaining to be conquered is not the longest. Great concentrations of military power are possible in the South Pacific and there is a considerable hinterland of an industrial system and a high grade reservoir of fighting manpower. As a home base it is second only to the continental United States in the maritime Pacific.

Even so, the chief offensive value of the South Pacific is that the area from there to Japan is virtually ideal for the execution of the amphibious offensive. The area abounds in numerous islands well suited for naval and air bases and so spaced as to be within not only bomber but fighter range of each other. Some of these are Japanese strongholds and will have to be taken, but other bases might be built on some of those islands where the Japs are not entrenched. Our air power working out of such bases could by reason of its superiority neutralize the efficacy of Japanese bases in the vicinity, thus avoiding the necessity of recapturing all of the Japanese-held islands. If necessary our offensive could turn to the east, to Java, Borneo, Sumatra, Celebes, and the other East Indies though no such course is contemplated. The direction of the offensive is northwestward. The critical objective will be the Jap-held base at Rabaul on New Britain. The approach could be through one or both of these routes, from the southern Solomons through the middle and northern Solomons and through Lae and Salamaua on New Guinea.

Once Rabaul is taken the beginning of the end will have arrived. For the following reasons: the Marshall and Gilbert Islands will be outflanked and our air power and surface navies will render them virtually untenable for Japan. With them out of the way, most of our supplies will proceed directly to our forward positions, rather than to Australia, thus shortening our lines of communication. Likewise the Caroline group

with the great naval base at Truk will be within reach of our land- and carrier-based aviation. Then we might be in an advantageous position to make an amphibious assault on Truk to reduce it and convert it for a base for ourselves in further attacks on island bases, including the Marianos and Guam, the Bonin group, and Marcus to the southeast of Japan preparatory for a final assault on Japan proper. An alternative strategy after the capture of Rabaul which might be undertaken alone or in conjunction with the first would be to turn to the northwest toward the Philippines and Yap and make the Philippines the final assault base against Japan proper. In order to do so it will be sufficient to apply air power chiefly to make Truk untenable to the Jap fleet. Truk would thus cease to be a menace on our flank even if we do not occupy it. Therein is the difference between a land fortification and a sea or air base. The former is in itself an obstacle which can be removed only by destruction. But a navy or air base is rendered useless as soon as it can no longer serve or contain forces. Truk will then become just another island.

Making the Philippines the cornerstone of the final assault on Japan is not predicated on any sentimental reasons connected with MacArthur's odyssey. It has the best of strategic considerations. The Philippines are located in the very center of Japan's ill-gotten loot. They are astride its lines of communication. Moreover, they are within easy bombing range of the industrial and military heart of Japan, if we include the nearby island base of Formosa. So also are the sea communications between Japan and the East Indies. Likewise, is most of the coast of China occupied by Japan. The sea-borne traffic of Japan will be completely interrupted by air power, surface navies, and submarines based on the Philippines. At best only part of this could be shifted to land transportation, but even that will not be immune to air attack from the Philippines. If then it is decided that help to China cannot be postponed, landing operations could be made on the China coast. The Philippines will furnish us at least part of the trained manpower for such enterprises or for landings in Japan proper. Once the lines of communication are severed between Japan and its island empire, Japan's power of resistance is gone, for its wherewithal has disappeared. Hence the retaking of the Philippines renders the reconquest of the various islands to the south unnecessary and the Jap troops located there cannot even be used for a last ditch defense of Japan. Loss of sea communications prevents retreat. It is not unlikely that faced with

such a hopeless situation Japan might surrender. But if not, then air power based on the Philippines and Formosa would proceed to soften up Japan for an invasion and serve as an irremovable umbrella to an invading force which could not be denied under such conditions. Such is the strategic importace of the Philippines.

The time consumed in this offensive need not be measured by the length of the campaign in the southern Solomons, for the delay there was occasioned by lack of sea and air support which made it impossible frequently to reinforce and supply the land forces. These limiting factors should disappear.

Success of these enterprises is predicated upon one paramount assumption which we are entitled to make: that we can soon have absolute air superiority at the various stages outlined. Advocacy of the southern route is that it best utilizes such supremacy. To counteract this strategy Japan may invade successfully the westerly part of Australia. This part is mostly desert land and of no importance. The vital part of Australia is the eastern section. Such a move would be only diversionary and should not deflect us from our main goal—the northwesterly advance. If Japan hopes to stop us it must stand athwart this advance. At every step of this amphibious offensive Japan's navy will have to fight or retreat and surrender a base from which we can make further progress while the need for the Japanese navy to fight will not be avoided but only postponed and from a worsened position. Such a Japanese maneuver may be termed appeasement strategy with the customary result. But when the Japanese navy decides to risk an all-out fight it will be under conditions chosen by us because at every stage of this campaign Japan's navy will have to engage our navy when the latter is under the protection of a superior land- and carrier-based air power. Whether through the gradual attrition of amphibious power such as Japan sustained at Guadalcanal or by some spectacular naval paroxysm —no matter which may be the choice of the Japanese high command—the result will be the same: defeat and annihilation of Japan's sea power and therefore her power of resistance.

The Progressive Offensive—How Soon?

There remains for consideration the problem of the time for the undertaking of the grand offensive against Japan. It would be less than illuminating to dismiss the question with the oversimplification that we

shall attack when we are ready. Indeed, some of the chief controversies concerning the conduct of the war have revolved around this issue.

Chiefly because of our central geographical position between Japan and Germany, because of our two-front war and our being the arsenal of the democracies, grasping the initiative by the United Nations has placed upon the United States the responsibility for determining the priorities of the Atlantic and the Pacific battlefronts in the global war.

The decision of Roosevelt and Churchill to concentrate first upon Hitler is surely wise. Under any circumstances, however, the postponement of the offensive against Japan is not the result of a choice of alternatives but has been forced upon us by the type of warfare peculiar to the Pacific. If the thesis is correct that the road to Tokyo leads through American control of the Pacific by the modern complex of surface navies, submarine fleets, land- and carrier-based aircraft, and amphibious land troops, then an all-out offensive against Japan is determined by the rate of our acquisition of such a force.

In any case, the impact of air power has revolutionized the complex of sea power. Until we get modern battleships built to function in our air age and until we acquire a sufficient number of aircraft carriers the all-out naval and amphibious offensive necessary to beat Japan is out of the question. This, of course, does not mean that the offensive must be postponed until the last ship of the two-ocean navy is completed, but it does mean that the offensive must await the acquisition of preponderant naval power.

Once that point is reached the offensive against Japan may be launched irrespective of the stage of the campaign against Hitler. Large numbers of American troops will not be required in the amphibious operations in the Pacific, and it is land troops which make the greatest demand on shipping. Then again, bombers are able to negotiate transoceanic flights through intervening refueling bases. Even fighter planes by means of extra detachable gas tanks are beginning to make such trips. Since heavy fleet units are unsuited for convoy duty, the Atlantic submarine campaign will not be a drain on the striking power of the American navy which can be devoted to the Pacific. When that striking power becomes equal to its task the offensive against Japan will not need to await the defeat of Hitler. Concurrent or even simultaneous campaigns in both the Pacific and the Atlantic will then be possible.

Until the time arrives for the all-out offensive, are we to expect the Pacific war to remain static? Decidedly not.

The strategy of the task force in the peculiarly suitable Pacific situation in this day and age of air power and wireless communication renders it possible for us to take the initiative. The fear of having a superior navy destroyed bit by bit when divided up in small forces has haunted the councils of strategy boards and has frequently been spilled over into public debate. In the relatively narrow spaces of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, before the advent of wireless communication and of air power, that fear had basis in fact. But in the vast reaches of the Pacific the chances of a concentrated fleet proceeding to destroy one section after another of the opposing fleet is perhaps less than conjectural. Air power is ambivalent in this respect. While its range and speed may surprise a naval force at sea, the carrier-based aircraft of a task force should be able to scout the vicinity and give warning of the approach of a superior force. Likewise, wireless communication should enable the broadcasting of the whereabouts of opposing concentrations of naval forces. At the worst the destruction of only one task force is risked, for in that case concentration of the remainder can be expeditiously effected. It is the traditional mobility of naval power which has enabled it to remain under cover until the very hour of a planned engagement. It is in relative naval dispersal, capable of conversion into prompt concentration, that safety, not danger, lies in the Pacific.

It is a matter of satisfaction that the American naval command in the Pacific cannot be accused of excessive caution. Admiral Halsey's raid on Makin in the Marshall group took place in the wake of the Pearl Harbor disaster. Others have followed and of many no announcements have apparently been made thus far.

Indicative of the same aggressive spirit of our commanders are the amphibious operations on the Solomons and New Guinea undertaken successfully at a time when we smarted under inferiority in numbers both in men and ships. Not only on land, in the air, but in the naval battles in the Coral Sea, on October 26, and November 13-15, 1942 off Guadalcanal, have we emerged victorious against numerical odds. It is such superiority in the quality of men, ships, planes, and munitions that argues well for our continuance of the limited-objectives offensive we have so auspiciously undertaken. It is these limited objectives which will furnish us with the

indispensable bases from which Japan will ultimately be subdued. As our strength grows by industrial accretion and that of Japan is withered away by attrition, our strategy passes gradually from an active defense at Midway to a limited offensive in the Solomons, and so on until imperceptibly it will shade over into the crescendo of that all-out offensive which will bring disaster to Japan. We should not expect an immediately apparent definite line of demarcation between the various stages of our war against Japan. What has been described may be referred to as the progressive offensive and is particularly suited to the amphibious operations which encompass the technique of total warfare against Japan.

WE NOTE . . .

LOOK TO THE MOTIVE

As we go to press, the nation has just passed through its most turbulent week of the war on the home front. Not since the Civil War have domestic tempers run so high in so many places at once. To begin with, there were the thinly disguised race troubles in Los Angeles, the so-called "zoot-suit riots." Then in the East the coal miners struck "for the third time." For this "illness" Congress offered one of the strangest nostrums in a strange career, the Smith-Connally bill. And as if this were not enough, on June 18 (which might well be known as "Black Friday") Congress abolished the National Resources Planning Board, and the House of Representatives, in a crescendo of hate and vindictiveness voted to destroy the domestic branch of O.W.I.; to abolish grade labeling and subsidies from the O.P.A.; and to make eligible for price price policy jobs in O.P.A. only those men who have had five years experience in business. Then as a climax came the race troubles in Detroit, in which 28 were killed, almost all Negroes.

These were some of the week's highlights. In the midst of such an unsavory stew, such events as the strike of 2700 foremen in a Detroit war plant, and the statement of the leading spokesman for the nation's most respectable organization of retailers that the only possible regulator of price is an adequate supply of goods (sic!) merely seemed like some kind of freakish froth.

Is there any pattern here? Regional events undoubtedly have regional causes. But at least two closely related generalizations may be made as to the reasons for our unprecedented national turmoil: 1) many Americans, including those in high places, have not yet made up their minds to face the issues and consequences of this particular war; 2) many of us are still suckers for isolationism, reaction, and that Nazi specialty—divisive rumor and propaganda.

John L. Lewis has been held up to the public as the great obstructionist of the American war effort. There is no gainsaying his preparation for that role. But for every Lewis there are a dozen reactionaries who should be sharing the spotlight with him. It is our contention that these gentlemen—some of them simply uninterested in the war, others actively opposed to its necessities, and still others plainly acting as fifth columnists—should be brought out from behind their barricades.

Why have certain newspapers repeatedly used the word "gangs" to describe Mexicans and other colored "zoot-suited" minorities in their headlines? Why has false rumor flown so rapidly and so straight to its mark in Los Angeles, Detroit, and elsewhere? What is the Ku Klux Klan doing in the Detroit area? Why have both Berlin and Tokyo radios been able to make so much of racial and industrial turmoil? If these questions and others were answered fully, there might be sensations which would put John L. Lewis in the shade.

The Justice Department at the least should look into the causes of specific racial and industrial troubles. And if

the F.B.I. has already investigated, how about some prosecutions? If turbulence continues to occur, the Smith-Connally bill will not be a patch on the sort of thing we can expect from this Congress. We need not only to learn the truth, but we must fend off the reactionary drive which thrives on bringing "law and order out of chaos." That kind of "order" has happened elsewhere, and it could, given its opportunity, happen here. P. B.

MOULTON ECONOMICS

Our biggest postwar problem is frequently lost sight of in some of the more blatant hullabaloo about the war and the peace. More deeply founded than the struggle over whether we shall choose isolation or internationalism as our foreign policy is this question: Can we, after we stop turning out the implements of war, use our technology to maintain full employment? The answer to this question will underlie both our confidence and our ability to do a sound job of making the peace.

Our industrial machine is enormously productive if we allow it to produce to capacity. The Federal Reserve Board Index of industrial production is currently indicating a physical volume of output twice that of the average for 1935-39. Can we sustain this volume of production after we have disposed of Hitler, Tojo, and their totalitarian menace to the world? There are two ways in which full employment and complete utilization of our technology can be attained. One is by a collective setup on the Russian model; the other is through fiscal policy. After Stalingrad no intelligent person can assert that collectivism is inefficient. Nevertheless, we must dismiss it as a solution to our postwar problem of unemployment because we are institutionally unequipped to accept it. Hence the only hope lies in intelligent use of the government's fiscal power.

Full employment by a fiscal policy means the use of taxation, borrowing, and spending to provide purchasing power sufficient to keep the machines running. The explicit recognition of this function of government is fairly new. The Swedes used it long before Keynes made the subject more or less understandable in his book, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money*. In the United States it is associated with the name of Alvin Hansen, whose book *Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles* and whose numerous articles have had a wide and significant influence.

Unfortunately, however, the Keynes-Hansen use of fiscal policy is still badly understood in this country. Hence it is with double dissatisfaction that we greet a new pamphlet on the subject, *The New Philosophy of Public Debt*, published by the Brookings Institution. Mr. Moulton, the author, follows his usual line of anti-progressivism, in misinterpreting the essential character of Hansen's ideas.

It is worth noting that Mr. Moulton's effort to make his own economics a futile science has always been apparent. Mr. Adolph Berle, Jr., addressing an audience at the Brookings Institution in 1940 pointed out that certain articles written by Mr. Moulton as early as 1918 had been read by Swedish economists and had considerably influenced fiscal policy in that country. Germany in turn was influenced by Sweden and under the direction of Hjalmar Schacht adopted a fiscal

policy which made the machinery of production operate for the benefit of an aggressive military state. Was the venerable gentleman who presides over the Brookings Institution gratified to be shown that his ideas could have any practical significance? He was horrified. Mr. Berle, says Moulton, "has here missed the fact of crucial significance."

The present pamphlet pushes a little further along its way the tradition of "glorious futility" which has been such a characteristic feature of the research studies of this highly respected and respectable Institution. We all remember the much publicized four-volume study of some eight or nine years ago. The only suggestion of policy that Mr. Moulton drew from that monumental study was that businessmen should lower prices. He did not even advocate the enforcement of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. After all, suggestion might have brought positive action!

The New Philosophy of Public Debt repeats the hoary clichés about the public debt but dresses them up in the language of the objective-minded scientist. At a time when enlightenment on the subject of fiscal policy is paramount it is tragic that an eminent economist should engage in obfuscation. For the issue is, how shall we maintain full employment and keep the machines running when the war is over? Whatever the faults of Mr. Hansen's fiscal policy at least he has faced the issue squarely and honestly. Mr. Moulton is burying his head in the sand and with his feet kicking dust in the eyes of people who might otherwise see what is going on.

v. c.

THE AMERICAN SOLDIER IS NO JOE PALOOKA—TOO BAD

It is perhaps as bad taste for a magazine as for an individual to say, "I told you so." But it's fun anyway. More than a year ago, in the first two issues for 1942, this section made a plea for a politically educated American army and navy. Of course, there was nothing original about such a plea. It seemed to many just good clean common sense to expect that the men who fight for "democracy" ought to know what all the shootin's for. But they didn't then—and they don't now.

Proof of this has been piling up, particularly in a series of excellent articles in recent weeks by Drew Middleton and Hanson Baldwin of *The New York Times*—that not exactly subversive institution. It appears that our soldiers fighting in Africa as well as those in the camps are much more interested in the funnies than in political argument; that they use the radio for swing music but never for news, much less for commentaries; that they are complacent, incredibly naïve about international affairs, and utterly allergic to any "song of social significance." They want to fight the Japs and not the Germans—"we got nothin' against the Germans"—and many of them think the only aim of the Tunisian campaign was to drive the Axis out of Africa—and then go home. All this from the *Times*, although some of it (the most serious part) creeps out only between the lines.

Now, these boys are not unique. They are a cross-section of the American public, and they represent the illiteracy of the American citizen. But as soldiers, they are now an arm of the American government, of a government whose leaders talk about the

Four Freedoms and the People's Revolution. How come the soldiers don't know about these? Is the Army organization standing in the way? Or does the administration fail to realize (but how can it?) that political education is *the* basic training for all fighting men who are to become more than a band of mercenaries.

Were the other armed forces of the world the same as the American, this political naïveté wouldn't be worth a comment. But American illiteracy stands out—according to the *Times*—as spectacularly as an American skyline or a Hollywood set. The political self-consciousness of the Axis troops is, of course, an axiom; but the same is true of the forces of the United Nations (minus the U.S.A.): the Russians and Chinese have been masters all along at making sure that their armies know what they are dying for, and the British Army Bureau of Current Affairs has long since made its men both news-conscious and discussion-conscious. Among their friends and allies in Tunisia, the American soldier (once more, the *Times*) was about as aware of the stakes of battle as a Senegalese knife-wielder (and even he probably knew about De Gaulle) . . . .

This political illiteracy is not something that can be smiled upon indulgently, as upon the literary backwardness of an all-American tackle. For there are going to be 10,000,000 potential new American Legionnaires after this war—and that should be a headache not only to hotelkeepers in convention cities. Without an understanding of what the war is about—above all, without a knowledge that it is part of a revolution that must be directed one way or the other—this Praetorian Guard will do one of two things: it will return to an isolationism that will be belligerent only toward domestic progressives, a reactionary isolationism that already is being anticipated by a rash of incredibly vicious advertising persuading the boys over there that they want to come back to a country "just the way they left it"—no tinkering allowed; or it will plan to run the world for an American Century. (At that, isolationism might not be so bad . . . .)

A year ago something might still have been done about it. But it's pretty late now. (One of the possibly less gloomy signs is that the Army Basic Specialized Training Program contingents that are just now being returned to a number of liberal arts colleges for further education follow a curriculum that includes an American History course, one, morover, whose suggested outline is definitely liberal and encouraging.) A situation can without dramatics be called desperate when what should be the world's best fighting hope for a genuinely democratic future—the American army and navy—turns out to be politically ignorant, doctrinally confused, unsure of itself, and interested in almost anything but what it's really fighting for. The price of political ignorance—as of all other kinds—is tyranny.

G. R. G.

BUY AN APPLE, MISTER?

Plenty of discussion is going on about America's economy after the war, but much of it has a quality of gutlessness and fatalism that doesn't fit a nation of pioneers currently praising the Lord and passing the ammunition. We are

told, in syndicated newspaper features, that twenty-four million demobilized soldiers and war workers, plus three or four million women staying in industry, plus a couple of million youngsters newly arrived at working age means a probable army of thirty million unemployed. Tsk, tsk, ain't it awful? What a lot of public works we'll need!

It is high time we decided to hold a few twentieth-century truths to be self-evident. If we can produce a hundred and fifty billion dollars worth of stuff a year and blow most of it to hell in the war we can produce as much or more of the things people need in peace. If we can utilize the skill and energy of all our people for destruction we can keep on utilizing it for life after the shooting stops. Granted that we can't do these things without conflict, muddling, trial and error, and political struggle, nevertheless they *can* be done. Ways and means are important but the problem is primarily one of will and creative imagination.

There is altogether too much of a national tendency to putter around in the past in order to decide what we can do with the future. It isn't so all-fired essential to consult charts, graphs, and the entrails of sacrificial bureaucrats before deciding how many Americans may be allowed to earn decent livings in an age of unparalleled productivity.

Of a different order from the obfuscations of experts and the timidities of the amateurs is the propaganda line of the reactionaries to whom "planning" is a fighting word. Many of these zanies have taken to cover the last few years, or they have abandoned the frontal attack for the harrying of communications lines and other devious strategies. But there are those who have been running the same chunk of gristle through the meat grinder for lo these many years. For pure sustained unreality we give you Mr. Ralph Robey, who currently writes a column for *Newsweek*.

Mr. Robey is discussing the National Resources Planning Board's Report:

> But such a system as that, you will say, is nothing but economic Fascism. Of course it is. That is what a planned economy means, and in the final analysis it is the only thing it can mean. And if the government undertakes to guarantee full employment, security, freedom from want, and all the rest of it, by means of a spending program that is exactly where we are going to end up because there is no other place where we can end up. . . . It is much to be hoped, therefore, that the Senate will follow the lead of the House in refusing to appropriate the necessary funds for a continuation of this organization. We have no need for such blueprints for postwar bureaucratic utopias.

Do Mr. Robey and his allies and followers realize what they are saying? They are telling the American people that they have no right to shape their own destiny. And by attacking all attempts at national planning, they are implying that nothing of the sort is necessary—that they have the situation well in hand and there will be nothing to worry about as long as the government keeps out of their hair. Do they really want to accept the responsibility that goes with such an assumption of righteous power? Maybe all demobilized soldiers and war workers should be supplied with a directory of the N.A.M. members, their town and country residences, and instructions somewhat as follows: "These are the boys who are going to fix everything up in the True American Way. If you

can't find a job, pack up your traps and move in on the one nearest you. Everything will be on the house."

F. C.

CONTRIBUTORS

J. RAYMOND WALSH, who deals in this issue with the all-important topic of how we can further action on the N. R. P. B. Report, is at present Director of the Department of Education and Research for the C.I.O. Previous to taking that position, he taught economics at Harvard University, at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, and at Williams College. He is the author of *C. I. O.: Industrial Unionism in Action.*

Since J. M. Keynes shook up economic theory in his significant book, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money,* no one (not even Lord Keynes) has had the temerity to develop a new theory of value to replace the one upon which classical economics has rested for so long. This is the job which C. E. AYRES has now tackled in his "Twilight of the Price System," a sequel to "Technology and Progress," which was published in the Spring issue.

TALBOT HAMLIN has both practical and theoretical knowledge of the problems he writes about in "A Public Opinion for Planning." He is a member of the City Planning and Zoning Committee of the Citizens' Housing Council of New York City and since 1934 he has been Librarian and Lecturer in the Theory of Architecture at the Avery School of Architecture, Columbia University. He is a frequent contributor to magazines and has written a number of books, of which one of the most praised is *Architecture Through the Ages* (1940).

BERTRAM D. WOLFE is acquainted with the social structure, history, and general culture of Spain and Latin America as well as with the fiction of which he writes. He lived in Mexico for a number of years and two of his books were written in Spanish. He is a frequent reviewer for *The New York Herald-Tribune, The Chicago Sun, The Nation, The New Republic,* and is now at work on a triple biography of Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin to be called *Three Who Made a Revolution.*

IRWIN Ross has been until recently the vigorous young editor of *New Threshold.* His articles on youth, politics, and other topics have fre-

quently appeared in such magazines as *Harper's, The New Republic,* and *Common Sense.* He is now on active duty in the Signal Corps.

RICHARD N. CURRENT, who writes of John C. Calhoun, spent four of his years in teaching at the Maryland State Teachers College, which is below Mason and Dixon's line. He has taught in several branches of the social sciences and is at present a member of the faculty at Hamilton College. He is the author of *Old Thad Stevens, a Story of Ambition* (1942).

For CHARLES I. GLICKSBERG this is the second appearance in the pages of the REVIEW, "The Decline of Literary Marxism" appearing in the Winter (1941) issue. His work on literary and other subjects appears frequently in American magazines. He has published *Walt Whitman and the Civil War.*

MELVIN RADER is well equipped to give philosophical chapter and verse for all aspects of the conflict between democracy and fascism. His "New Wine and Old Bottles" appeared in the Summer (1941) issue, and he is the author of *No Compromise* (1939), a study of the ideological aspects of the fascist-democratic struggle. He is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Washington, and is at work on a book tentatively to be called *Human Values in Crisis and Reconstruction.*

LAWRENCE and SYLVIA MARTIN, who write of Nicaragua and its "canal," are at present in Mexico where he is representing *The Chicago Times* on a roving assignment and she is finishing a novel. Mr. Martin was editor of the magazine *Ken.*

Since graduating from Antioch College in 1937, DAVID DEMPSEY has worked successively in a variety of jobs for The American Civil Liberties Union, Institute for Propaganda Analysis, *Common Ground,* and *The Reader's Digest.* He has published articles in *Harper's, Common Sense,* and *The New Republic.* At present he is waiting to be inducted into the Marine Corps as a combat correspondent.

JOSEPH ROSENFARB's "Strategy in the Pacific War" is the logical sequel to his "Strategy of an Allied Offensive," which appeared in the Winter (1942) issue. Strategy is an avocation, for in everyday life he is a member of the legal staff of the National Labor Relations Board.